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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes the life and writing of inventor and scientist Alan Turing in
order to define and theorize chiasmic relations between bodies and texts. Chiasmic
rhetoric, as I develop throughout the dissertation, is the dynamic processes between
materials and discourses that interact to construct powerful rhetorical effect, shape
bodies, and also compose new knowledges. Throughout the dissertation, I develop
chiasmic rhetoric as intersecting bodies and discourse, dynamic and productive, and
potentially destabilizing.
Turing is an unusual figure for research on bodily rhetoric and embodied
knowledge. He is often associated with disembodied knowledge and as his inventions are
said to move intelligence towards greater abstraction and away from human bodies.
However, this dissertation exposes the many ways that bodies are active in shaping and
producing knowledge even within Turing’s scientific and technical writing. I identify
how, in every text that Turing produces, chiasmic interactions between bodies and texts
actively compose Turing’s scientific knowledge and technical innovations towards digital
computation and artificial intelligence. His knowledge, thus, is not composed out of
abstract logic, or neutral technological advances. Rather, his knowledge and invention are
composed and in through discourses and embodied experiences. Given that bodies and
discourses are also composed within social and political power dynamics, then the
political, social, and personal embodied experiences that compose Turing’s life and his
embodiment also compose his texts, rhetoric, inventions, and science.
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In Chapter 1, I introduce Alan Turing and the significance of my research for the
fields of rhetoric of science and technology, body studies, and also for our understanding
of Alan Turing’s technical writing. In Chapter Two, I first show that antithesis has been
the primary figure representing the dichotomy between bodies and knowledge. However,
I also draw from feminist science studies and a style analysis of Turing’s essay “Nature
of Spirit” to demonstrate that a strong antithesis between bodies and mind can never be
maintained: bodies can never be totally excluded and bodily presence is rhetorically
significant. In Chapter Three, I define how bodies are always already connected with
discourse: the two can never be separated. In Turing’s article “On Computable Numbers
with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem,” the intersection between bodies and
texts is significant in the way that Turing draws from his embodied experience
performing calculation in order to invent the Turing Machine, which became an
important theoretical foundation for digital computation.
In Chapter Four, I argue that the chiasmic relation between bodies and texts is
dynamic and productive. The dynamic chiasmus in Turing’s article “Intelligent
Machinery” reveals the ways that Turing’s embodiment as a homosexual man in England
in the 20th century informs his early proposals for how to develop artificial intelligence.
In particular, the very same disciplining—through intervention and a focus on the body—
that compose Turing’s embodied experiences as a subject of sexuality and
governmentality also composes Turing’s proposal for constructing intelligence in
machines. In Chapter 5, I posit that Turing rhetorically constructs a disruptive notion of
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machine intelligence that is embodied, feminine, and performative or imitative. This
finding is of particular importance in the field of science and technology, which is
predominantly known for excluding women as well as qualities associated with
femininity. Turing disrupts traditional expectations in technical writing by feminizing the
machine. His article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” disrupts traditional
definitions of intelligence by making femininity, fallibility, and embodiment central
components that qualify a machine as an intelligent being. In Chapter 6, I conclude by
demonstrating the importance of chiasmic relations between bodies and texts for
technical writing broadly, including the teaching of technical writing. Then I end by
proposing a pedagogy of care and disorientation that are attuned to the complex
embodiment of students interacting with texts in our composition classrooms.
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CHIASMUS 1:
CHIASMIC RHETORIC

“Write yourself. Your body must be heard.” Cixous
“Language has all the suppleness of human flesh, and something of its warmth.” Quinn

In this dissertation, I analyze the interactions among the life and the writings of
Alan Turing, who has been celebrated as a father of computer science, honored as a
British war hero for his work as a cryptologist in WWII, and is one of the many victims
of British laws criminalizing homosexuality. This research focuses on the intersections
and interactions between the body of the scientist and the writing of science. In order to
investigate these intersections and interactions, I demonstrate that the rhetorical figure
chiasmus—which is significant in rhetorical theory, literary theory, and gender theory—
is a productive heuristic for analyzing the relations between bodies of flesh and bodies of
texts. Chiasmus is a rhetorical figure that connects two phrases so that the phrases are
balanced and at the same time the phrases can be dissimilar or even antithetical. For
example, Isaac Newton illustrates his law of motion: “if you press a stone with your
finger, the finger is also pressed by the stone.” For theorists of gender and bodies,
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chiasmus also figures relations between bodies and discourses that are dynamic and coconstructing. As I develop and explore increasingly complex notions of chiasmus; so too,
the relations between bodies and discourse become increasingly complex.
Chiasmic rhetoric, as I develop it from both rhetorical theory and feminist theory,
is composed of dynamic processes between materials and discourses that interact to
construct powerful rhetorical effect, shape bodies, and also compose new knowledges. I
define chiasmic rhetoric as the rhetorical effects of the relations between bodies and
discourse. And these chiasmic rhetorical effects aid in constituting knowledge.
Throughout the dissertation, I develop chiasmic rhetoric as 1) intersecting (bodies and
discourse) 2) dynamic, which is to say productive, 3) potentially destabilizing. I'll
develop each of these movements of chiasmic rhetoric in chapters 3, 4, and 5. This
dissertation develops a theory of chiasmic rhetoric by drawing upon definitions of bodies
in relation to discourse posited by gender theorists, especially Judith Butler, Elizabeth
Grosz, and Karen Barad. These feminist theorists present definitions of bodies that
intersect with discourse in order to compose bodies as well as compose knowledge. In
this definition, discourse and bodies are intersecting and interacting, yet also diverging
from or exceeding each other. Each singular body is the product of the unique
interactions and relations between unique material bodies and shared but complex
linguistic construction. Through the interactions between language and bodies, chiasmic
rhetoric produces powerful, materially embedded rhetorical appeals. In order to develop a
notion of chiasmic rhetoric, I posit that rhetoric, especially rhetoric of science, can benefit
from more complex theories of bodies, especially theories grounded in feminist and
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gender theory, that make visible the significance of embodiment for knowledge
production.
In this way, too, chiasmic rhetoric will move to show how the gap between bodies
and knowledge, first opened by Plato, can be moved ever closer towards closure.
Through this dissertation, I demonstrate that the chiasmic rhetoric of Alan Turing’s
particular embodied experiences contributes toward the process of his inventive and
insightful scientific and technical work. At the same time, his education, research, and
disciplinary training also function as technologies of the body that co-construct Turing’s
embodied experiences.
Regarding our knowledge of bodies in rhetoric, this dissertation contributes to the
fields of rhetoric and composition, especially in technical and scientific writing and
rhetoric, by analyzing how a body’s particularity and uniqueness shape the composition
and the content of text and technical knowledge. This project demonstrates how Alan
Turing’s bodily particularity and uniqueness shape the composition and content of his
texts that contribute towards the development of digital computation. By interpreting the
chiasmic relations between bodies and rhetoric, we can see not just what we know, but
also how we know through rhetorical forms.
I am glad to be placing the rhetorical forms at the center of this project. Often,
when scholars of rhetoric turn towards bodies, ontology, or epistemology, they also move
away from the nuts and bolts of rhetoric and language—like structure, rhetorical forms,
and style. The performative critique of Luce Irigaray demonstrates that male philosophers
have not only composed arguments that exclude women, but that these men have also

3

performed masculine embodiment in the form, style, and syntax of their compositions. I
show that by turning towards bodies in rhetoric we can also turn towards the material or
formal aspects of rhetoric and language. Both the form of bodies and the form of
language actively contribute to the meaning and knowledge we construct.
In addition, this project contributes toward current scholarship on the rhetoric of
science and technology. For over 20 years, rhetoric of science scholars have
demonstrated the ways that scientific discourse as well as scientific facts are embedded in
and produced through rhetoric (Bazerman, Myers, Campbell, Fahnestock). Gross makes a
stronger claim that rhetoric is constitutive of scientific knowledge (Rhetoric of Science;
cf. Starring the Text). Marcello Pera also makes this argument but extends the role of
rhetoric into the very methods and logic of scientific reasoning and discovery. Although
Gross recently argued for a more moderate version of this claim (Starring the Text), the
field and also science studies more broadly have continually shown how our scientific
knowledges are inseparable from the words, figures, forms, and strategies of composing
science in discourse (Taylor). This dissertation focuses on the deep, meaningful relations
between Turing’s embodiment and the construction and composition of his scientific and
technical knowledge. This contribution demonstrates that all knowledge is constructed by
particular bodies in particular contexts, and that the political, social, economic, gendered,
raced, and sexualized particularities of those bodies also form the knowledge. My
inclusion of bodies into the rhetoric of science is significant because these bodies coconstruct powerful rhetoric and new knowledge, and with the exception of feminist
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science studies, studies of the rhetoric of science and technology have not considered
embodiment as a active or productive aspect of scientific and technical discourses.
I am not, however, attempting to contribute to current debates and discourses on
Turing’s biography or his technical innovations. Volumes of work have already been
published that detail Turing’s biography; of those Andrew Hodges’ biography is
doubtless the most detailed, complex, and scholarly. In addition, volumes of work have
already been published on Turing’s theoretical contributions to mathematics, computer
science, and artificial intelligence. B. Jack Copeland and his frequent co-author Diane
Proudfoot are the leading experts on Turing’s writing and inventions. Certainly the
conversation that Turing initiated on artificial intelligence has also generated volumes of
theoretical scholarship. I draw on all of this scholarship, but my primary contribution
towards an understanding of Turing is informed by rhetorical theory as well as theories of
bodies and gender. My research is the first to analyze Turing’s embodied experience and
his rhetorical practices. Instead, I am contributing to scholarship on Turing by
demonstrating how his rhetoric and his embodied experiences constitute his technical
invention and scientific knowledge production.
This dissertation challenges the common understanding of Turing as a figure who
erases bodies with digital technology and artificial intelligence. Granted, some claims
that Turing disembodies knowledge are, on the surface, justified: Turing moved
computation out of the hands of men and women and into a computer, and he challenged
the humanist claim that we are the sole owners of intelligence when imagined machines
could be trained to demonstrate intelligence. In this way, he is seen as complicit in a
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broader shift toward digital technology, which is also seen as a shift away from human
bodies. In order to complicate this narrative about disembodiment and digital technology,
I analyze Turing’s writings and embodied experience as they move towards and then
beyond the invention of digital computation. My analysis demonstrates that Turing was
far from a disembodying, abstracting inventor. The opposite is true: Turing’s texts are
lively with bodies and always connected with his embodied experience. Specifically, this
research demonstrates the ways that his thinking and his writing are fully integrated and
co-constructed with his particular embodied experiences. More broadly, these arguments
contribute towards technical communication and digital technologies. This dissertation
asserts that all modes of communication and even all modes of invention are always
already embodied and material. Finally, while other scholars of science and technology
have demonstrated the ways that technology has been discursively coded as masculine
and an extension of masculine strength and drive to control (see Easlea; Cockburn;
Seidler; Grint and Gill), this research highlights a unique and disruptive moment in the
history of computing in which both engineer and technology were coded in feminine
ways. Erin Manning and Brian Massumi point towards the embodied context of
knowledge when they write, “concepts must be experienced. They are lived.” In the
figure chiasmus, bodies and discourses intersect and interact with rhetorical effect and
knowledge production even in the most abstract discourses of mathematics and digital
computation.
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Constructing Alan Turing
Constructing his Role in Computer Science
Alan Turing, born in 1912 and deceased in 1953, is a disputed ‘father’ of digital
computation. Beyond his various involvements with the community of inventors working
towards digital computation, strong defenders of Turing’s legacy stress that Turing
contributed the vision or insightfulness that paved the way for other inventors (Copeland
“Turing after the UTM”). In particular, Turing’s 1936 article “On Computable Numbers
with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem” is often cited, including by Von
Neumann, as a theoretical foundation for digital computation. Hodges, one of Turing’s
most committed advocates, praises Turing “as one of the very few who had the vision, it
fell to Alan Turing to force the British government into the modern world” (219). Agar
suggests that, although Turing did not directly work on the Colossus (the computer built a
the British Government Code and Decipher School to decrypt German messages during
WWII), Turing influenced its construction because the computer “was a symbolprocessing device that immediately recalled the imaginary machine [Turing] had
conjured up in his 19371 paper” (111-112). Leavitt also gives Turing credit for his
conceptual contribution towards computation. Leavitt seems to dismiss von Neumann’s
contributions by writing that the US Electronic Numerical Integrator And Computer
(ENIAC), fully functional by 1947, was “von Neumann’s apparent wholesale
appropriation of [Turing’s] ideas” (201). Likewise, Dyson also grants Turing the role of
the conceptual father of digital computation, while portraying von Neumann as the a
1

The date of “On Computable Numbers” is often cited incorrectly. Its original
publication date is in November 1936.
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brilliant and more business savvy opportunist. Biographers reconstruct Turing as a
genius, but because he preferred to work with numbers and machines rather than people,
he remained over looked by historians. In addition, these accounts often point to his
personal queerness as a sign of social awkwardness that made him reticent to appear in
public. While these claims about why Turing may have failed to gain recognition may
generally be valid, he did gain public attention as first a war hero and then as an inventor.
He frequently appeared on radio shows and public debates, although his performance was
often critiqued as awkward or so technical he was incomprehensible. In these accounts of
Turing’s legacy, biographers also reconstruct a stereotype of the solo genius whose
commitment to knowledge is praised while individuals like von Neumann are often
characterized as power hungry or even narcissistic. Nevertheless, Turing’s name has
never been on a major computer patent and for many years his contributions towards
computers were left unrecognized.
The debate over Turing’s contribution towards the digital computer continues:
Just this year, Thomas Haigh published, “Turing Did Not Invent the Computer” in
Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery. In order to support this
denial of Turing’s contributions, Haigh separates computer science from computing
technology. Grounding his argument in a bifurcation of theory and practice, Haigh claims
that while Turing did publish some of the most significant foundational texts in computer
science, he did not directly invent any computer2. Haigh’s distinction between theoretical

2

This claim is debatable. Turing worked on Computers for the British Code and
Decipher School, the National Physics Lab, and the University of Manchester. However,
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and technical advances is anachronistic. Although commonplace in contemporary
computer science, in the 1940’s and 1950’s, especially in the midst of WWII, theorists
like Turing designed, built, and operated computing technologies. Haig critiques
Copeland for conflating theory with practice. This paradigm difference between the
theoretical advancements and the technical advances are commonplace in contemporary
computer science. However, Turing certainly didn’t know the difference. In the 1940’s
and 1950’s, especially in the midst of WWII, the theorists like Turing designed, built, and
operated computing technologies.

Constructing his Sexual Identity
In addition to being the object of debate in the history of computing, Turing is also well
known as a tragic victim of anti-gay laws in England, under which Turing was sentenced
and punished with chemical castration. This punishment was levied against Turing after
he was arrested under “gross indecency” laws in 1952. Unwilling to admit that
homosexuality was a crime, he did not deny the accusation nor did he defend himself. He
was sentenced to one year of estrogen treatment, which was essentially a form of
chemical castration. Just one year after the sentence of estrogen injections was complete,
he apparently committed suicide from ingesting cyanide. Although many details of
Turing’s life are debated, none is so adamantly or as inconclusively debated over whether
he committed suicide or if he accidently poisoned himself. In 2009, Prime Minister

his name was never on a patent nor was he ever the lead designer of the final version of
any of these particular computers.
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Gordon Brown issued an apology to Alan Turing. And on Christmas Day 2013, while I
was writing this dissertation, Alan Turing was officially pardoned.
Although this is a well-documented fact, Turing biographers and scholars
commonly refrain from making mention of his sexuality except in reference to his trial
and then later his death. For instance, although Copeland was one of the most prominent
advocates soliciting the British government for Turing’s pardon, in his scholarship on
Turing’s theories and intentions, Copeland never mentions Turing sexuality and seldom
mentions his personal life. Whitby, Haig, Dyson and many others who do discuss
Turing’s personal life, still do not discuss his sexuality unless it is in reference to Turing
trial and his death. Here are two notable exceptions. Hodges’ biography is by far the most
complex and unapologetic account of Turing’s sexuality. Leavitt also states that his
primary goal in writing Turing’s biography is to repair the previous problematic accounts
of Turing’s life, sexuality, and thinking. In this dissertation, I discuss Turing’s
embodiment in chiasmic relation to his writing and technical invention. And this
embodiment does include some discussion of his sexuality. However, I must insist that,
as we move to include Turing’s body more fully, that we do not reduce his embodiment
exclusively to his sexuality. This is important because Turing’s embodiment is complex
and includes many diverse experiences. Nevertheless, heteronomativity and the
construction of sexuality do not only regulate sexual practices but also practices that form
subjectivity more generally. Hence—in the chiasmus between Turing’s embodiment and
his discourse—his sexuality as well as his gender do play a prominent role.

10

Tracing Bodies in Philosophy and Rhetoric
The connections I draw between bodies and rhetoric in Turing’s text are not new; a
connection between bodies and rhetoric can be seen throughout the history of Western
philosophy. Since Plato, bodies and rhetoric have shared similar fates in relation to Truth.
For instance, in the Phaedrus, Plato ranks souls according to their proximity to truth and
knowledge. Obviously, the philosopher was at the very top of the list. The sophists—
those who made a profession out of teaching the art of oratory and persuasion—were
ranked nearly at the bottom, just slightly better than the tyrant. Those who work with
their bodies primarily, laborers and craftsmen, were ranked just slightly higher in the
proximity to truth. In Plato’s ranking, we find that those who build their craft primarily
with their words or bodies are both alienated from true wisdom. This is because, for
Plato, both bodies and language are just temporary, worldly representations. The body is
a burden and obstacle for the soul of the person. Likewise, a word is a mere mimicry or
representation of a true form. This treatment of bodies and rhetoric became one of Plato’s
most widely adopted legacies.
In The Advancement of Learning, Bacon re-reads the people of his day back into
Plato’s cave where they are chained and blinded by pretty words, bodily pleasures, and
superstition. Bacon develops a method of inductive logic that attempts to free the
thinking man from the trappings of language and his subjective bodily perspective (while
acknowledging their existence as necessary “Idols” in human life). Rene Descartes also
holds that language and bodies distract from knowledge. His method of deduction begins
by doubting bodily senses, including sight. Like dialectic for Plato and induction for
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Bacon, deduction offers for Descartes a way to move beyond the burden of bodies and
words towards pure logic and cognition.
Notably, rhetoric is often explained metaphorically as a woman who uses her
body to distract and pacify men from doing serious intellectual work. For instance, John
Locke wrote, “eloquence, like the fairer sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer
itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving,
wherein men find pleasure to be deceived” (book III). The assumption here is that their
bodies primarily define women. In this metaphor, rhetoric, like a woman’s body, is only
useful for simple, superficial pleasure. So rhetoric and women's bodies pose the same
threat—they both focus on bodies, pleasure, and sensation. Bodies and rhetoric were
opposed to serious knowledge that was understood as transcendent or superior to
experiences of pleasure through bodies and words.

Bodies in Relation to Reason
The work of feminist philosophers helps to explain why and how bodies were excluded
from philosophy and Truth. Notably, Genevieve Lloyd argues that the very definitions of
reason are dependent on excluding bodies, material, and also women. This exclusion of
bodies from the definition of reason, however, does not mean that bodies play no part in
the development of theories of reason, logic, and knowledge. No, the opposite is case.
She explains that the very definition of reason is dependent on first developing restrictive
definitions of bodies.
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For Plato, reason either transcends bodies or the two are defined as opposites or in
conflict (Lloyd 207). In the Phaedrus, for instance, bodies are compared to an ignoble
horse that fights against the controlling reason and knowledge of the charioteer, which
represents the rational, wise soul. Bodies are temporary, volatile, and natural. Reason, on
the other hand, transcends and controls everything that is associated with bodies. Lloyd
demonstrates that if bodies are defined as temporary, volatile, and natural, then reason is
defined as eternal, stable, and cultivated or heavenly. This is not the only way that
philosophers have separated bodies from reason.
Lloyd also explains that the Enlightenment with its development of scientific
methods used a different logic to separate bodies from reason. For instance in the writing
of Francis Bacon, knowledge is the power to control and master nature, which contains
no reason or intelligence. The physical world and knowledge are not necessarily battling
against each other as we see in Plato. Nevertheless, the physical world and knowledge are
defined as opposites: the physical is devoid of reason, and reason is the power to control
the physical (Lloyd 10-17). Although different philosophers have conceived of varying
relations between bodies and reason, Lloyd argues that what these different notions have
in common is that after first defining bodies, reason stands in for all that is definitionally
opposed to bodies. This definitional opposition allows philosophers to conceive of reason
and logic as transcendent from bodies.
Although bodies are excluded from the definition of reason, philosophers
nevertheless devote extensive attention to discussing and defining bodies. These same
men—Plato, Descartes, Francis Bacon—who exclude bodies from reason and
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philosophy, also theorize bodies, especially how to manage, regulate, control, and
discipline bodies. For instance, Descartes, the famed father of modern philosophy,
excludes bodies in his Meditations by creating a rigid distinction between mind and body.
Lloyd explains that this sharp distinction between body and mind is crucial for the
development of his scientific method, which utilizes the pure intellect of the mind and
excludes the sensations of bodies (45). However, Descartes also wrote extensively on
bodies. In his treatise Passions of the Soul, he defines bodies as “everything that can be
observed in us that is opposed to our reason” (365.5). According to this text, our bodies
are machines that regulate our sensations and passions so that our logical, rational minds
are left pure from our animal-like passions (354.10-355.10).

Feminist Critique of Reason/Body Antithesis
This mind/body dualism has been consistently critiqued for centuries. Significantly,
feminists identify ways that women have also been separated from knowledge in this
binary. For this project, it is important to note two main lines of critique.
First, the split between mind and body is challenged because it is not logically or
ontologically viable. Moira Gatens interprets the theories of Benedict Spinoza to remind
us that his thinking, even back in the 17th century, collapsed the binary between mind
and body and between reason and emotion. Gatens explains that Spinoza’s ethics
associate rationality and intellect with kinds of lived, bodily activities. Thinking is a kind
of action or mode of being that the mind performs (Gatens 61). Understood this way,
reason cannot be separate from bodies because reason requires a body to act and think.
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Because humans can only know or think through and in our bodies, we can also improve
our knowledge and rationality by better understanding our bodies, rather than
transcending our bodies as Descartes would suggest. In addition, Lloyd demonstrates that
reason and logic have never been disembodied. Rather, reason and logic have been
consistently defined in opposition to anything feminine. The so-called universal subject
and objective logic are neither universal nor objective, but instead conform to masculine
characteristics and value masculine subjects (Lloyd iii-x).
Second, Cartesian dualism is critiqued because, despite Descartes’ intention to
include women and men equally in this ‘universal’ reasoning, his commitment to split
body and mind actually reifies male dominance and female exclusion or subordination.
Bodies are first defined as separate from reason. Then, femininity is also defined as
opposed to reason because femininity is associated with bodily pleasure, birth, emotion,
and other corporeally-bound experiences. As Lloyd argues, because reason is defined in
opposition to the feminine, then to achieve rational thought we must first transcend or
exclude anything defined as feminine. Her argument demonstrates how the very
definition of reason preserves power relations that give men dominance and superiority as
more rational beings (103).
After identifying the problems with our definitions of bodies, gender theorists,
especially Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz and Karen Barad, have worked to address this
problem by redefining bodies as meaningful, volatile, relational, and even agential. While
I engage in a detailed discussion of these definitions of bodies progressively in each
chapter of this dissertation, for now, these philosophers are significant because they all

15

move towards new definitions of bodies. I connect these feminist definitions of bodies
with rhetorical theory in order develop a notion of chiasmic rhetoric as a process of
interacting and co-constructing bodies and discourse. With this notion of chiasmic
rhetoric, I analyze Turing’s texts in order to demonstrate how the intersections between
his embodiment and his compositions compose Turing’s concepts and his writing
towards the invention of digital computation.

Bodies in Relation to Rhetoric
The passive bodies that feminist scholars have identified are also be found in some
rhetorical theory. However, instead of truth or knowledge transcending or controlling
bodies as we see in philosophy, rhetoric and language transcend and control bodies. For
instance, we see this when Michelle Ballif (Seduction, Sophistry, and the Woman with the
Rhetorical Figure 25) and Diane Davis (Breaking Up 40) both define bodies as passive
and even non-existent before the constructing power of language and rhetoric. Gail
Corning and Randi Patterson define bodies as sites of inscription and construction at
intersection of “persuasion, discourse, and power” (9). These definitions define bodies as
passive objects that are constructed through active language. This gives rhetoric a
transcendent, productive role over bodies. By first defining bodies as objects and
language as active powerful processes, rhetoricians are then able to theorize rhetoric
without accounting for the bodies that live and breathe in each rhetorical situation.
Since at least the 1990s, the emerging field of body rhetorics argues that bodies
have been marginalized from contemporary scholarship. These scholars cite a perceived
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absence of bodies as the exigency for more detailed research that focuses on bodies. (e.g.
Corbeill, Nature Embodied: Gesture in Ancient Rome; Crowley “Body Studies in
Rhetoric and Composition”; McKerrow, “Corporeality and Cultural Rhetoric: A site for
Rhetoric's Future,” Jack Selzer and Sharon Crowley, eds. Rhetorical Bodies, Barbara A.
Biesecker, John Louis Lucaites, Rhetoric, Materiality, and Politics). For example, in their
edited collection Rhetorical Bodies, Sharon Crowley and Jack Selzer argue that the
linguistic turn focused so narrowly on language that bodies were either excluded entirely
or were included as inert, passive matter constructed by all-powerful language.
In response to this perceived absence, rhetoricians have moved to include bodies
more fully and actively into our theories of discourse and persuasion. Debra Hawhee
argues that we must include bodies in rhetoric in order to address the vast diversity of
rhetoric we encounter in our day-to-day lives (“Bodies, Rhetoric, and Everyday Life”). In
her analysis of Burke’s life and writing, she describes language and bodies in a tight,
interacting relationship, in which bodies and language both have some influence or power
over the other (Moving Bodies). This relationship between bodies and language can also
be seen in Burke’s theory of consubstantiality from A Rhetoric of Motives. Burke
introduces this term that joins two distinct, even opposed parties by focusing on shared
interests or commonalities (20-21). Consubstantiality is a way of “acting together” (21)
between bodies and discourse. For Burke, bodies and language are never identical;
however, they are always intersecting and interacting.
In the related field of Composition studies, Kristie Fleckenstein (Embodied
Literacies), Sondra Perl (Felt Sense) and Peter Elbow (Vernacular Eloquence) all argue,
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in different ways, that composition has failed to utilize a writer's body to improve
writing. They all offer different solutions for bringing bodies into composition more
fully. For instance, Peter Elbow argues that, if we speak aloud while writing, then our ear
and ingrained sense for language will aid in compositing clear, simple, eloquent writing.
While I acknowledge that the common claim in body rhetorics—that bodies have
been excluded—is valid regarding much of rhetorical theory, reading generously into the
history of rhetoric reveals a rich tradition of discourse on bodies. Since at least as far
back as the ancient Greeks, bodies have played important roles in rhetoric. The sophists
held the belief that the universe is a connected interacting whole, wherein everything is
material, including language (Kerferd 72). With this understanding of the universe,
sophists theorized rhetoric as a material or bodily method of creating change. Gorgias
demonstrates this theory of language when he wrote that words worked like strong body
seducing Helen of Troy (“Encomium of Helen”). In part, this can be read as a metaphor.
However, Gorgias also believed that words have the power act on bodies by recreating
sensory experience (Enos 132-3)—which his Encomium does by physically
demonstrating it! Long after the sophists, even Aristotle accounted for the different kinds
of bodies—young, strong, or old—of potential audiences, although somewhat
rationalistically (On Rhetoric 165-9). A key figure in Roman rhetoric, Cicero understood
oratory as working on intuition in much the same way that music works on bodies to
make us move (Katz).
Within modern rhetorical theory, bodies play active roles in some of the most
significant texts. The 18th century saw renewed interest in elocution and chironomia,
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which were two forms of pedagogy that taught orators to train their bodies’ gestures,
postures, pronunciation, and vocal performance in order to maximize persuasive impact.
(Austin, Chironomia; Bulwer, Chirologia). The work of Kenneth Burke contains
extended discussions of bodies acting rhetorically (Permanence and Change; see
Hawhee, Moving Bodies). James Berlin’s social-epistemic rhetoric shifts the focus of
rhetorical theory towards the historical and material contexts of text and shifts the focus
of pedagogy towards understanding our experiences as texts to be read. The focus on
historical context refocuses on specific bodies within specific material contexts. In
addition, focusing on experiences as texts refocuses on our bodily experiences (e.g.,
emotions, reactions, movements, and senses of security or insecurity) and how rhetoric
shapes our actions, beliefs and identities. In race rhetoric, Keith Gilyard’s scholarship
studies how race functions in dominant discourse to prescribe limited or even
dehumanizing identities to black bodies while white bodies define the norm (Race,
Rhetoric and Composition). Feminist rhetorics also have called attention to gender and
the role of women in rhetoric’s history (e.g., Jarrett, Rereading the Sophists; Glen,
Rhetoric Retold). Feminist scholars have also theorized rhetorics race, laughter, and
silence and listening rhetoric, which all include some consideration of bodies (e.g. hooks
Talking Back; Davis, Breaking Up [at] Totality: A Rhetoric of Laughter; Glen,
Unspoken). George Lakoff and Mark Johnson also account for how our bodies participate
in rhetoric by drawing from recent findings in cognitive science (Philosophy of the
Flesh). They explain that our brains use metaphor to understand abstract concepts by
relating them to concrete, bodily experiences.
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I move through these texts quickly to emphasize that there is no deficiency of
discourse on bodies in recent rhetorical theory. If Burke compared scholarly discourse to
entering a parlor with a heated conversation already in progress (Philosophy of Literary
Form, 110-111), the parlor in which rhetoricians discuss bodies is quite a crowded party.
Not only do we have a body in rhetorics, we have a lot of different bodies doing different
things. In the above review of literature, I have emphasized the inseparability of
discourse and bodies by focusing on the many intersections between the two in the
history of rhetoric. The intersections between discourse and bodies demonstrated in this
quick literature review are significant for this dissertation because they set the stage for
the chiasmic relation between bodies and discourse. Rhetoric and bodies seem to be
inseparable.

The Mutual Threat of Bodies and Rhetoric
This intersecting treatment of bodies and rhetoric is not coincidental: both represent
challenges to universal truth, reason, and logic. If an observed truth is to achieve the
status of universality, then that truth must be true for all bodies, at all times, in any
language, and potentially in any rhetorical arrangement. Rhetoric and bodies both
challenge claims to universal truth because both call attention to the particular physical
and discursive context in which truths are constructed, composed, and communicated.
Therein lies the threat that philosophers since Plato have warned against: both bodies and
rhetoric remind us that knowledge is from some body and understood through some
rhetorical strategies and within established discursive codes.
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Instead of universal truths and transcendent knowledge, bodies and rhetoric
compose knowledge and even truths that are limited the specificity of unique situations,
stylistic choices, singular bodies, and our particular life experiences. All of these
particularities shape how we communicate. In addition, the particularities of our bodily
and rhetorical forms, in this case Turing’s bodily particularity and rhetorical particularity,
construct how we interpret, understand, and value knowledge and meanings. Our bodies
shape what we know about the world, our ethics, and political values. In addition,
language and rhetorical choices shape how we understand the world. Language and
bodies are both forms that interact to construct the lenses through which we understand
our lives, our world, and our values.

Chiasmus and Embodiment
The chiasmic relation between bodies and discourse, which we will investigate in and
through Turing’s writing, is by no means new or unique. Maurice Merleau-Ponty set a
precedent for thinking of bodies as chiasmic figures. In “The Intertwining—the Chiasm,”
Merleau-Ponty introduces the term chiasm to explain the crisscrossing, intertwining
interactions among vision and touch—and by extension objectivity and subjectivity.
Merleau-Ponty begins with the experience of touch and touching in which the subjective
experience of touching is also the objective touch of the other. Chiasmic experience and
material reality reverse and intertwine to connect subjectivity and objectivity. MerleauPonty then extends this intersection so that vision relates to the connection between
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external, social, and cultural experience while touch relates to internal, personal, and
individual experiences.
By arguing that flesh and world intertwine though sight and touch, Merleau-Ponty
concludes that subjective knowledge is always intertwining with objective knowledge.
Merleau-Ponty describes these intertwining experiences in wave-like, intertwining terms:
“Through this crisscrossing within it of the touching and the tangible, its [the hand] own
movements incorporate themselves into the universe they interrogate, are recorded on the
same map as it; the systems are applied upon one another, as the two halves of an orange”
(133). The subjective experience of any human is always connected and, as MerleauPonty writes, “recorded on the same map” as objective reality. This conclusion refuses to
deny objectivity. Merleau-Ponty is not a solipsist nor is he an empiricist. Instead,
intertwining flesh and the world assumes that any knowledge is at the same time both
objective and subjective.
Working with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of chiasm, Judith Butler further develops
the definition of bodies as chiasmic figures. In particular, the rhetorical figure chiasmus
becomes the model for understanding the relation between bodies and language. Butler
defines chiasm as “the rhetorical figure…that two different relations are asserted which
are not altogether commutative” in which “there is a formal symmetry in the figure of the
chiasm, there is no semantic equivalence between the two phrases symmetrically so
paired” (“Sexual Difference as a Question of Ethics” 75). Butler sees this figure as
powerful. The meaning between the two sides of chiasmus, like the relation between
language and bodies, always exceeds each other. Although there is formal balance, they
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both produce surplus. In Bodies That Matter, she describes the relation between bodies
and language as “chiasmic in their interdependency, but never fully collapsed into one
another” (69).
Although she never explicitly uses the word chiasmus, Elizabeth Grosz’s theories
also imply chiasmic relations. In particular, Grosz describes the interactions of material
and culture as a Mobius strip. This shape of the Mobius strip is initially a chiasmus in so
far as it is made of two parts that intersect in the center (36). However, this figure adds a
further layer of complexity to the chiasmus. First, the two intersecting lines are not two
separate lines. Rather, they are folded over to connect at both ends. This is a single
connected strip that is twisted into an X. This means that the two lines not only intersect,
they also curve around and back into the other side. Second, this twisted strip, in order to
create the X, must also have a twist on each side at which point the inside become outside
and outside becomes inside. We find similarly complex, intersecting relations defining
the rhetorical figure of chiasmus.

Chiasmus and Form
Chiasmus, although defined in a variety of ways, always creates an intersecting formal
balance between two different clauses, phrases, sentences, or larger sections of text. The
figure is composed of two intersecting, always connected, but never collapsible parts. For
instance, we have Francis Bacon’s chiasmus “If a man will begin with certainties, he
shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts he shall end in
certainties” (in Quinn 94). The figure is made of two lines that intersect. The meanings of
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these two phrases intersect, but they also diverge so that the meanings are opposed. The
intersecting parts of the chiasmus simultaneously suggest difference and inseparability.
Likewise, bodies are composed of different yet inseparable parts—both body and
language—as I will analyze in the case of Turing. Bodies and Language neither
collapsible into a larger whole nor are the distinct parts totally separable or totally distinct
from the interacting parts. The relation between the two is so close that we cannot
understand bodies without language, and we cannot construct meaning without our skin
to sense, our hands to write, and our mouths to speak. The relation between these two
parts is also equal; language does not supersede or override bodies, nor do bodies
determine or control language.
Chiasmus has been defined inconsistently at times as a trope, other times as a
schema, and at times as both. The differences between tropes and schemas are significant
because they parallel the antithetical relation set up between knowledge and bodies.
Schema means the shape or the form of language. This is the structure, sound, and the
space that words take up on pages. Edward P.J. Corbett, for example, defines scheme as a
“deviation from the ordinary pattern or arrangement of words” (425-6). Trope is defined
as “a deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of a word” (426). Tropes are
figures of concepts and content. Because tropes figure concepts or content, they are often
given more attention and value as important ways that humans communicate. Fahnestock
writes that it is especially the trope of metaphor that has received extensive scholarly
attentions (4-6). Schemas, however, have had an uphill battle. As Fahnestock explains,
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schemas are often defined as ornamental, non-essential, even excessive or distracting (17;
cf. Lyotard).
This distinction between schemas and tropes parallels the distinctions between
knowledge and rhetoric, mind and body, and message and media (see McLuhan),. In each
of these distinctions, philosophy and science have traditionally privileged the abstract
first term as separate, and perhaps more pure or true, than the material or structural. Just
as mind has been privileged over bodies, and ideas or knowledge cherished without
regard to the media, so to tropes have been privileged as epistemic—or keys to
understanding and knowledge—while schemas have been seen as unessential, structural,
and instrumental for communicating, understanding, or constructing knowledge. When
Francis Bacon, in The Advancement of Learning, rails against rhetoric as a frivolous and
decorative practice, he is writing against rhetoric as an ornament of words. Even Henry
Peacham’s 1577 treatise on rhetorical forms, which is ostensibly a celebration of
rhetorical forms, still compares them to the flora and fauna that decorate the garden of
eloquence (in Espy).
This diminished or unessential role for the schema, however, is by no means
uncontested. The later shift to privilege ideas as independent of formal structures,
according to Fahnestock, is another negative consequence of the “fatal dissociation”
between content and form (58). Jeanne Fahnestock argues that schemas form the epitome
of scientific argument. She also argues that Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian make no
distinction between tropes and schemas, because, in some ways, these fathers of rhetoric
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understood form in a tight, complex relationship with content. Form and content are
inseparable; moreover, they both inform and dynamically co-construct each other.
Chiasmus forms the primary figure of my rhetorical thinking in this dissertation.
In addition, I have composed the dissertation as an initial iteration of a performance of
chiasmic movements that create multiple points of intersection between bodies and
rhetoric. I have done this primarily by intersecting and connecting biographical details
from Turing’s life, feminist theories of bodies, technical history of digital computation, as
well as detailed study of the rhetorical figure chiasmus. By cutting together these
different discourses, this dissertation creates intersections and interactions between
Turing’s body, theories of bodies, technology, and rhetoric. In composing the form of this
dissertation, I was also committed to writing in a narrative, performative style. This is not
exclusively a stylistic choice. Just as rhetorical figures construct knowledge, so too, my
use of narrative shapes the knowledge of this text by adding energy, movement, and the
particularity of Turing’s story. Narratives and stories, as theorized by Adrianna Cavarero,
anchor theory in specific human body (Relating Narratives). This style is central to
Cavarero’s philosophy, as she argues that bodies have long been erased from philosophy
and political theory (For More Than One Voice). To counter-act this centuries-long trend,
Cavarero uses narrative and storytelling as her philosophical method. The result is that
her texts live and breathe with lively bodies on every page that give depth and complexity
to her ontological and political thought. Likewise, I use Turing’s narrative to drive the
argument and the form of this dissertation.
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Chapter Overview
Each chapter gradually develops a notion of chiasmic rhetoric by considering
increasingly more complex movements of chiasmic figuring. As these chiasmic relations
become more active, so too does my discussion offer complex analyses of Turing’s
embodiment and how that embodiment relates to his developments of digital computation
and artificial intelligence. In Chapter Two I begin by discussing antithesis, which is
related to but simpler than chiasmus. I argue that antithesis is the primary figure that has
been used to represent the relations between bodies and knowledge in philosophy and
demonstrate how Alan Turing reforms long established antithetical relations between
bodies and mind in his young writing in the 1932 essay/letter “Nature of Spirit.” To
demonstrate that we need a more complex figure to understand the relations between
bodies and knowledge, I enroll feminist critiques of mind-body dualism into a close
reading of Turing’s style to find locations in the text where antithesis breaks down.
Having established the added complexity of the relations between bodies and
knowledge, I turn to chiasmus for the remainder of the dissertation. In Chapter Three I
develop the most extended discussion of chiasmus. This chapter functions as the center
point of the dissertation and creates a grounding for understanding chiasmus between
bodies and discourses. In that chapter, chiasmus moves to connect or intersect two things.
From this movement to connect, I will build the remainder of the dissertation into more
and more dynamic and even unstable notions of chiasmus between bodies and discourse.
In Chapter Three, I use the detailed scholarship on chiasmus from the historical, literary,
rhetorical, and stylistic perspectives to argue that Alan Turing’s thinking and invention
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are fully integrated and intersecting with embodiment, even in his most theoretical and
most abstract 1936 article “On Computable Numbers with an Application to the
Entscheidungsproblem” that proved that mathematics would always have some mysteries
and unsolvable problems. To get to this conclusion, Turing had to first start with the
embodied process of solving calculations. With this argument, I therefore further develop
a notion of chiasmic rhetoric in Alan Turing’s writing in which bodies and discourse coconstitute knowledge.
In Chapters Four and Five I develop chiasmic rhetoric through increasingly
complex notions of embodiment and relate these Turing’s own embodied experiences. In
Chapter Four, I argue that chiasmus moves towards dynamic relations between the two
intersecting parts of bodies and discourse. In this case, Turing’s body and his writing on
artificial intelligence in “Intelligent Machinery” (1948) dynamically intersect in so far as
the disciplining and regulating that Turing experienced on his own body were reinscribed onto the computer’s body. In Chapter Four, I also integrate theories of
sexuality, especially by Foucault, in order to call attention to the many rigorous ways that
the intellectual training that Turing benefited from constitute a form of bodily training
that compose him as a subject with sexual subject outside of heteronormative standards.
In Chapter Five I pay close attention not only to embodiment of Turing and of the
computer, but also to bodily differences. Chiasmic rhetoric, here, moves towards
becoming a destabilizing force. In particular, this chapter looks at the gendering
discourses of Turing’s world and also in Turing’s text. I analyze Turing’s most famous
text “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” to argue that Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric
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destabilizes the relations between bodies and discourse. Here, I find that the relations are
destabilizing because Turing not only embodies his machine in particular ways but also
genders the machine and the machine’s technicians as feminine. This specific feminizing
calls attention to the bodily differences that are re-inscribed when Turing begins with
bodily experiences in order to produce knowledge of artificial intelligence.
Finally, in Chapter Six, I conclude with a discussion of how the notions of
chiasmic rhetoric that I have articulated in this dissertation generate critical and
productive methods of teaching writing, especially the teaching of technical writing.
Given that all writing is embodied writing, I argue that the writing of science and
technology has more work to do to acknowledge and account for the particular embodied
context of its production and also the embodied effects. It is with the movements of
chiasmic rhetoric that I am able to demonstrate the progressively complex, integrated,
dynamic, and even destabilizing relations between Turing’s embodiment and his
technical writing. And chiasmic rhetoric has important implications for teachers of
technical writing. In addition, it is through the movements of chiasmus that I demonstrate
the many significant ways that Turing’s knowledge production and his inventiveness
composed through his embodiment. This suggests that we must pay attention to the
unique bodies composed between material and cultural construction in the classroom, and
how we might do this.
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CHIASMUS 2:
PRODUCING ANTITHESIS THEN BREAKING ANTITHESIS

“I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter
but certainly not always by the same kind of body.”
~Turing, “Nature of Spirit”

“A perennial motif that underlies much of scientific creativity—names, the urge to
fathom the secrets of nature…we will fathom the ultimate secrets of own mortality.”
~Keller, From Secrets of life to Secrets of Death

Before Alan Turing invented the digital computer and cracked the codes produced by the
Nazi Enigma Machine, he was just a boy experimenting with friends, with relationships,
with gnats in jars, and telescopes pointed to the skies. He was also a boy who received
rigorous disciplining to conform to standards of British decorum. Through this
disciplining and also through his study of biology, physics, and logic, Turing learned that
a good body was disciplined, clean, and controlled. In this chapter, I will draw
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connections between young Turing's experiences and his early thinking on the relations
between mind and body. I will identify these connections between his life and ideas
through a close analysis of his essay/personal letter, titled “Nature of Spirit.”
In “Nature of Spirit,” as I will demonstrate, Alan Turing defines bodies in
opposition to spirit or free will. “Nature of Spirit” reproduces the well-entrenched
religious, scientific and philosophical relation of antitheses between bodies and mind.
Antithesis is a rhetorical figure that defines two things as opposed or mutually exclusive.
Traditionally, Western philosophy and science have reified a relation of antithesis in
which bodies are outside or opposed to knowledge, truth, and reason. After defining
antithesis, I will draw from feminist critiques of philosophy in order to trace the historical
significances of antithesis between knowledge and embodiment. Feminist philosophers
demonstrate that, while antithesis between body and knowledge may be rhetorically
maintained, in fact, there are many levels of connection between knowledge and the
particular historical, social, political, and embodied context, out of which knowledge
emerges. This chapter is organized in the form of antithesis: it is composed of two parts
that are opposed. I will first demonstrate how antithesis structures Turing’s essay, and
then I will turn to demonstrate the ways that the article cannot not maintain mutually
exclusive antithesis. In the second half of this chapter, I perform a close style analysis of
Turing’s essay in order to locate places in the argument, structure, and style where
antithesis breaks down: places where mutual exclusivity between mind and body are not
maintained.
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Turing’s Education
Alan Turing and Christopher Morcom met at the prestigious Sherborne School when they
were both teenagers. Alan didn’t fit in at the school, which seemed to be more concerned
with teaching manliness, manners, and decorum than science and math. By ‘didn’t fit in,’
I don’t just mean he wasn’t one of the cool kids, which he certainly was not. He didn’t
seem to fit in with any of the students. For 2 years, he had few or no friends. Although
many of his professors agreed that Alan was unusually bright, even the adults teased
Turing because of his appearance, which was often disorderly or even dirty, and his
mannerisms, which were quiet and dreamy. He
seemed unable to use a pen without getting ink
all over his hands. On the sports field, he
appeared to be day dreaming more than
participating in a competitive event (Hodges
11). His mother sketched the image to the left
when Alan Turing was just 8 years old, which
would surely have embarrassed almost any
young boy (Leavitt 11).
Figure 1 “Watching the Daisies Grow” Drawing
by Mrs. Turing, which she sent to the matron at
Turing's elementary school in the spring of 1923.

For an upper-class, young man at the
beginning of the 20th century England, what

seem to be peculiar habits to my 21st century sensibilities were more than embarrassing
social faux pas. Alan’s peculiarity represented a major impediment to graduation from
Sherborne and threatened his access to elite British society. Although everyone knew he
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was unusually bright, his parents continually received bad reports based on his bad
handwriting, messiness, disordered dress, and general inability to conform to the social
norms (Hodges 25).
Into this context, Christopher Morcom entered Alan Turing’s life. Turing was 16
and Morcom was 17. These young men became friends. Morcom and Turing were also
deeply intellectually engaged. Their letters back and forth discuss the details of their
experiments and methods. They wrote about how to find particular asteroids and what
constellations they had seen through their telescopes. Together they discussed chemistry,
physics, math. At a place like Sherborne, where the sports were far more important than
experiments and abstract mathematics, Turing was starved for companionship as well as
intellectual simulation. Morcom’s friendship fed Turing personally and intellectually.
This context is important in order to understand the importance of this friendship
on Alan Turing. Morcom was not just a friend. He was Turing’s first close friend. In
addition, he was the first to really engage with Turing in a way that allowed Turing to
thrive as an intellectual young man with particular interests in science and math. This was
an important turning point in Turing’s life. Morcom was more popular. With this
companionship, Turing began to make more friends. He was enjoying his school
experience and striving to succeed socially and academically, in large part, to impress
Christopher (Hodges 42-43).
Several biographers describe Morcom as Turing’s “first love,” even Turing’s first
lover. David Leavitt describes their relationship as one that “blossomed along the classic
trajectory of nineteenth-century “romantic friendship,” marked by flurries of rhapsodic
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emotion” (16). But “classic trajectory of nineteenth-century “romantic friendship”” is
somewhat ambiguous. We know that Turing was open and even confident about his
sexuality within his small group of close friends. Leavitt even calls Turing “naïve,
absent-minded, and oblivious” for being so open about his sexuality (4). We know
relatively little about Turing and Morcom’s relationship. We know from his letters that
Alan was attracted to Christopher at first sight. Like many teenage loves, Alan felt that
Christopher “made everyone else seem so ordinary” (in Hodges 35). The most extensive
biographer on Turing, Andrew Hodges, writes that the romantic attraction was one-sided,
but that their friendship was genuine and even affectionate (44).
These studious, even nerdy, young men made plans to enroll in the same college,
King’s College at Cambridge University. They made plans to continue their research.
They wrote letters about comet sightings (Hodges 45). After two years of friendship, on
February 6th 1930, Christopher was rushed to the hospital in London. Less than a week
later Christopher died of tuberculosis. Turing was not told that Christopher was ailing
until after he passed away.

Alan Turing’s “Nature of Spirit”
Two years later, Alan traveled to visit Christopher’s mother at her home, which is called
the Clock House in Bromsgrove. This was not Alan’s first visit with Mrs. Morcom, who
was an artistic, free-spirited woman. They became friends after Christopher died. Turing
joined the Morcom family for vacations and for day-trips to Mrs. Morcom’s London flat.
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During this particular visit in 1932—in the house where Christopher spent his childhood,
experimented in the lab, gazed at the stars—Alan wrote a short essay “Nature of Spirit.”

Figure 2: “Nature of Spirit” Letter Head from the Clock House

This 6-page, hand-written essay has been read as a seed pot out of which grew the
theories that made possible the invention of modern computers and digital computation
(Hodges 67; Copeland 30; Leavitt 102). In some ways, the essay seems to conform to the
conventions of scholarly writing. He cites two opposed positions that many students of
science at the time would have been familiar with, which are material determinism and
emerging theories in quantum mechanics. In particular, he offers his summary on these
two differing schools of thought on the relation between bodies and human freewill.
Turing quickly summarizes his interest in these two fields and then clearly places his
stake along with those who defend human free will and controlling mind over matter.
However, the essay breaks the conventions of scientific writing more than it
conforms. In no way is this essay an example of scientific research or scientific writing.
This is a note, the personal musings of a young man who has a deep interest in science.
Turing does not attempt to conform to the structure of scientific writing. Gross identifies
the dominant structure of articles in scientific journals: Introduction, Methods, Results,
and Discussion (IMRaD). As will be discussed more in Chapter 3, even Turing’s
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published technical articles do not conform to this typical form. He is a young man
interested in science. Most of his letters to friends and family included detailed
descriptions of the books he read, experiments he performed, and theories he was
developing. Even as a boy, he wrote to his mother about experiments with flies and drew
sketches of less-than-successful invention. Like many of these letters, “Nature of Spirit”
discusses his thoughts on scientific matters, but he is not attempting to formulate a viable
argument. Nor does he attempt to conform to the expectations of a scientific audience,
which of course was in no way his target audience. Rather, this is a sensitive, caring note
of hope from a grieving boy to the grieving mother of Christopher Morcom. “Nature of
Spirit” connects science and spirituality. Turing discusses his former belief in a heavenly
afterlife and the possibility for a person’s spirit to live on beyond the death of a person’s
body. And all of these spiritual, even mystical, claims are made in the context of
scientific justification.
Although Turing posits claims about both materialism and spirituality, he offers
no evidence or support for his claims. He engages with scientific theory but does not
quote directly or even explain in any detail. Although he is positioning his claims
between two different scientific theories, he writes his own position in the style of
personal musing. For instance, he writes, “personally, I think” and “I cannot guess what
happens.” These word choices suggest a low level of certainty, or rather, no certainty3. In
this essay, Turing does not attempt to make empirical claims in this essay. He writes
about spirits and alternative universes. Some words are placed in scare quotes, which
3

In Latour and Woolgar’s classification of statements of fact in scientific writing, this
would be statement type 1: speculations that convey the lowest certainty (79).
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suggest that Turing himself didn’t quite accept his use of words like “spirit.” These scare
quotes are ways for Turing to distance himself from the words “spirit” and “mechanical”
(see Wysocki and Lynch 575). The physical essay reveals Turing’s messy handwriting,
scratched out words, extra smudges and blobs of ink that dropped on the page has his
hand moved from the inkwell to the page. In its form, claims, and even its physical
appearance, this little essay is a personal, early musing of a young scientific mind
thinking about a very personal topic.
If we consider the context in which Turing penned this essay, then the purpose of
the essay appears to be less to establish his position on contemporary scientific theory
and more to think through his dear hope that Christopher Morcom’s spirit may live on,
even though this is never stated explicitly. This short essay was obviously not intended
for publication or any professional audience. The one and only intended reader was
Christopher Morcom’s mother. Turing wrote the essay while visiting her at the home
where his friend grew up. Early in the day, Turing walked around the grounds that
Christopher explored as a young man. Christopher’s mother wished Alan good night as
they all retired for the night. Turing wrote the essay in Morcom’s room. He slept in
Christopher’s bed. After all this, on stationary with “The Clock House” letterhead, Turing
wrote “Nature of Spirit” hypothesizing that spirits may live on in alternative bodies. On
the 3rd page, Turing pens the word “but when the body does the ‘mechanism’ of the body,
holding the spirit is gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps
immediately [sic]” (qtd in Hodges 64).
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Figure 3: "Nature of Spirit" sample of Turing's handwriting.

Although Christopher’s body may have died, his spirit may have lived on to inhabit other
kinds of bodies. This hypothesis and hope that his friend’s spirit may still live on
becomes an initial entry point for understanding the relations between bodies and spirits
that Turing held at this time.

Defining Bodies in “Nature of Spirit”
The primary question of “Nature of Spirit” addresses the relationship between bodies and
spirits. Turing specifically uses the word spirit, but I will also relate this spirit to notions
of mind or consciousness. I make this association in part because Turing seems uncertain
about this term: he uses quotes whenever he uses spirit. In addition, the theories that he is
citing of are not theories of spirits in the religious sense. Rather, they are theories of the
relation between material and human consciousness or free will.
The significance of this essay is not in its scientific of theoretical soundness.
Rather, the significance is in the fact that the essay lays the groundwork for
understanding how Turing defines the relation between bodies and minds. Turing’s
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answer is not because it is unique. Rather, his answer re-inscribes an age-old relation of
antithesis between bodies and minds through scientific speculation.
Turing begins by dismissing a notion that “if everything was known about the
Universe at any particular moment, then we can predict what it will be through all the
future” (qtd. in Hodges 64). This position, which is a material determinist position, would
allow no room for human will but would instead hold that matter predetermines all
activity in the Universe. Hodges explains that this would have been a familiar concept for
any student of science or math. For any problem, if sufficiently detailed information were
provided, then the entire future of the physical system could be determined (Hodges 64).
These material determinist theories would include astronomy, which Turing mentions
specifically in “Nature of Spirit.” In addition, many mathematicians espoused a kind of
material determinism. In 1900, David Hilbert, the prominent mathematician, posed the
Entscheidungsproblem, or the problem of decidability that asked if mathematics was a
completely ‘decidable’ science. Until 1936, Hilbert and the majority of prominent
mathematicians concluded that every mathematical question could be solved given
comprehensive data and precise terms. This conclusion would be undermined in 1936
with the publication of Turing’s first major contribution to mathematics “On Computable
Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem,” which will be the focus of
Chapter 3.
Turing dismisses material determinism in favor of human will that is able to
“determine the actions of the other atoms of the universe” (qtd in Hodges 64). Turing
counters this material determinist argument by citing the theories of quantum mechanics,
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which studies the physics of atoms and the smallest scale of matter. Turing was interested
in new quantum mechanics because, at the very small scale of atoms and particles, “it
seemed that certain phenomena were absolutely undetermined” (Hodges 65). Quantum
mechanics has shown that random, unpredictable phenomena proliferate at the atomic
level and cannot be explained through material observation (see Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle which he first published in 1927). Turing was working directly with Arthur S.
Eddington’s in The Nature of the Physical World, which argues that the random
phenomena observed in quantum mechanics are not random at all but rather the effects of
human will or intuition. Hodges describes this book as an “olive branch that Eddington
held out from the throne of science towards the claims of religion” (64). Eddington draws
from Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principles, which draws on quantum mechanics to “check
the findings” of philosophies, including Descartes’ notion of an independent mind with
free will. John McTaggert’s Nature of Existence, published in 1921, extended the olive
branch that Eddington held out from science to religion. According to McTaggert, the
relationship between bodies and spirit is such that “matter is meaningless in the absence
of spirit” (qtd in Hodges 64). McTaggert drew loosely from quantum mechanics to justify
notions of reincarnation. According to McTaggert, a human mind (which Turing would
call spirit) amplifies through matter beyond a single body (66). As a teenager, Turing
believed in a Christian notion of heaven. He imagined that spirits could live without
bodies. He rejects Christianity by the time he enters college. However, his beliefs in
spirits do not stray far from Christian notions of souls and heaven.
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While Turing expresses his conviction that spirit and bodies are connected, this
connection is not a relation between two equal parts. In “Nature of Spirit,” Turing
expresses his belief that “as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I
consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ‘attract’ and hold on to a
‘spirit’, whilst the body is alive and awake the two are firmly connected” (qtd. in Hodges
64). While spirit and body are connected, spirit determines and gives meaning. Matter is
meaningless and lifeless. Matter dies and decays. Spirit is not bound to this same sad
state. Instead, “I think,” Turing contemplates, “that spirit is really eternally connected
with matter but certainly not always by the same kind of body” (qtd in Hodges 64). When
the body dies, spirits can live on in another kind of body. While spirit is particular,
unique, and eternal, any kind of mortal body can passively hold onto spirit without
changing the nature or character of the spirit. The work of McTaggert gave Turing more
the scientific justification to imagine spirits inhabiting new bodies rather than residing in
a heavenly place. It is unclear what kind of body Turing may have imagined
Christopher’s spirit inhabiting. Hodges imagines that Turing may have hoped that “the
Clock House still held the spirit of Christopher Morcom” (63). Hodges then asks “Could
the atoms of Alan’s brain be excited by a non-material ‘spirit’, like the wireless set
resonating to a signal from the unseen world?” (63). Years later, after many years of
intellectual development, Turing will again suggest that some of the functions of human
minds can be performed by new bodies. But this time the new bodies will be mechanical.
In order to better understand the relation between bodies and minds that Turing posits I
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will next review the significance of antithesis as a rhetorical figure and as a relation
between bodies and minds in philosophy.

Form and Rhetoric of Antithesis
In “Nature of Spirit,” Turing presumes that the relation between bodies and matter is one
of antithesis. Antithesis is a rhetorical figure that includes two parallel phrases, ideas, or
things and defines the relationship between the two things as opposed, contrary, or
essentially different. Turing’s use of antithesis within scientific writing is not unusual. In
Rhetorical Figures in Science, Jeanne Fahnestock finds antithesis as a crucial figure in
many foundational texts of scientific writing, including Francis Bacon's Advancement of
Learning (59) and Darwin's The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (65). This
is also the figure that cements the difference between male and female as an antithetical,
contrary relationship (Fahnestock 81-85). Richard Lanham, in Analyzing Prose, suggests
that antithesis may be ingrained into our biology: “as a habit of mind, antithesis may well
be intrinsic to how we think, part of the brain's now-familiar right and left
hemispherically” (122). He finds antithesis in every aspect of life from the animal's body
language (122) to the very “patterns of thinking” that also frame the structures of formal
logic (125).
In modern definitions of antithesis, many scholars continue to privilege antithesis
as a more meaningful trope over any schema of form. When the form of antithesis is
included, it is incidental or unessential for the effective use of antithesis. For instance, in
A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, Richard Lanham defines the figure as the act of
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“conjoining contrasting ideas” (12) and mentions no formal qualities. Edward P.J.
Corbett defines the figure in terms of either a figure of words and ideas or as a figure of
ideas independent of form. His primary definition is that antithesis is “the juxtaposition of
contrasting ideas, often in parallel structure”(464). Arthur Quinn defines antithesis as a
figure that both affirms one thing and to deny/negate its opposite (67-8). He makes no
mention of a specific formal structure, and of his examples do not follow into any
particular form or structure.
In his more in-depth research on rhetorical figures Analyzing Prose, Lanham's
discussion of antithesis brings the figure back to its formal schema. For Lanham, figures
are like maps: they trace out in space the relations between things (119). These formal
structures then become ingrained in our thinking as tacit knowledge: we understand the
concept in part because we recognize the form. Antithesis gets its rhetorical force from its
formal structure, which is recognized and understood by the reader. The form itself
creates antithesis. However, Lanham’s is a flexible schema. Lanham defines antithesis as
a form with parallel wording. According to Lanham, the ‘sense’ of antithesis must be
created, but that sense can appear in a variety of forms. Throughout his discussion,
Lanham analyzes a variety of figures, in a variety of grammatical structures that all work
to create antithesis in both concept and form. Sometimes these are parallel; sometimes
they are out of balance. Other times these are equal, or not equal. The importance is
placed on figures that “both frame thinking and, by their formal ‘logic’ of sight and
sound, urge certain thoughts upon us” (125).

43

Although other scholars define antithesis as enacted in content alone, Fahnestock
maintains a formally strict definition and demonstrates this in each of her examples. In
addition, she defines a more specific structure for antithesis. In particular, the formal
structure of the antithesis is “defined as a verbal structure that places contrasted or
opposed terms in parallel or balanced cola or phrases” (46). Fahnestock draws this from
Aristotle's Topics, which defines antithesis as both contrary ideas and also as a formal
structure (51-52). She also explains that the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum as well the notion
of antithesis in Quintilian and Cicero’s writings understand antithesis to be a figure that is
both contrary or opposed ideas as well as a formal or stylistic device (55).

Relations of Antithesis
Antithesis, like many rhetorical figures, constructs specific relationships between two
things. According to Fahnestock, antithesis can create new oppositions where there were
none. It can use established oppositions in order to frame new arguments. In addition,
antithesis can be used in more subtle ways to define or reconfigure the relationship
between established opposites (58). This point is important because a number of different
kinds of antithetical relationships are possible through this rhetorical figure. Antithesis
can create a cut, essentially slicing two concepts of things into definitional opposites.
This is a contrary relation (Corbett 129-131). This is like the cut between definitions of
man and woman or masculine and feminine. The terms are defined through their mutual
exclusion of the other. The relations between mind and body are most often contrary
relations of mutual exclusivity where no middle ground is possible. But the opposition
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does not have to be mutually exclusive. The antithesis could be that of scale (large or
small, good or bad) or kind (cat or dog) (Corbett 59).
The effect in all forms of antithesis, according to Lanham, is that the relations
appear inevitable. The tacit logic of the figure works so that “the second half of the
assertion seems to follow inevitably from the first because the shape of the phrasing says
so” (Lanham, Analyzing Prose, 124), which creates the “path of least resistance” (136).
In addition, the figure of antithesis creates either/or logic where no middle ground it
possible. This, Lanham asserts, creates “mutually exclusive roles. It excludes, by its form,
the temptation to stand in the middle” (123). In addition, this figure lends itself toward
false dilemma or either/or fallacy. This is a common logical error in which only two
options are considered while alternatives or middle ground are excluded.
Antithesis can be understood in terms of topoi, or common places for starting
arguments. Edward P. J. Corbett defines three topoi that also forms of antithesis:
contraries, contradiction, and difference (129-31). These three classifications are part of
his common topics for inventing arguments, which he draws heavily from Aristotle’s
Topics. Contraries and contradictions are closely related terms. Both set up mutually
exclusive relationships. However, contrary sets up a relation where one term is defined as
“opposite or incompatible things of the same kind” (hot vs. cold) (129), while
contradiction sets up a relation where one term is defined as the negation of the other
term (hot vs. not hot) (131). This difference is subtle but important for the purposes of
argumentation. Contrary defines the relations between things as opposites where both
terms are defined in opposition to the other. For instance, in the contrary between hot and
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cold, their opposition defines both terms. However, with contradiction, the relations are
defined by one term as the negative or absence of the other. For instance, in the
contradiction between hot and not hot, the second term only has meaning in so far as its
lack, or absence of heat.
In the third class of antithesis, difference compares ideas or things through a more
flexible and complex relation. In this comparison of difference, the things or ideas do not
have to be of the same kind or species, for instance cats and dogs. These things are
different, but they are not defined as opposed. In addition, relations of difference may
share some qualities. For instance, cats and dogs are both mammals. An author could
compare these different things without constructing an opposition. Rather, difference
creates an antithesis where the two concepts overlap in some ways and diverge in others.
This relation of difference is significant because antithesis does not have to construct a
relation of mutual exclusivity. The topoi of difference allow the antithetical ideas or
things to be defined through their dissimilarity while, at the same time, sharing some
similarity or commonality. This is not the relation that Turing constructs in “Nature of
Spirit.” However, as this chapter progresses I will demonstrate ways in which the strict
mutual exclusivity of contrary cannot be maintained. Although I do not argue that Turing
creates a relation of difference in this article, through a reading of his style and form, I
will locate connections and mutual inclusivity between bodies and mind. Before I make
that shift, I will next identify contrary antithesis as significant rhetorical form in Alan
Turing’s essay “Nature of Spirit.”
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Identifying Antithesis in “Nature of Spirit”
Alan Turing builds his argument for spirit as transcendent of bodies on the topoi or
common ground of contrary antithesis between bodies and minds. Antithesis works most
obviously on the level of content in Turing’s “Nature of Spirit.” The two terms are
mutually exclusive. Both are defined in opposition to the other: what is spirit is not body
and what is body is not spirit. This antithesis can best be described as a contrary because
the figure defines the relationship between bodies and spirit like two sides of the same
coin: the definition of bodies becomes the opposite of spirits and the definition of spirits
becomes the opposite of bodies. However, unlike contradiction, for Turing bodies are not
defined as the negative or the absence of spirit. In fact, Turing writes: “but when the body
dies the “mechanisms” of the body, holding the spirit is gone & the spirit finds a new
body sooner or later perhaps immediately” (qtd in Hodges 64).
I identify this relation as contrary because, for each quality that defines spirits,
bodies are associated with the opposed quality. For instance, spirits are defined as unique
and freed from lived experience while bodies are defined as general forms that are bound
by material constraints. Bodies die. Bodies also need sleep. Death and sleep are not
experiences of the spirit. In addition, Turing writes, “matter is meaningless in the absence
of spirit” (qtd in Hodges 64). So bodies are meaningless, but spirits are meaning-giving.
He writes that bodies “hold on to” spirits while alive. Another key term Turing uses is
“mechanisms,” which he puts in scare quotes. This word choice suggests a notion of
bodies as mechanical, programmed, automatic. Earlier in the essay Turing writes that
bodies serve to “amplify” the working of spirits. Again, this word choice works
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metaphorically. Here bodies are like speakers or amplifiers that help to project the sound
(content/data) of a person or recording. Spirit is active and meaningful. The matter of
bodies is instrumental and serves to aid but not contribute or change the content of the
spirit. This suggests a definition of bodies that are passive content, form with no content.
Spirits, on the other hand, are defined as active content of a person, identity that is
indifferent to form. In all of these qualities, the qualities of spirit are contrary to the
qualities of bodies.
By drawing upon the antithesis between bodies and spirit, Turing is drawing from
a common place of arguments. The antithetical relationship is not a new concept that
Turing introduces or extends. Instead, this antithesis would have been an accepted notion.
As Fahnestock explains, antithesis builds a new argument based on accepted notions of
antithesis. Corbett classifies contrary and contradictions as common topics. These
common topics are to be used to generate or discover new arguments. In order to develop
a new argument, Turing started with the common topic of an antithetical relation between
bodies and spirits that his audience would have readily accepted. But what then, if not a
new relation, was Turing trying to argue? In this essay, Turing works from antithesis
between bodies and spirits in order to posit a new argument that perhaps spirits can
continue to live in a number of different kinds of bodies.
Antithesis can also be found in the macro organization of the essay. The
organization is in the form of antithesis in so far as the position posited in the opening is
first refuted and then the contrary position is established in the final paragraph. In the first
paragraph, Turing introduces a notion of biological determinism, which is exactly the
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notion that he seeks to reject. He writes, “it used to be supposed in Science that if
everything was known about the Universe at any particular moment then we can predict
what it will be through all the future” (qtd in Hodges 64). The second paragraph moves to
a notion where spirits are the key meaning-gives, but they are also eternally connected to
bodies: “As McTaggart shews [sic] matter is meaningless in the absence of
spirit…Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter but certainly
not always the same kind of body” (qtd in Hodges 64). Then, in the final two short
paragraphs, Turing considers how spirits may move from body to body as our material
existence ages and dies. He questions, “why we have bodies at all; why we do not or
cannot live free as spirits and communicate as such?” (qtd in Hodges 64). This structure
creates antithesis between biological determinism, which he rejects, for the alternative of
all-determining spirit with passive bodies. This antithetical structure pivots on the claim
that bodies and spirits are eternally connected but not always to the same body. This
antithesis form creates a sense that there are only two alternatives, as Richard Lanham
explains, that are mutually exclusive: matter is either all determining or spirit is all
determining. No middle ground is possible. In addition, the antithesis structure transitions
so that the notion of biological determinism is negated through the move to affirm spirit.
Finally, how may we see antithesis on the formal level, the sight and sound of the
sentence? Fahnestock defines as antithesis as a schema of parallel phrases connecting
opposed idea. To begin, nowhere in Turing’s essay do we find a schema of antithesis as
defined by Fahnestock. But this does not mean that we cannot find the sense of antithesis,
as described by Lanham, in the formal structure Turing’s writing. First, many of the
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sentences bodies and spirits alternate between the subject and the object. For instance,
Turing writes, “the body by reason of being a living body can ‘attract’ and hold on to a
‘spirit’… spirit finds a new body sooner or later…The body provides something for the
spirit to look after and use” (qtd in Hodges 64). In each of these cases, bodies and spirits
are separated into the subject and object. As Corbett explains, contrary antithesis creates
a relation where, in this case, bodies and spirits are mutually exclusive (129-131). In the
form of Turing’s essay, that separation can even be found on the level of the sentence by
separating the terms into either the subject or the predicate. This separation creates a
visible and structural divide between bodies and spirits. In addition, bodies and spirits are
associated with different kinds of actions. Bodies “can ‘attract’ and hold.” “The body
provides something for the spirit to look after and use.” These verbs—‘can attract and
hold’ and ‘provides’—put bodies in an instrumental or useful role. Bodies provide
resources. Bodies hold and attract. The actions that bodies perform are in the service of
something else, and that something else, for Turing, is spirit. Meanwhile “spirit finds a
new body.” Spirits communicate; they do things and they use bodies. In these cases, spirit
has the will to find, use, and look after bodies. Sprits act on the basis of will. Bodies are
passive resources that hold and amplify the will of spirits.

Purpose of Body and Mind Antitheses
This relation that I’ve described above is far from unique. This can be found in volumes
and volumes of philosophical and scientific theory. As Hodges points out, “Alan could
have found many of these ideas in his reading of Eddington while still at [Sherborne]
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school” (64). Arthur Eddington wrote The Nature of the Physical World, which Turing
had been reading since he first arrived at Sherborne. Eddington was a Quaker who sought
scientific justification for his religious beliefs. His book explicitly explains the human
body as a kind of machine. This machine of our bodies facilitates the working of human
free will.
This notion of bodies and spirits that both Eddington and Turing presume can be
found throughout the history of philosophy and rhetoric. This contrary antithesis has been
a common place for defining not only bodies, but also for defining what kinds of
knowledge is valued in philosophy and science. This tradition assumes that bodies are
passive and meaningless without mind or spirit. Likewise, Alan Turing writes of bodies
that are meaningless, mechanistic, and passive; this is the result of long-standing
discursive codes that defines bodies as opposed to knowledge. Out of this context, it is no
wonder that Alan Turing could envision a way for his friend Christopher’s active, wise
spirit to transcend and overcome the death of a passive bodily container. Turing clearly
indicates that any body will suffice. He writes, “spirit’s really eternally connected with
matter but not always by the same kind of body.” And that when a particular body dies
“spirit finds a new body sooner or later.” In other words, the particularity of a human’s
body is irrelevant. Spirits need to live or reside in bodies, but spirit can move from body
to body. Equipped with this antithetical relationship between bodies and minds, Turing
will later invent a thinking machine. However, later we will find that bodies in Turing’s
text play a more complex and even active role in their relation to thinking and mind.

51

Movements of Antithesis
Lanham uses an active, physical metaphor to explain the rhetorical work of antithesis.
Antithesis performs a rhetorical Judo: “by keeping the phrase but inverting its meaning
we use our opponent's own power to overcome him” (122). Antithesis sets up contraries
but only in order to throw one under the dominance of
the other. In the practice of Judo, as with antithesis, the
superior athlete may not be stronger. No… it is trickier
than that. The dominating athlete uses the forms and
techniques of Judo to turn strength of the opponent into
the opponent’s own downfall. The image to the left is a
Figure 4: Olympic pictogram of Judo

pictogram of a Judo match. The two opponents meet

in the middle. They touch. The body of one seems to meld indistinguishable into the body
of the other. This figure looks deceptively like a caring or sharing embrace. However, at
the heart of this connection we have antithesis and opposition. The two meet, touch,
balance into each other only to try to master. Brut strength will not win this opposition. If
one opponent were to throw in all of his strength, then he would lose his balance. Once
balance is lost, the match is over. The superior opponent knows how to match strength
while maintaining balance. By maintaining that balance, the superior opponent can turn
the power of her opponent into the crucial move to dominate the lesser opponent.
Fahnestock writes that antithesis is most complete when the figure is set in two
parallel and balanced phrases (46). By setting up the figure in a balanced structure,
antithesis gives a sense of evenness and completeness. Just as with the body and mind
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antithesis, the two are set up as two poles out of which the world can be divided neatly
and cleanly between the two. This appearance of balance, according to Lanham, also
gives a sense of naturalness or inevitability (Analyzing Prose 125). Fahnestock may agree
with this claim as she writes that antithesis is strongest when the readers already buy into
the opposed relation (58). When readers come across this balanced yet oppositional
figure, it appears to contain everything, both the negative and the affirmative. Both sides
of the coin are visible by connecting the antithesis. The writer appears to be revealing all:
the light and the dark, the heads and the tales, statement and counterstatement.
However, by setting up a figure that claims to show both sides, the figure creates
a logical fallacy of false opposition. The figure may tell the reader that it shows
everything, both light and dark; however, all shades of grey and all color are hidden in
the figure. By dividing the opposition into two balanced, seemingly complete opposed
pairs, antithesis hides more than it reveals. Antithesis hides the grey areas between the
two opposites. The contrary relations of antithesis also hide how the two things or ideas
may create relations of sharing and co-construction rather. This is especially true for
contrary and contradiction. Only difference is a relation that allows for opposition while
at the same time preserving complex connections and similarity.
Antithesis also appears to be natural or inevitable, as if there is no other way to
understand the relation between the two opposites. As Fahnestock argues, this figure
“exploits the existence of many “natural” opposites in the vocabularies of languages”
(Fahnestock 47). In the case of body-mind dualism, the figure of antithesis does not
simply set up balance between the two: bodies and minds are the two parts that make up
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our world. More specifically, if the figure of antithesis sets up these opponents so that
one is clearly poised to dominate the other, then the figure sets up from the start a relation
where minds are the dominating, constructing opponent.
This relation of contrary antithesis is obvious in Turing’s essay. Bodies are
associated with passive, instrumental verbs. At the same time, spirit is associated actions
that are willful, productive, and meaning-giving. By setting up this balance that divides
the world into passive bodies and active minds, the figure of antithesis creates a sense of
natural, inevitable opposition. Everything associated with bodies appears naturally
opposed to minds. Women, nature, emotions, sex, bodily desires: all of these fall neatly
and naturally as opposed to minds, knowledge production, and agency. In the figure of
antithesis, the split appears natural and inevitable.

Feminist Critique of Antithesis
When feminists identify and critique the contrary relation between bodies and
knowledge, their insights are meaningful to women because the critique identifies the
means through which women have been systemically excluded from the very definition
of reason, logic, and knowledge. And the significance goes beyond this important
contribution. This feminist critique matters because they reveals what men have to gain,
or what men seek to gain, by defining bodies in opposition to reason. Men gain a means
to elevate the knowledge they produce to the level of universal, eternal, objective truth.
This gives their knowledge a power of indisputable truth. In addition, by creating
universal truths that transcend bodies, this knowledge has a power over bodies and a
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power over and beyond our human lives. When we break down the antithesis between
bodies and knowledge, we can begin to see the rich, productive, and politically
significant ways in which bodies inform our knowledge production. We also begin to
break down the grip of universal truth in favor of particular, contextually contingent
knowledge.
Even at a young age, Alan Turing learned to discipline his body in order to
communicate. In particular, as will become a theme throughout his life, Alan Turing
invented technological means of controlling his body so that he can ‘properly’ develop as
a student. For example, young Alan Turing had terrible handwriting. As Hodges explains,
young Turing’s handwriting problems “plagued him” (14). In fact, adult Alan Turing had
pretty messy writing. As a child, he couldn’t seem to write without getting ink all over his
hands, little arms, and his writing table. This was a serious problem. At the elite
Sherborne School, students were evaluated more on their ability to conform to standards
of decorum than they were on their course work. Likewise, the neatness and orderliness
of his writing and physical appearance was evaluated as much, or even more, than the
content of his writing. At a young age, Alan Turing learned that controlling and training
his body was a prerequisite for educated young men.
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Turing’s first and second inventions, at the age of 11, were writing machines. On
April Fool’s Day, 1923, Turing describes his first invention to his mother: “Guess what I
am writing with. It is an invention of my own it is a fountain pen… you see to fill it
scweeze E and let go and the ink is sucked up and it is full [sic]” (ctd Hodges 14). This
squiggly line sketch does not appear to represent a particularly promising solution to this
problem. Apparently this new
device was intended to slowly
control the ink to avoid
smearing onto his arms, shirts,
and tables. This particular letter,
which was written using his
pen, does not necessarily
demonstrate better handwriting.
A couple of months later, he
Figure 5: Letter to Mother and Father with Diagram of Fountain Pen.
1929.

wrote about his second
invention: a typewriter with

“funny little rounds” for letters that press against ink. By this time he gave up on legible
handwriting in favor of mechanical writing. Turing needed to discipline his body in order
to progress as a student. At this time in his life, his body was the problem. He solved that
problem through these childhood inventions, through these technologies.
Young Turing sought to train his body in order to conform to the standards of an
educated young man. These can be seen as small, literal manifestations of what Foucault

56

would identify in his lectures on govermentality as “technologies of the self.” However,
for Foucault, these technologies of the self are much larger than any literal technology.
Technologies of the self refer to a broad set of practices, laws, conventions, and
discourses that individuals practice in order to represent, and even constitute, themselves
as subjects. Chapter 4 addresses the interactions and co-constructions between bodies and
writing (a mode of technology of the self) and will engage with Foucault’s concepts in
detail. For now, I raise this concept in order to call attention to this small example, of
which many more will be discussed in Chapter 4, in which technology is used to
discipline Turing’s body. This literal controlling bodies through technologies of the self
is a specific instantiation of a larger epistemological necessity to control bodies for the
sake of knowledge production.

Controlling Bodies
Adrianna Cavarero explains that controlling bodies and managing bodies is of vital
importance: it is only through controlling or excluding bodies that claims of universal
truth can be posited. Cavarero explains that Plato first defined philosophy as the pursuit
of true forms and as antithetical from bodily life. For Plato, philosophy is most like
mathematics4. This connection would have been especially meaningful for Plato because
logos can also mean numbers (Cavarero 152-3). Associating philosophy and Truth with
numbers and mathematics was a much more appealing option than associating Truth with
4

Toulmin and Goodfield suggest that Plato’s theory of matter, which explains all matter
in terms of quantifiable, geometric shape, and volume, would also reduce all physical
science to mathematics (75-82).
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bodies and speakers. Bodies and speakers are all different. They change over time. They
live in concrete reality. The particularity of a concrete body or context informs the truth
produced. For Plato, Truth and true forms must be free of the instability of material
reality. True forms must be timeless, invariable, and therefore abstract. Numbers are not
necessarily connected to material reality. One can think of numbers, count, solve
problems, without ever associating those numbers with physical things. In addition, the
relation between numbers is always stable. The value of 3 + 2 is always the same no
matter what is being counted. As Plato associates truth with numbers (a kind of logos)
and distances truth from speech (another kind of logos), truth comes to be understood as
abstract, disembodied, and universal. Again, this separation allows philosophers to
maintain an illusion of universal truths that are independent from the particularity of the
speaker.
This split allows for a tradition of philosophy that promises to construct Universal
Truth. This must have been so very empowering to those who ‘discover’ truths. Their
ideas were not particular, contextual ideas that may have begun and ended with the life of
the person. Instead, they were discovering timeless truth. They were articulating truths
that existed for all time, for all men, in any place. This form of knowledge—the
knowledge that can never and will never change—was the premium for philosophers.
While Cavarero argues that the body-mind dualism offers the promise of eternal
truths, in the antithesis titled Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death, Evelyn Fox Keller argues
that, for scientists, this split may offer the hope of transcending human mortality. This
hope is “a perennial motif that underlies much of scientific creativity” (39). Science is
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driven by “the urge to fathom the secrets of nature, and the collateral hope that, in
fathoming the secrets of nature, we will fathom the ultimate secrets (and hence gain
control) of our own mortality” (Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death 39). Keller argues that,
within scientific discourse, the divide between man and nature, a divide that leaves
women on the side of nature, is a longstanding and well-entrenched figure of antithesis
that divides the knowledge of men and science is separate from the secrets of nature, life,
and women. Women and the natural world have been conceptualized as those who can
nurture and birth new life and hence as mysteries that need to be understood, controlled,
and replicated. This work suggests an implicit hope that knowledge will lead to
addressing man’s oldest problem: death. While biology has historically been a science of
endless mysteries and iteration, Keller identifies a new rhetorical strategy within
molecular biology and genetics that mimics or parallels the rhetoric of physics and math.
For the first time, Keller argues, biology appeals to the ethos and logic of physics and
math: biology became a science with the codes that could unlock all mysteries. Once
biology could unlock the mysteries of life, then the scientists may eventually control life
and also death.

Controlling Turing’s Body
In many ways, Turing was a product and beneficiary of this long-standing antithesis
between body and mind. Turing was trained to strive for this premium, universal truth.
He studied Bertrand Russell’s The Principles of Mathematics, which outlines the abstract
logical foundations that cement mathematics as an objective and rational science (Hodges
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90-91). J. David Bolter calls the Turing machine the “embodiment” of formal logic. “In
the computer,” Bolter explains, “symbolic logic has achieved what it could not achieve in
the cryptic pages of Russell’s Principia; it has become the foundation of computerized
mathematics” (71). Turing was familiar with Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz’ efforts in
the 16th century to create a mathematical code to precisely calculate and evaluate all of
human knowledge (Leavitt 28-30 and Bolter 73). When studying the relationship between
mathematics and “ordinary life” with Ludwig Wittgenstein, Turing disagreed with the
philosopher by insisting that a strictly formal logic and code could be developed to
calculate knowledge, including what Wittgenstein called “common sense” (Leavitt 146147). Through his education and his research, Turing learned that premium knowledge
was abstract, transcendent truths. These logical foundations of his work are only possible
by taking great efforts to abstract knowledge from any particular body, any particular
historical time, and even any particular linguistic construction, which the antithesis of
body and mind makes possible.
In addition, Turing was also very explicitly pursuing the secret of life and the
potential to master death. Keller’s research specifically applies to biology and genetics,
but her same claims can be extended to understand Turing’s essay. By defining mind in a
contrary relation with bodies, Turing can first imagine human life in alternative bodies
and then will go on in his career to suggest that a kind of intelligence may exist in
mechanical bodies. In this early article, Turing pursues scientific explanations for
imagining life after death. Toward the end of his life, Turing will explicitly develop the
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connections between biology, code, and the control of life in his work on morphogenesis,
which is the study of cell growth and development.
Those who seek Universal Truths and eternal life are not the only ones to benefit
from the antithesis between body and mind. Susan Bordo explains that even poststructuralist philosophers, known for their rejection of foundations and universal truth,
also work out of a notion of body and mind antithesis. In particular, postmodern notions
of free play, in many ways, depend on abstracting knowledge from particular bodies.
Bordo recognizes that post-modern theorists effectively challenge the “view-fromoutside” that is idealized in much of philosophy and science. However, it its place, postmodern theorists have offered a view-from-everywhere. Bordo writes, “the spirit of
epistemological jouissance suggested by the images of cyborg, trickster, and the
metaphors of dance, and so forth obscure the located, limited, inescapably partial, and
always personally invested nature of human “story making” (228). Postmodern play may
not claim to have unbiased access to stable knowledge. However, it does claim a kind of
transcendent form of knowledge construction. This free-play of ideas and words
transcends the situated and grounded of particular physical contexts.
Instead of this “epistemological jouissance,” Bordo asks for a humble attempt at
epistemology, which she calls a view-from-somewhere (145). This view-fromsomewhere is always limited and informed by our particular bodies and contexts.
Similarly, Cheryl Glenn associates her feminist historiography with resistant
postmodernism. Unlike what she calls ludic postmodernism, which is play without any
established location, Glenn explains that her feminist histories of rhetoric resist narratives

61

of The history of rhetoric and instead asks “Whose history? Whose rhetoric? Which
rhetoric?” (5). Answering these questions require scholars to account for the unique,
relational embodied experiences and how our embodied experiences shape how we
produce knowledge, what knowledge we produce, and the rhetoric we compose.
Although Turing’s rhetoric suggests a transcendent view of knowledge and mind, as I
continue to develop the chiasmic rhetoric that connects bodies and discourse, so too,
Turing’s rhetoric will appear in a particular social, historical, and embodied context that
informs his rhetoric and the knowledge he produces.

Losing Antithesis in “Nature of Spirit”
I’ve demonstrated how antithesis appears both in the concept as well as the form of
Turing’s short essay. I’ve also demonstrated how, through its history in Western
philosophy and science, the antithesis between bodies and minds has been reified over
and over again. And, with each new iteration, this antithesis allows for notions of stable,
transcendent truth as well as an prerequisite of managing and controlling bodies and an
underlying patriarchy that excludes women (or those associated with the category
feminine) from intellectual as well as political engagement. But this choice between mind
and body is a false alternative. This is based on a shared assumption the relation between
bodies and mind is a figure of contrary antithesis. Antithesis between body and mind
allows for notions like Turing’s that transcendence from bodies is not only desirable it is
also potentially possible. However, even in Turing’s writing, the contrary relation
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between body and mind begins to blur. These are places where the mutual exclusivity of
bodies and minds is impossible to maintain.
While Turing clearly does reify the antithesis between bodies and minds, in the
argument and the form of “Nature of Spirit,” the contrary antithesis between bodies and
minds begins to break down. Turing’s body and life intertwine with his writing and
thinking in a variety of different ways. One of these ways that body and mind antithesis
breaks down lies in the fact that Turing was motivated to write “Nature of Spirit” out of a
desire to be reunited with his friend Christopher Morcom. Beyond that, in the style and
syntactical level of this essay, Turing’s writing figures bodies and spirits with some
connections and relations.
The most obvious location where the body mind antithesis in this essay breaks
down or begins to blur is in his frequent use of ‘I.’ He writes, “Personally, I think that
spirit is really eternally connected with matter. I did believe it possible for a spirit at
death to go to a universe entirely separate from our own, but now I consider that matter
and spirit are so connected…” An ‘I’ can never map cleanly onto one side or another of
the body mind-dualism. This personal pronoun refers to Turing himself. This writer must
necessarily connect both body and mind, even if this is simply on the level that a body is
required for writing to occur. ‘I’ refers to Turing as a person. This includes his thinking,
but this thinking does not come out of nowhere. Instead, this thinking, in this text in
particular, is highly influenced by Turing’s personal experiences, his emotions, his
desires, and his feelings of pain and loss. This ‘I’ does not develop these ideas out of
nowhere. Instead, this ‘I’ draws these ideas directly from his research, his education, and
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also his upbringing as a Christian. In addition, this ‘I’ connects the text to Turing as a
body. He wrote this by hand. His body sat in Christopher Morcom’s room, with a pen in
his hand, and a lamp so that he could see. By writing ‘I,’ Turing affirms that a person
with a body, mind, history, education, culture, and language put a pen to paper to
articulate these concepts.
In addition, Turing’s use of ‘I’ is prominent. He uses ‘I’ to own all of his claims
and ideas. Instead of stating his claims about the relation between bodies and spirits as
objective facts, Turing places himself at the center of this essay. In the first paragraph, in
which Turing is reviewing established literature, he does not use any ‘I’s. However, as
soon as he turns to articulate his understanding of the ostensibly antithetical relation
between bodies and spirit, he uses ‘I’ in all but 2 sentences. By structuring each sentence
so that the ‘owning’ subject is the author himself, Turing calls attention again and again
to source of this knowledge. He makes no attempt to posit objective claims about reality.
He does not objectively describe the relation between body and spirit as if he were
describing certain, concrete facts about reality. Instead, he places himself as the active
subject of each sentence. The claims he develops can only be read by first remembering
that a particular British, young, well-to-do, white, gay, male person has developed and
owned these ideas.

From Antithesis towards a New Figure
In so many ways, the figure of antithesis is insufficient for conveying the relation
between bodies and minds. The figure creates a black and white opposition where we

64

need to find more shades of grey. The figure appears to be balanced and complete, but its
use for the body/mind dualism has continually given mind the dominant role and body
the subordinate. The relationship between bodies and minds is far more complex than
antithesis allows. For instance, antithesis cannot explain Turing’s inventive thinking that,
although committed to abstract logic, was also surprisingly concrete.
In the following chapters, I will develop how chiasmus is a rhetorical figure that
more fully accounts for the complex relations and interactions between our bodies, our
writing, and our knowledges. This figure is necessary to understand the interactions
between bodies/knowledge and writing/idea. Antithesis and chiasmus are related but
distinct rhetorical figures. Fahnestock includes antithesis between the two phrases as one
possible aspect of chiasmus (128-9). Lanham describes chiasmus as a larger, umbrella
category under which antithesis can be included (122). While these figures are related,
antithesis and chiasmus construct very different relationships between their parts. Both
rhetorical figures structure kinds of relations between things, ideas, or phrases. Like
chiasmus, antithesis creates parallel relation between the two parts. In addition, like
chiasmus, antithesis creates a tension or a dissonance between the parts. However, unlike
chiasmus, the relation created in antithesis is creates a linear, even teleological relation
between the parts. The figure chiasmus creates a more complex relation between the parts
of the figure of speech as well as a more complex relation between bodies and language.
Chiasmus allows for difference and complex locations of similarity. Whereas antithesis
between body and mind constructed a mutually exclusive relation, chiasmus potentially
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creates a co-constructing, dynamic, and productive relation between bodies and
discourses that produce knowledge.
Four years after penning “Nature of Spirit,” Turing published his groundbreaking
essay “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.” The
importance of this essay cannot be underestimated; this article lays the logical foundation
for digital computation as well as applies that logical foundation into a surprisingly
simple solution to a long disputed mathematical question. Because of its importance,
mathematicians and computer scientists have studied it again and again. However, we
know nothing about his process of developing these ideas. He kept no notes. He
published no preliminary research. He had not even given lectures in which we may be
able to find traces of his early development of these ideas. How did he develop these
innovative concepts? This was the question that his research assistant asked Turing
decades later. While laying in a sheep pasture, on a lovely summer day, Turing watched
the clouds pass by. And he figured it out (Hodges 105). There in the grass, Turing figured
out how to invent the universal computing machine. This process of invention cannot be
explained through an antithesis of mind and body. A more complex intersection of body
and mind was at play on that sunny summer day.
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CHIASMUS 3:
INTERSECTING BODIES AND DISCOURSES

“Chiasmic in their interdependency, but never fully collapsed into one another”
~Butler, Bodies that Matter

“The behavior of the computer at any moment is determined by the symbols which he is
observing, and his “state of mind at that moment”
~ Turing “On Computable Numbers”

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated the ways that Turing’s early writing reinscribed
an antithesis between bodies and minds. However, I also demonstrated the various
stylistic and formal ways in which a hard antithesis of mutual exclusivity broke down to
reveal locations of blurring and intersection. In this chapter I will draw on scholars of
both rhetoric and gender theory in order to posit the first move towards chiasmic rhetoric:
this is a move to intersect bodies and discourse. This chiasmic rhetoric at the intersections
of bodies and discourses will help me to demonstrate the many ways that Turing’s
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knowledge is produced in tight connection with embodied experiences. Bodies are
present in Turing’s technical writing in “On Computable Numbers, with an Application
to the Entscheidungsproblem.” In addition, bodies are central for his theoretical
contributions and breakthroughs in digital computation. This chapter, therefore,
challenges some common ways of understanding digital technology as disembodied. This
gives bodies more significant roles in science and technology studies because bodies are
the starting place for solving abstract theoretical problems and for inventing digital
computation.
After providing the disciplinary and social context in which Turing wrote “On
Computable Numbers,” I will review the definition and theories of chiasmus in rhetorical
theory. Then, I’ll relate the rhetorical properties of chiasmus to the notions of chiasmic
bodies in feminist texts. I will also demonstrate how these chiasmic relations break many
of the objective conventions of rhetoric of science. Finally, I’ll analyze Turing’s texts,
looking for places where bodies take space and intersect in ways that are productive for
knowledge production.
In the four years between writing “Nature of Spirit” and the publication of “On
Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem” little changed
in Turing's daily life. Most of his days seem filled with thoughtful quiet stereotypes of
what the “life of the mind” looks like: He lived alone. He worked alone. He ran alone. At
Kings College in Cambridge faculty and students dined together, which were Turing’s
most regular social interactions. He also went out to pubs with friends, saw plays, and
generally enjoyed a quiet but rich personal and professional life. Throughout this time

68

during and after his undergraduate studies, his life occupied many of the same offices,
seminar rooms, streets, and labs. He engaged with many of the same friends and advisors
day after day, year after year. He graduated in 1934 but earned a fellowship that allowed
him to continue to live in Cambridge. He rowed every morning in college. After
graduating he ran every morning. His friend group remained largely the same: small, allmale, intellectual group of close friends. He never successfully entered the most
prominent echelon on Cambridge society. Nor did he seem to try. His other friends joined
social clubs. Turing never did. Perhaps, as Andrew Hodges suggests, this reservation to
move from the margins to the center of elite society was a protection (78).
Although homosexual acts were illegal and widely stigmatized in British society
generally, Hodges argues that King’s College was a unique place. Turing's sexuality
seems to have been common knowledge among his peer-group at Kings. David Leavitt
describes the culture at Kings as “an ideal environment for intellectual and erotic
experimentation, encouraging dissent while protecting the incipient dissident from the
sort of violent counter-reaction that his ideas and behavior might have provoked in a
more public forum” (23). Hodges and Leavitt make these claims based in large part to the
presence of other prominent, open gay intellectuals, including E. M. Forester, who lived
on the same street as Turing, and the theoretical mathematician G. H. Hardy.
“Homosexuality, in private,” Agar writes, “was a key part of the college culture” (69).
And Agar goes on to describe the school as “a rare oasis, sympathetic both socially and
intellectually” (69). Kings had a reputation for teaching students to question the status
quo. As such, the school also had a “gay reputation,” according to Leavitt, that was open
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to discussion and practice of alternative sexualities (18). Within Turing’s friend group,
sex, pleasure, bodies, and desires were openly discussed as lived realities and subjects of
psychoanalytic and theoretical inquiry. In the letters between Turing and his friends,
young men all suggest that the boys who attend elite public schools like Sherborn were
confortable and knowledgeable about same-sex attraction and affection. Hodges suggests
that Cambridge was perhaps the one place where Turing could develop personally,
intellectually, and socially as a “complete, consistent whole” (78). Kings was a safe place
for Turing. “He simply accepted it,” Leavitt concludes but “assumed (wrongly) that
others would as well” (19). Within this space, Turing built a good life. He also began
building a name for himself as a mathematician and logician.

Defining Chiasmus
Chiasmus is a bit trickier to define than antithesis. Antithesis has been defined and named
relatively consistently throughout the history of rhetoric, but chiasmus has had an
inconsistent role in the history of rhetorical figures (Fahnestock 131). To be sure,
chiasmus as a figure can be found in very ancient text and has been identified as a critical
figure for ancient Hebrew writers (Lund). However, within handbooks and studies of
rhetorical figures, chiasmus is somewhat obscured because its primary qualities can be
found in different ways within many different rhetorical figures. Chiasmus doesn't make
its debut until Cicero’s Rhetorica Ad Herennium, several centuries after the first
handbook of rhetorical forms. Even when chiasmus does appear as a rhetorical form, it is
named inconsistently, but the same general features are included. Cicero names this
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figure commutatio one of the many related forms of chiasmus, which “occurs when two
discrepant thoughts are so expressed by transposition that the latter follows from the
former although contradictory to it” (Cicero 325). Both Lanham and Fahnestock think of
chiasmus as a genus figure, under which several species of figures derive. Epanados,
antimetobole, hysteron proteron, commutatio, permutatio, palindrome5: these are all
different positions of the same root figure. For scholars of rhetoric, looking for the X that
marks the spot identifies chiasmus and its relatives. Chiasmus is composed of two (or
more) connected phrases, which may be contrary, contradictory, differing or
complimentary. The first phrase of the figure is inverted or reversed in the second phrase.
“Ask not what your country can do for you but what you can do for your country.” This
creates a mirror image between the first and the second phrase.

Form of Chiasmus
Fahnestock identifies the chiasmic figure antimetoble in the most formally specific way
(123-5). This figure must have two balanced phrases connected into a single sentence. In
addition, at least two of the terms in the first phrase must be repeated in the second. This
is the easiest variation to find because of the repetition of terms as well as reversed
repetition of the grammatical structure. However, most of the definitions of chiasmus
allow for great flexibility in the wording and structure. Fahnestock writes that chiasmus
5

Epanados is an inverse repetition on the level of the phrase (Quinn 93). Antimetoble or
commutatio is an epanados that also includes antithesis between the two phrases (Quinn
93). Hysteron proteron means a phrase reverses the temporal sequence (Quinn 43).
Permutatio is a change with a repetition (Lanham, A Handlist 76). Palindrome is a
chiasmus in letters that make up a word or phrase (Quinn 93).
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can use synonyms or grammatical variations in the second phrase. This means that the
same basic X structure is preserved, Fahnestock allows for some variation of wording
(124). Richard Lanham, predictably more flexible, defines chiasmus only by the
grammatical structure (122-3). The words in both of the first and the second phrase
correspond, but the correspondence could be that of synonym, similar parts of speech,
similar sounds, same first letter, parallel ideas, or contrary ideas. The only specific
requirement for Lanham is that chiasmus is a formal structure composed of two parts,
which could be phrases, sentences, or whole sections of books, and those parts must
reflect or reverse in some way. Quinn defines chiasmus figure as epanados, which is
“organizing spatially around a center” (95). Mardy Grothe, author of a book entirely
filled with examples of chiasmus, Never let a fool Kiss You or a Kiss Fool You, even find
chiasmus when the first half of the phrase is absent. He calls this an implied chiasmus.
We find it whenever a popular saying or quote is exactly reversed in order to give the
popular phrase a different meaning. For example, “time wounds all heels” (115). Grothe,
who is ever excited about chiasmus writes, “the fun of implied chiasmus is dual first you
have the pleasure of figuring out what's been reversed; then you get to marvel over the
ingenuity behind these inspired chiastic creating” (114).
The size of chiasmus ranges from whole books, as is found commonly in biblical
chiasmus and hysteron proteron6 to very small forms like the palindrome. Palindrome is a

6

Quinn defines hysteron-proteron as another kind of chiasmus. It means to reverse the
chronological order. To put the horse before the cart, as Quinn puts it (43). In Greek, it
means “the latter [put as] the former” (Lanham Handlist 58). The etymology of this word
is the same as hysterics, which means traveling womb. When something (in this case
time) moves about where it should not, to create an unsettled effect.
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one-word chiasmus. They can be read from front to back and back to front. My favorite
palindrome is “taco cat,” which now a widely popular with its own Internet memes, video
loops, websites, and merchandise. The tiny palindrome is the chiasmus that takes the least
amount of space. It is also likely the hardest to identify. From whole books to the word
“dad,” chiasmus can be expansive or diminutive. The same formal X structure applies.
Chiasmus is a crucial figure in biblical studies, most famously by Nils Lund in
Chiasmus in the New Testament. The sheer volumes of texts on chiasmus in biblical texts
serves as evidence of the established prominence of chiasmus as a central rhetorical
figure in biblical rhetoric (see review in Man’s “the Value of Chiasm for New Testament
Interpretation”). For instance, Ronald Man argues that chiasmus functions as so much
more than an ornament. Chiasmus functions in biblical texts as “a means toward more
effective communication of their messages. In the case of chiasmus, this is accomplished
by underlining the central emphasis or clarifying correspondences in the text” (154). But,
scholars of biblical texts most often define the figure with an addition of a central focal
point. This includes a third element: central point or pivot point. Fahnestock calls this an
additional element that “populates the center” (126). This formal structure looks like
ABCBA. John Beck, in “Biblical Chiasmus: Exploring Structure for Meaning,” argues
that, in biblical studies, chiasmus must contain a significant central element connecting
the first and last phrase. Whenever the center pivot point is present, that point is of crucial
importance for scriptural interpretation and even rhetorically symbolic of Christ at the
center of the on the chiasmic cross. However, many other biblical scholars define
chiasmus with or without a center (Man 146-147). This formal definition of chiasmus
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will be central to connecting Turing’s body with the knowledge he produced. And this
argument that Turing’s body matters for this thinking is especially unusual considering
that this article, “On Computable Numbers,” contributes to a field that had long created
and maintained a notion of knowledge and truth in mathematics that are separate and free
of the weight of bodies.

Universal and Relative Schools of Mathematics
I will review, as briefly as I can, the major theoretical conversations and trends into
which Turing was contributing and also intervening. Understanding this context is
significant for my goal of identifying chiasmic rhetoric in this article because we find that
Turing was engaging with a discourse community that rigorously separated abstract logic
from any kind of material or embodied context. Given this context, Turing’s inclusion of
embodied experiences is an especially surprising and also especially disruptive inclusion.
Connections between material and logical theory are a-typical for the field of
mathematics. In his glossary of scientific words, biochemist and science fiction writer
Isaac Asimov, defines mathematics as an abstract science with no necessary connection
to material reality. He also notes that the abstract nature of mathematics is part of its
appeal for Plato and other pursuers of universal truth. Max Newman, this more concrete
thinker, advised Turing on his undergraduate thesis and also taught Turing the principles
of mathematics, which covered Bertrand Russell and J. H. C. Whitehead’s Principia
Mathematica, David Hilbert’s “Mathematical Problems,” and Kurt Gödel’s theorems of
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incompleteness and incompatibility (“On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia
Mathematica and Related Systems I”).
Russell, Whitehead, and Hilbert represent the old guard of modernist logic and
mathematics. They pursued universal principles that would explain all phenomena. These
universal principles of mathematics would, as Hilbert, Russell and Whitehead hoped,
create order and control out of an otherwise chaotic world (Leavitt 40-41). Hilbert
published his attempts at universal foundations for mathematics and logic in 1901. This
was a new century, and this would be a century of order, logic, and reason. At the same
time Hilbert published his 27 problems. These problems were, according to Hilbert, the
most significant questions for mathematician. With the publication of these questions,
Hilbert set the agenda for theoretical mathematician (Hodges 91). The three most
significant problems were “Is mathematics complete,” “Is mathematics consistent,” and
“Is mathematics decidable.” Together, these questions defined mathematics as a science.
Hilbert posited these as questions, but he also assumed that with time mathematicians
would find positive solutions to these questions. The program for mathematics, as Hilbert
defined it, was to prove that mathematics is complete, consistent, and decidable
(Copeland 46-47; Hodges 91; Leavitt 40). This means that mathematics would always,
given enough time, be solvable. Evelyn Fox Keller argues that mathematics maintains a
significantly different relation to knowledge and epistemology than the sciences like
chemistry, biology, or physics. These later fields are all connected and base knowledge
from material reality. Mathematics, on the other hand, is separate from material reality.
During the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, mathematicians like
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Hilbert assumed that mathematics was inherently logical, internally consistent, and
ultimately solvable. This is significantly different, Keller points out, from sciences that
draw knowledge from material phenomena due to diversity and variability of physical
world. Especially for Hilbert, the mathematical and logical universal forms are there to be
discovered. He was, as Leavitt points out, a Neo-Platonist (39). Logic and mathematical
axioms were Absolute True forms that existed above and beyond any human experience.
These axioms needed to be discovered through rigorous methods of logical proof. Leavitt
notes that Hilbert metaphorically referred to mathematics as a paradise of logic and
reason (40-41). Hilbert and his school of mathematician wanted above all else for logic,
reason, and formalism to create order out of chaos and to let peace win out over the
absurd, purposelessness of war. But the 20th century brought with it many challenges to
the hope for complete mathematics as well as WWI.
After WWI, a younger group of mathematicians began to trouble the waters in
mathematics. In particular, in 1931 (Turing was in his first year at King’s College), Kurt
Gödel falsified the first two problems: he found that mathematics is not complete and that
it is not consistent (“On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica
and Related Systems I”). Copeland explains Gödel’s theorem: “if the system is
consistent, there are statements of arithmetic that are not provable in the system—the
formal system fails to capture the ‘whole thought content’ of arithmetic” (48). This
means that mathematics is not a totalizing science capable of solving all of its problems
without drawing from non-mathematical means of signification, formalism, and
information. With these theorems, Gödel showed that the paradise of mathematics would
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always be full of black holes and that snakes would always lurk in the trees. These
schools of mathematics also represent significant political shifts (Leavitt 39). In
particular, the older group of mathematicians held idealist notions that reason, if rational
humans could only apply mathematical principles appropriately, would bring order and
also peace. That was the dream in 1900. By 1936, with one world war past and another
on the horizon, the hope was gone that universal forms could bring order and peace to
human knowledge and human civilization. All of the younger generation of men would
go on to play some part in WWII, building computers for everything from cryptology to
atom bombs. The younger generation of mathematicians seemed to take disorder, chaos,
and paradox as an unavoidable given. Gödel and others even found disorder, chaos,
creativity, and even intuition in mathematics, the most objective, ordered science.
Gödel’s findings were groundbreaking, but they still left mathematics with the
authority of decidability. In other words, mathematics could always, given enough time
and the correct procedure, find a solution to mathematical problems. Gödel felt that there
must be a way to falsify this claim, and he worked, unsuccessfully, for over a decade to
find the logical proof. This is the question that Turing tackled and his proof, almost
inadvertently, invented digital computation. One comment in particular that Newman
made may have been a starting place for Turing’s thinking. Newman referred to Hilbert’s
“definite method” for deciding all mathematical problems as a “mechanical process”
(Hodges 93, Copeland 206, Leavitt 53). Newman likely used the word mechanical
metaphorically, not literal machinery but mechanistic processes performed by human
computers, who were mostly female clerical workers (Chun 38-41) . Leavitt explains,
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“The word “mechanical,” in its original sense, had referred to manual occupation, a work
performed by human beings. By the 1930’s, however, mechanical meant gears, rotors,
vacuum tubes” (54). Newman, like Turing would continue, approached the pursuit of a
definite method for mathematic as a physical process. The difference is that Turing would
translate the physical process of a human solving a problem into a machine solving a
problem.

Turing’s Place within Mathematics
Turing enters these conversations as a young man, a relative outsider, and as a
materialist. From this position, Turing was able to solve a long-standing problem within
mathematics. And his solution, which is to way that mathematics was not a decidable
science, contributes towards the shift away from purely abstract, universal notions of
mathematics.
What is especially significant for this dissertation is that he begins with the
embodied process of human computers, thereby intersecting embodiment with abstract
mathematics. There are volumes of work on the significance of this article for
mathematics, computer science, and digital computation7. I am not attempting to extend
these discourses, which are already quite rich. This is especially true considering that
Turing’s article is a foundational text for the theories of computer science. I am seeking
to contribute to scholarly discourses on rhetorics of science and rhetorics of bodies. I will
7

Of these, I highly recommend for their detailed and accessible explanations of Turing’s
theories Copland, The Essential Turing; Petzold, The Annotated Turing; Agar, Turing
and the Universal Machine.
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draw from much of this research in order to analyze “On Computable Numbers with an
Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.” In this, we find scientific and technical
rhetoric in which the chiasmic relations between bodies and discourses of abstract
mathematics intersect in a way that is central to Turing’s argument and Turing’s machine.
This chiasmic relation between bodies and abstract mathematics then became the
foundations upon which Turing, Newman, Von Neumann and others build digital
computers as well as the field of computer science.
In “On Computable Numbers,” Alan Turing accomplishes two primary things: he
mathematics is not a decidable science and, in order to make this conclusion, Alan Turing
also invents the Turing Machine, which became a significant logical foundation for the
digital computer, although even Turing didn’t see its significance at the time8. In this
article, Turing proves that the problem of decidability could never be solved by effective
method, which is the method of logical and mathematical proof in which problems are
solved through finite steps and precise instruction so that the solution can be reproduced
exactly.
Copeland stresses that Turing’s argument specifically addresses mathematics
through effective method. Copeland finds that scholars most often get this point wrong in
8

This is a complex, theoretical, and esoteric article. The article is partially composed of
surprisingly conversational exposition and unreadable equations of symbolic
mathematics. As a scholar far outside of mathematics and computer science, I do not
claim to understand the full complexity of this article, especially as it relates to
mathematical symbolism and mathematical proofs. However, this article has been studied
and explained at length by experts in mathematics and computer science. Of these, I will
draw primarily from the work of John Copeland and Andrew Hodges, who are both
scholars of mathematics and the history of computing. Copeland in particular offers
insights as an expert in philosophical logic as well as mathematics and the history of
computing.
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so far as they conflate effective method of calculation with all methods of calculation
(“Narrow Versus Wide Mechanisms”). Copeland identifies this as the Turing-Church
fallacy: the claim that Turing found that mathematics was unsolvable by any methods.
Copeland clarifies that some mathematical problems are not solvable through effective
method. The key difference is that Turing proved that effective methods (or computable
methods) cannot solve some problems. As Hodges explains, this question means “did
there exist a definite method which could, in principle, be applied to any assertion, and
which was guaranteed to produce a correct decision as to whether that assertion was true”
(91). In Turing’s Man, Bolter identifies this method with all abstract, symbolic logical
proofs.
Turing offers the Halting Problem as one problem that cannot be solved through
effective methods. If a computer (either human or machine) was given the Halting
Problem, the computer could calculate the algorithm but would never reach a conclusion.
The mechanical (or electric) computer is important here because Turing needed to prove
that a problem would run forever without solution. If a single human being were
calculating the problem, the time spent calculating and the accuracy of the calculation
would be necessarily limited. On the other hand, when Turing replaces each activity of a
human computer “working in a disciplined but unintelligent manner” (as he writes in his
manual for the Manchester Electronic Computer Mark II) with a machine, then the
machine can run infinitely. In the case of the Halting Problem, the computer would run
infinitely because the problem would circulate back repetitively. Turing proved the
limitations of effective methods, but alternative methods may still be utilized to solve
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those problems that are undecidable through effective methods. Later in his career,
Turing would turn to methods of random selection and intuition to as possible
alternatives. I will next provide a more complete exposition of chiasmus in order to
establish the first movement of chiasmus, which is that chiasmus always connects.

Positioning Chiasmus Between Antithesis and Parallelism
Although I argue for a shift from antithesis to chiasmus as figures that structure the
relation between bodies and knowledge, the antithesis and chiasmus are actually closely
related. In fact, Lanham defines antithesis as a kind of chiasmus (125, 133). Both figures
create relations between two different things. In addition, both figures, when they are
defined in relatively strict formal terms as Fahnestock does, are composed of two phrases
that are connected in order to emphasize difference, contrary, or comparison, or changes
in degree. However, antithesis creates a relation that emphasizes opposition. Especially in
the case of contrary antithesis, this is a relation of mutual exclusivity where no
intersection or interaction is possible. In antithesis, bodies and everything associated with
bodies are cut and separate from discourse and knowledge production. But chiasmus is a
complex figure and creates a complex relation.
Chiasmus is also includes formal parallelism. Parallelism is a rhetorical figure in
which syntactical and semantic similarity repeat in at least two phrases. In actuality,
parallelism is so common and so often desirable in composition that it is much more than
rhetorical figure; this is a formal aspect of almost any piece of writing that structures
everything from sentences to whole arguments. Parallelism is used to emphasize equality,
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balance, and similarity. Parallelism could be thought of as two parallel lines. Like in
Euclidian geometry, two parallel lines on a plane will never intersect. The relation
created in parallelism is one of parity, equality, or balance. While antithesis creates an
impression of separation and mutual exclusivity that conceals any points of similarity or
sameness, parallelism is the opposite. Parallelism conveys a sense of sameness or
equality even though there may be no connections between the two concepts or phrases.
Chiasmus creates a relation that allows for both the difference that we find in
antithesis and the equality or balance that we find in parallelism. But there is one
significant difference: chiasmus always connects. With antithesis, the relation between
the parts divides to emphasize opposition. With parallelism, the relation emphasizes
similarity, but that similarity is always between parts that separate. Chiasmus must, by
definition, create intersections between two things just like the X in chi. Connection is the
key to chiasmus’ rhetorical force. While antithesis and parallelism can be read linearly,
chiasmus must be read by interpreting the levels of intersections. This means that reading
must go back and forth between the different sides, with the meaning changing through
the complex set of interactions back and forth. Chiasmus may take many forms, shapes,
and sizes, but chiasmus always connects.

Bodies in Turing’s Mathematics
According to many scholars, Turing is a thinker who creates more distance between mind
or thinking and bodies and human embodied experience. This claim is most obvious in J.
David Bolter’s book Turing’s Man. Bolter’s research focuses less on Turing’s life or his
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theories than about the larger trends in our understanding of our relationships between
humans and our technologies. According to Bolter, “Turing’s Man” is a way of
understanding the human body and human life as immaterial, purely logical, and
regulated. When Turing invents his Turing machine, according to Bolter, he embodies
pure logic. Bolter’s larger argument is that this invention then becomes the primary
metaphor framing how we understand human bodies and life. Humans then, are also
understood as pure logic, as computing machines who process information and are
hardwired in particular ways. In a lot of ways, Bolter’s claim is justifiable in Turing's
article. Turing literally integrates a human computer into a mechanical computer. He
starts with what a man can do; then he writes on top of that what a machine can be made
to do. In particular, this was taking the human work of logical proofs and writing that in
code. According to this logic, by ‘embodying’ abstract logic into digital, electric
computers, Turing and a cohort of scientists including John Von Neumann, Alfonzo
Church, and George Stibitz created a pure logic machine.
When Bolter writes of ‘embodying logic’ he does not mean human bodies or
bodies in the sense of an organic physical form. Instead, embodying means to give a
material or concrete form. This argument presumes that logic can be and has been
disembodied or without any material form. Feminist philosophers, who emphasize the
situated construction of logic, truth, and knowledge, have routinely critiqued this
argument. Andrea Nye posits one particularly focused critique in Words of Power. She
traces the material, political, and social intersections with the definition of logic. This
work adds nuance to Bolter’s claim in a number of ways. First, logic is not a single,
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timeless concept but a fluid and evolving notion of what is accepted as valid and
objective reason. Second, her research demonstrates that, although the definition of logic
is associated with objectivity, the very definition of logic is always constructed in
particular material circumstances. In this way, logic has never been disembodied. Logic
is always already in a chiasmic intersection with material and bodies.
Turing does come from a generation of thinkers who idealized abstract logic, but
his writing and theories are surprisingly embodied. Gödel and Hilbert were proponents of
abstract, formal logic. There is no doubt that Turing also held some of these notions.
However, this is not the only way that mathematics was understood. Another Cambridge
mathematician who Turing studied and also was commonly in contact with, G. H. Hardy,
critiqued Hilbert for pursing abstract logical forms. Hardy understood mathematical logic
in material terms of games in which the different aspects of mathematics are “the material
with which we play” (35 in Leavitt). In this mathematical game “the axioms correspond
to the given positions of the pieces, the process of proof to the rules for moving them, and
the demonstrable formulae to the possible positions which can occur in the game” (Hardy
35 in Leavitt). Likewise, multiple biographers note that Turing was a surprisingly
concrete thinker. When he writes about effective method of mathematics, this effective
method is a concrete process performed by a concrete body. The point here is that Turing
understands logic and mathematical process in materialist, concrete, embodied terms.
Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric features embodied processes of computation that are already
connecting with discourse.
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Chiasmus Acting to Take Space and Connect
Having defined chiasmus in both rhetorical theory and in feminist theory in chapter one, I
will now continue this examination by discussing what chiasmus does—what is its
rhetorical and performative power—as a figure in writing as well as a figure connecting
bodies and words. Jeanne Fahnestock argues that figures of speech can only really be
understood in terms of what the figure does well (23). Likewise, Arthur Quinn defines the
figures of speech by what they do in and for a particular text (2). The emphasis of this
question is on doing: a verb and action. The focus on action is crucial because I will be
working, in part, from the theoretical perspectives of material feminists, in particular
Judith Butler and Karen Barad and other feminists who theorize bodies, sex, gender,
difference, and power relations as sets of interactions and performances. These
performances are constantly being done and redone, shaped and reshaped. As such, the
focus on action, performance, and phenomena resists defining a single, stable relation
between bodies and language.

Figures Taking Space
Chiasmus takes up space. By repeating terms on both sides of chiasmus, the figure
inherently includes redundancy. But refusing concision, chiasmus establishes its
importance through spatial arrangement. This is one of the defining qualities that Arthur
Quinn notes “such a spatial technique, with its obvious analogies to painting, can be used
to organize larger and larger units of material” (95). How may chiasmus work in
painting? Consider Michelangelo’s Last Supper. The spatial organization is centered
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around a middle point, Jesus Christ, with balanced but different arrangement of disciples
on each side. The organization creates a number of effects. First, it focuses the painting
not on the right or the left side, but on the point of connection and interaction in the
middle. In addition, the spatial organization creates a sense of balance and parallelism.
The disciples on each side are separated, but the balance gives a sense of unity or
wholeness. The image is split, but the composition as a whole appears unified. My eye
focuses first on the center and then only gradually out to the left and right. There is no
specifically linear way to read this image. Instead, the eye moves from center out, back to
center, and out again and again. Likewise, chiasmus as a rhetorical form in text is a
spatial form that intersects differing parts. Chiasmus takes space on the page as well as it
does on the canvas. The repetition of terms refuses any desire for concision.
This particular way of taking space requires a chiasmic way of reading. The
chiasmus changes the reading process into a non-linear process. In an ABBA or ABCBA
structure, or even an ABCDEDCBA structure, the meaning of the text only becomes
clear when read from the outside corresponding parts into the center: the reader must
move from AABB to AA BB or from ABCDCBA to AABBCCD. Take the biblical
example: “Do not give what is holy to dogs. And do not throw your pearls before swine.
Least they trample them under their feet, and turn and tear you to pieces.” Read linearly,
the swine both trample the pearls under feet then turn and tear apart the addressee.
However, read chiasmically, this verse is balanced through the reversal of the phrases.
A - Do not give what is holy to dogs.
B - And do not throw your pearls before swine.
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B - Least they trample them under their feet, and
A - turn and tear you to pieces

Should be read chiasmically as:
A - Do not give what is holy to dogs.
A – [lest they] turn and tear you to pieces
B - And do not throw your pearls before swine.
B - Least they trample them under their feet, and

This makes reading the text much like peeling an artichoke: we have each the outside
layers, gradually eating until we finally get the sweetest artichoke heart. One cannot
simply cut through the outside layers to get to the center. This chiasmic process of
reading preserves the relation between corresponding parts. Reading this, chiasmus is a
process of folding and refolding the figure to compose meaning and argument. In
addition, when the figure has a pivotal center, the process of reading each part in its
relation to the center. Upon that center, everything else revolves. The first half of the text
builds up to that point and the second have of the text unravels from that center pivot
point. By taking space, and considering the particular shape that chiasmus takes space on
the page, this figure frames and guides the reading process, which becomes embodied in
and through it.
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Bodies Taking Space
This taking space is also a crucial concept for feminists. Bodies are physical and as such
they take physical space. This may seem to be obvious; however, feminists have needed
to reiterate this obvious experience because, within philosophy, political discourse, and
rhetorical theory, it is the very physical existence of bodies that is consistently
overlooked or undervalued. Although this feminist focus on bodies is a long one, within
the last 25 years, this debate has coalesced around a critique of philosophy and theories
that are variously called the linguistic turn, cultural turn, the rhetorical turn, and feminists
have responded by turning towards bodies9. For example, Elizabeth Grosz challenges
social constructivists notions of bodies, which continue to be prevalent. Social
construction definitions of bodies, as Grosz grants, de-naturalize the body by
demonstrating the many ways that language and culture construct the “natural body.”
This definition is important and politically valuable for feminists because it
liberates women from the burden of sexist notions of women’s bodies as essentially
feminine, weak, or irrational. However, their efforts to demonstrate how culture
constructs bodies often posit definitions of bodies as passive ‘blank paper’ on which
active language and culture shape without resistance. Moira Gatens persuasively
demonstrates that this re-inscribes mind body dualism so that culture and language are
9

This new material feminist critique of the linguistic turn is articulated by Gatens, Grosz,
Braidotti, Barad and others. A useful summary of this critique can be found in Susan
Hekman’s The Material of Knowledge. Sarah Ahmed, in “Imaginary Prohibitions: Some
Preliminary Remarks on the Founding Gestures of the New Materialism” adds useful
nuance to this critique by: 1) identifying ways that new material feminists straw man the
linguistic turn, and 2) identifying material and bodies as crucial to some aspects of the
linguistic turn.
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constructive forces while matter is passive and dumb (Imaginary Bodies). Karen Barad,
as several others do, charges the linguistic turn with once again erasing bodies. But the
critique is more extensive. The linguistic turn hasn’t just erased bodies; it has also erased
matter, reality, and the physical. In the place of material and physical, language and
semantic language as code have been elevated as the highest epistemic value. “Language
has been granted too much power,” Barad charges; “it seems that at every turn lately
every ‘thing’—even materiality—is turned into a matter of language or some other form
of cultural representation” (Meeting the Universe Half Way 132).
In addition to their critiques of the linguistic turn, feminist theorists have also
posited various theories that affirm bodies as active and productive in both epistemology
and ontology10. In fact, the turn towards bodies has been initiated in a variety of academic
fields, notably led by Bruno Latour. However, as Susan Hekman argues, feminists have
been at the forefront of these efforts. Their work has been particularly significant
because, unlike Latour and other STS scholars, feminists approach their research with an
attunement to the power relations and systems of privilege and discrimination that shape
politics as well epistemology. Heckman reminds us that feminists need material reality
and bodies. Feminist projects depend on material reality for “making true statements

10

This collection of feminists is often labeled “New Material Feminists.” Other labels for
this feminist theoretical school include “corporeal feminism” (Grosz) and “agential
realism” (Barad). Hekman argues that the fact that these feminists have not yet been
identified under a single school of thought indication of the “newness of the approach”
(68). I would add that the difficulty in labeling this group is also due to the diversity
within this group of feminists, which range from Barad’s engagement with quantum
physics to Garland-Thompson’s materialist approach to disability studies. This school
does share in common the commitment that bodies emerge from the intersection and
interactions of materials and languages.
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about the reality of women’s lives—their oppression, their inferior social status, the pain
inflicted on their bodies. Without the ability to make true statements about women’s
lives, feminism, like science, makes little sense” (66). In order to make political and
ethical claims about women’s lives, we must be able to make fact claims on the basis of
material reality. Among those claims to reality are that women’s real lives, knowledges,
and experiences are undervalued, marginalized, or targeted with violence. Feminists need
to be able to identify and critique the “unbearable weight” of our bodies (Bordo) and the
points of pain and hurt that come with our embodied experiences (Wendall). Elizabeth
Grosz has argued that our bodies are resources for knowledge (“Bodies and Knowledge,”
Volatile Bodies). And Adrianna Cavarero writes that a human body that is always unique,
particular, and never-repeatable, and this unique body is constitutive of our ontology. In
order to make any of these claims, bodies must be understood as material phenomena that
take physical space in material reality.

Figures Intersecting
Chiasmus, in this first movement, intersects two different things in ways that reflect
feminist critiques of body and language discussed above. The move to intersect is the
common denominator among all of the different definitions of chiasmus in rhetoric and
also a constitutive of the relation between bodies and discourses in the feminist theories.
As a rhetorical figure, chiasmus connects two phrases or concepts. As an embodied
figure, chiasmic rhetoric intersects bodies with discourse. And this intersection can be
active toward knowledge production as well as the production and disciplining of bodies.
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I will first discuss how the intersecting move of chiasmus from rhetorical theory and then
demonstrate how the same chiasmic intersection figures prominently in feminist theories
of bodies, especially for Judith Butler.
Chiasmus figures the relation between bodies and discourse because the rhetorical
figure allows for a complex relation of balance and similarity found in parallelism as well
as the difference and divergence of antithesis. In his close reading of Miguel de
Unamuno's novels, Paul Olson traces how chiasmus works as a formal device connecting
flesh and word. Through this formal structure, Unamuno’s novels use chiasmus to frame
words and flesh as mutually dependent entities without ever collapsing one into the other.
This complex intersection is crucial for the figure’s rhetorical power. This intersecting
figure creates complex relationships between parts. Fahnestock write that chiasmus, and
the specific sub-class of chiasmus, antimetabole, is causal in opposite directions and
reversible: “The antimetabole expresses an interchangeability that suggests not identity
but mutual constitution” (141). The two terms co-construct their meaning and rhetorical
force. She also writes that within science writing, chiasmus is most often used to define
relations of “reciprocal causality” and “mutual dependence” (141). Rhetorically, this
figures creates “a sense that the two entitles always require each other and therefore
cannot be separated” (141). This will later figure the relation between bodies and
discourse co-construct each other and cannot be understood outside of that coconstruction. Similarly to Fahnestock, Richard Lanham uses the example “do unto others
as you would have them do unto you” in order to demonstrate how chiasmus emphasizes
mutual reciprocity (Analyzing Prose 123).
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Fahnestock also explains that this principle of reversibility, that the causal
relationship is co-constructing, was crucial for Aristotle’s notion of chiasmus. In Topics,
Aristotle uses examples of chiasmus as a premise-generating machine (Fahnestock 132).
Chiasmus had to be reversible and the phrases have to make sense both ways. “Since one
term so depends on the other, it does not matter which comes first, and indifference
displayed iconically in the syntax of the figure” (141). For instance, “if the honorable is
pleasant, what is not pleasant is not honorable” (133). The phrase “a human is a body and
a body is a human” does not work when reversed. That is because the two terms are a
genus-species relation where body is a larger category under which human is contained.
In order for chiasmus to generate logical theses the relation between the two things must
be parallel or balanced (132). Just as chiasmic figures of words create balance and
reversibility, so too bodies and discourse are connected so that one does not determine or
dominant the other. Rather, bodies and discourse are co-constituting.

Intersecting Bodies and Discourse
Intersecting is also a crucial concept for feminist theories of bodies. In particular, bodies
are defined at the intersection of material, culture, language, and power relations. It is
through these intersections and interactions that human bodies are meaningful and
sensible. Butler describes this intersection explicitly as chiasmic. For instance, in Bodies
that Matter, we find that “language and materiality are fully embedded in each other,
chiasmic in their interdependency, but never fully collapsed into one another, i. e.,
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reduced to one another, and yet never fully ever exceeds the other. Always already
implicated in each other, always already exciting one another” (38).
This definition of the chiasmic relation between bodies and language includes the
exact same qualities that define the rhetorical figure chiasmus: through both parallelism
and antithesis, the two entities are connected, interdependent, but never collapsible. As
both parallel and antithetical, “language and materiality are never fully identical nor fully
different” (38). Now, when Butler writes about materiality, she is using a particular
notion of materiality. This is not the common usage of materiality. Instead, she is
thinking of materiality that is always already constituted in and through language. She
clarifies this notion of materiality in her introduction to Bodies that Matter. Although she
has been criticized for making bodies passive to the construction power relations, in fact,
her intent is to “return to a notion of matter, not as a site or surface, but as a process of
materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effects of boundary, fixity, and
surface we call matter” (xviii). In other words, she is interested in the process and
performances, by which the appearance of stability is created. Again, this is a definition
of bodies that resists fixing the qualities and stasis. Instead, the focus of the definition of
this relation is always on action, process, and performance. Bodies are not understood so
much as things to be defined and more as embodying actions that are phenomena to be
studied.
This focus on action and process is most explicit in the work of Karen Barad. She
approaches her feminist theories of embodiment first as a physicist and expert on Niels
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Bohr’s theories of quantum mechanics11. No doubt Turing read the work of Bohr,
especially his contributions to quantum mechanics, which were central to Turing’s
materialist world-view that also allowed for some random or unexplained phenomenon.
Barad defines the material-discursive reality through a theory of agential realism, which
claims that if we shift our focus from identifying things and matter and towards the study
of actions, phenomena, and process, then we can understand discourse and matter as fully
entangled and as always enacting a form of agency. Barad argues that material and
discourse are intersecting in a constant state of inta-action.
In this context, discourse could be understood as any relationality between
entities. Like Grosz’s definition of embodied subjectivity and Butler’s theory of
performativity, the body is the site of contestation or negotiation between material and
culture. Within these negotiations between material and culture, both have access to
agency in so far as both determine and affect the other. However, Barad takes this
argument one step further by arguing that neither material or culture exist before intaaction. Rather, all material and meaning emerge through inta-action. This means that the
foundation of human ontology requires interaction with other things, beings, and
discourses in order to come into being.
The process of inter-action is constant. With new inter-actions and new
discourses, the agential material changes. At the same time, as discourse and culture
encounter and entangle new material, the discourse and culture adjust and adopt.
11

Both Bohr and Turing’s work are influenced by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. In
addition, both Bohr and Turing met with Heisenberg in Princeton. However, Turing was
at Princeton before WWII started and Bohr was there during WWII in order to discuss
Heisenberg’s work on the atom bomb.
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Meaning/discourse and material/bodies are in a constant process of inta-action,
negotiation, and co-constitution.
Barad’s theories go beyond most feminist theories of the body in two primary
ways. First, a thing or a meaning emerges not only through inter-actions between matter
and discourse, but also through the interactions of matter and matter. In this way Barad’s
theories focus on matter, even matter outside of human experience. Second, Barad
identifies a form of agency with all matter, not just human consciousness. This is not a
normative use of the word agency, which is often defined as a quality a subject possesses
or does not possess and that is enacted with intention. Instead, agency emerges through
intra-actions and entanglements between phenomena. With this definition, agency is the
ability to impact or shape other phenomena, even if that impact is through resistance or
recalcitrance.
Bruno Latour and similar scholars of Actor-Network Theory also contribute to the
study of science and technology. In particular, this scholarship investigates the
construction of facts within networks of people, laboratories, methods, with specific
technologies and methodologies (Reassembling the Social). These complex factors
contribute to the construction and circulation of facts. Although this research does
demonstrate the social construction of facts, the goal is not to invalidate science or
reality. His intent is to move closer to facts and reality by studying how empirical reality
intersects and interacts within a full network of material, cultural, social, and personal
nodes (“Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” 231). However, as Barad and Hekman both
argue, ANT focuses so closely on the concrete actors and actants, it does not account for
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the social, political, and cultural forces that contribute to the construction of facts and
reality.
Feminist scholars of science, technology and bodies also study the construction of
facts. However, they add to this discourse a focus on the political, cultural, and rhetorical
factors that influence knowledge construction. The work of Barad makes an explicit
connection to the rhetoric of science. In addition, the work of Butler and Grosz
establishes that bodies play a central role in knowledge production. As such, these also
inform the rhetoric of science. Within the past 20 years, the field of feminist science
studies has enacted a shift in science studies and rhetoric of science. In particular, this
field has not only contributed to the study of how facts are made and distributed.
This field has also accounted for how facts are made within power relations that
construct knowledge, facts, and shape our embodied experience. Ann Fausto-Sterling,
who is both a biologist and a feminist philosopher, is most widely known for her feminist
critiques of entrenched sexism in scientific discourse. Her work is explicitly rhetorical in
so far as she analyzes how the words, categories, and metaphors used in science
perpetuate sexism and essentialist notions of gender. For instance, Fausto-Sterling
demonstrates our normative notions of two sex is a myth that reduces complex relations
between internal genitalia, external genitalia, chromosomes, hormones, and social
construction, into two limited categories when at least five categories are needed to
define sexual difference (Myths of Gender and Sexing the Body). Fausto-Sterling’s
scholarship exposes how complex biological data are constructed and explained in ways
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that support sexist beliefs about women, perpetuate essentialist notions of gender, and
reinforce gender norms of masculinity and femininity in the study of material reality.
In the case of “On Computable Numbers,” bodies and discourse intersect to
construct new knowledge about the foundation of mathematics and also construct the
theoretical and applied foundation of digital computation. Attention to Turing’s chiasmic
rhetoric makes the connections between embodied experiences and discourse visible. In
addition, this chiasmic figuring allows us to see how the chiasmic intersection between
embodiment and discourse are constitutive of Turing’s solution to the problem of
decidability.

Turing’s Turn Toward Bodies
In this article, Turing composes his solution from a surprisingly concrete, embodied
notion of mathematics. This concrete approach to mathematics stems from his relatively
new conviction in materialism. Between writing “Nature of Spirit” and “On Computable
Numbers,” Hodges explains that Turing lost his faith in an eternal, separate spirit form.
Instead, Turing invested more and more in quantum mechanics and applied mathematics
as well as the more abstract logical mathematics. When he wrote “Nature of Spirit,”
Turing was reading John McTaggert and Arthur S. Eddington with great interest. Both of
these writers were adopting the findings in quantum mechanics very loosely in order to
find scientific justifications for Christian notions of human spirit and free will in minds
that are somehow independent or separate from bodies. Turing clearly wanted to believe
that Christopher’s spirit could live beyond his body. He missed his friend. The hope that
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science could potentially explain the continued life of Christopher’s spirit drove Turing to
consider scientific justifications for spirit’s transcendent life after a body’s death. And
this this time, Turing could more readily reinsribe antithesis between bodies and minds.
However, Turing was also a rigorous and committed scientist. College for Turing, like so
many of us, led down a path of commitment to alternative forms of knowing that
contradicted the religion of his youth. Hodges writes that before completing his
undergraduate thesis, Turing “would soon emerge as a forceful exponent of the
materialist view and identify himself as an atheist” (108).
As a materialist, Turing believed that all phenomena are material phenomena.
Nothing exists outside or apart from the matter. However, Turing’s materialism is
different from an earlier pre-quantum mechanics notion of materialism. The notion of
material that he learned as a child, which was a notion that material was inert and
mechanical, had been complicated significantly by quantum mechanics. Since
Heisenberg introduced his uncertainty principle, matter, atoms, and physics were seen to
behave in random, unpredictable ways. As he matured as a theorist, he embraced
randomness and uncertainty as inherent in material life. This shift towards materialism
also complicates the relations between bodies and abstract through. Or, to put it more
precicely, his shift towards materialism means bodies and material would intersect with
discourse, even in the most abstract theoretical proofs.
Equipped with this materialist, concrete mode of thinking and Turing’s embodied
experiences, Turing composes “On Computable Numbers” so that embodied experiences
form the very foundation of his abstract theory. In this way, chiasmic rhetoric is the
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relation between embodied experiences and his theoretical writing, which together
produce new knowledge within the field of mathematics. And feminist theories of science
studies remind us that not only are these abstract theories and bodies connected, they are
also all implicated in similar social, political, and cultural dimensions. In later chapters I
will call further attention to the connections between Turing’s ideas, his body, and also
the larger social system in which his ideas and body were composed. Next, I will
highlight three primary ways—in his style, his method, and his conclusion—that
chiasmic rhetoric intersects bodies with Turing’s theoretical contributions to mathematics
and later to computer science.

Turing Intersects Bodies and Logic
Chiasmic rhetoric intersects bodies and Turing’s thinking first, on the level of style. The
style the Turing uses in this article is surprisingly concrete and even conversational. The
most obvious way that Turing connects these abstract proofs with his concrete life is with
the first person pronouns. He personally claims each of his arguments with “I give some
arguments” and “I show…” (58-59). He also connects himself with his readers with the
pronoun we when we writes comments like “We may compare a man in the process of
computing a real number…” (59). Turing uses these first person pronouns throughout the
article. Even though much of this text is composed of symbolic numbers and equations,
much of the article is also composed of surprisingly conversational tone. This style does
not conform to established conventions of scientific writing, which include introduction,
methods, results, analysis/discussion (Penrose and Katz 93-95). However, these primary
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parts can be interpreted as present. In fact, Turing explains his ‘method’ of effective
method throughout. This method of solving the problem of decidability is also, for most
of us, his most meaningful contribution. His method requires him to build a machine that
becomes the prototype of a digital computer.
A second way, and more obvious way, that bodies are in chiasmic intersection
with Turing’s thinking in this article is through his method. His method of solving this
problem begins with the embodied human process of calculation. When he writes,
“imagine a computer…” Turing is referring to a person, in Turing’s case ‘a man’
although computers were most often women (Chun, Bolter). Turing then describes the
process of computing as a physical process: This man sits at a desk, writes with a pen, on
paper, reads instructions, and moves the paper along from one step to another step of the
instructions. Turing describes the paper that the man uses. Turing’s man, this computer,
is given very complex calculation, which was typical and tedious. These calculations
would take any man a very long time, which means he would have to take breaks. “It is
always possible for the computer to break off from his work, to go away and forget all
about it, and later to come back and go on with it. If he does this, he must leave a note of
instructions, written in some standard form” (79). Before stopping he would need to write
down instructions for himself “in some standard form” in order to know what to do next.
Then, Turing suggests, “suppose that the computer works in such a desultory manner that
he never does more than one step at a sitting” (79). This man has to get up after each
step… perhaps to get a drink of water or stretch. Each step of the calculations must be
written down in the most basic terms.
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This embodied experience of a lazy man writing down instructions is the basis on
which Turing invented the digital computation. These instructions for each step become
the prototype for software. These are the instructions that tell computers each step. Then
Turing describes a kind of machine that can read the tape, mark 0 or 1, and move the tape
from right to left. With these simple functions, Turing invents the very basic model of the
hardware for computers. Hodges noted that Turing’s method of solving one of the central
questions of mathematics “but it was not only a matter of abstract mathematics, not only
a play of symbols, for it involved thinking about what people did in the physical world…
All he had done was to set up a new model, a new framework” (107).
This method of embodying the process of computation was considered highly
unusual. Hodges calls his method unique for its “definite, down-to-earth resolution of the
paradox of determinism and free will, not a wordy philosophical one” (108). Bolter calls
this method “strange” and even “simple-minded” (169). Its originality can be seen most
clearly when comparing it to Alfonzo Church’s method for solving the problem of
decidability, which was published just a few short months before Turing’s article.
Church’s “well formed formula” is comparable to the Turing machine, as Turing admits
in the appendix to his article (88). However, Church remains abstract. The formula is
equally as functional for concluding the problem of decidability. However, Church never
discusses how the formula would be calculated. He was not attentive to the physical
process. Turing’s thinking is unique in so far as he is thinking very literally and
concretely about the physical processes of calculation and mathematics. By starting with
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the embodied process, Turing ties mathematical theory directly to the concrete, embodied
process of performing calculations.
This concrete, embodied method was the key to the invention of digital
computation. As Hodges wrote, this solution was almost too applicable and concrete.
Hodges writes that, when Newman, Turing’s mentor who taught a course on the
Foundations of Mathematics at King’s (Hodges 90) read the article, Newman, “could
hardly believe that so simple and direct an idea as the Turing machine would answer the
Hilbert problem over which many had been laboring for five years since Gödel had
disposed of the other Hilbert questions” (112). Theory was the drug of the day.
According to William Pager, an American mathematician who contributed towards
computer developments in the US, “there was a widespread belief that you turned to
applied mathematics if you found the going too hard in pure mathematics” (in Rees 607).
And Hodges comments regarding Turing’s turn to application that “such a foray into the
practical world was liable to be met with patronizing jokes within the academic world”
(157). But Turing solved this theoretical problem by starting with the least theoretical
place: a man, sitting, at a table, with a pencil and paper. In particular, the kind of paper a
child would use to work through math problems. What could more simple? And starting
in this place, Turing entered the field as a relative outsider, solving a theoretical problem
through very concrete methods.
Finally, chiasmic rhetoric allows us to see that bodies take space and intersect
with Turing’s very conclusion. This form of taking space is more subtle but still
significant. When Turing concludes that the problem of decidability could not be solved
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through effective methods, he proves mathematics will always be in some ways
unexplained and unexplainable. Using effective methods of logical proofs, a Turing
machine could calculate some problems, like the halting problem, but the problem would
need to be calculated infinitely without ever coming to a conclusion.
Turing’s conclusion is the final end to the dream posited by Hilbert and an entire
school of mathematics that imagined mathematics as a garden of logic, order, and control.
Turing’s conclusions, in effect, derail the drive to control within mathematics. And in
order to make this final blow to ideal mathematics, Turing had to start with a chiasmic
relation between bodies and knowledge. Although he does not explicitly discuss quantum
mechanics in this article, he studied it at length throughout this time period and goes on
to investigate quantum mechanics in more depth after publishing this article. Quantum
mechanics had decades earlier proved that not all material phenomena were explainable.
There would always be some mysteries to the material universe. However, because
mathematics is defined as abstract and without matter, some mathematicians continued to
maintain that math was solvable and that mathematical principles could eventually rid
this logical science of mysteries and randomness. Turing’s materialist understanding of
mathematics, logic, and bodies, then, became the foundation on which he toppled the
abstract, formalist, modernist notions that numbers and mathematics may somehow be an
abstract, perfectly logical, universal science. By applying materialism and quantum
mechanics, Turing insists that mathematics must be material and physical process.
Starting from this commitment, he was able to demonstrate the limits of mathematical
knowledge and of mechanical calculations.
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Intersecting Bodies without Difference
By defining chiasmic relations in which bodies and discourse are always already
intersecting but also exceeding each other, Butler’s arguments allow me to refocus a
reading of Turing’s writing so that we can see the deeply integrated ways that embodied
experiences inform and shape his knowledge production. By starting with bodies, Turing
was able to clear the theoretical air and make great progress. In this way, bodies intersect
directly with Turing’s thinking, invention, and writing. Here, the chiasmic rhetoric moves
to connect bodies and discourse. Although this is a simple movement, for Turing, his
rhetoric that intersects bodies and discourse allowed him to solve abstract mathematical
theories, develop the foundations for computation, and also challenge the long-standing
believe that mathematical knowledge is separate from material and therefore freed from
the limitations and variability inherent in our material world.
Turing was certainly not the first to try to build a thinking machine. A century
earlier Ada Lovelace and Charles Babbage worked to invent an analytical engine that
they hoped would be a thinking machine. At the same time as Turing was writing this
article, John Von Neumann was at Princeton trying to create a computation machine but
was stuck on the logical foundations (Copeland 23-25). Turing was reading Von
Neumann’s work throughout the 1930's, and Von Neumann gave a series of lectures at
Cambridge that Turing attended. But Von Neumann was making it too complicated. He
had the correct hardware, but his coding was too complicated and cumbersome. The
beauty of Turing's invention, again, was in its simplicity.
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However, the bodies that we find in Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric are not rich
notions of human bodies. Instead of human embodied difference, Turing makes explicit a
long-standing metaphor between human bodies and machines. Turing writes, “We may
compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a machine which is only
capable of a finite number of conditions” (59). Hodges explains at multiple points how
commonly the notion of man’s body as a machine would have been to Turing (96, 107).
This metaphor, then, would have been an easily accepted starting place for Turing’s
theoretical claims. He came to this project with a mechanical notion of bodies. Based on
this mechanical notion of bodies, it seems almost inevitable that he could then easily
replace each aspect of this mechanical body with a computation machine.
However productive this chiasmic intersection may be, Turing’s particular notion
of bodies that he articulates in this article excludes, erases, and ignores many of the rich
aspects of human embodiment. Turing’s discussion of bodies as a foundation for
computation offers a limited perspective on what bodies are and what bodies can do.
What do we know about these bodies that Turing has laid at the foundation of digital
computation? The only particularities or needs that this body has is 1) male, 2) finite
memory, 3) has a hard time staying in a chair for long periods of time, and 4) has
different states of mind.
Considering that Turing didn’t have an assistant to perform his computations, he
was probably imaging his own body. What did he leave out? As Turing sat performing
computations he was perhaps in Cambridge. As he wrote this article, Turing was serving
as Don at his former school. This position required very little from Turing. He had the
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freedom to research and write. He spent his free time with friends, most of whom were
other scientists or mathematicians. Turing ran long distances every day. He ran for the
runner’s high. He ran to keep his body strong and healthy. He also ran to think. We see
no particularity of Turing’s body in this metaphor of the mechanical body. These
particularities may include his overall physical strength, his fair skin, his proclivity for
vacationing in sunny places, or his preference for British ale. None of these particularities
factor into Turing’s development of the computer as a man into a computer that is a
machine and a process of formal logic and symbolic forms.
Throughout his life, Turing learned how to dress like a man of privilege. He was
taught to value physical fitness, competition, and athletic events. This bodily training was
not incidental to his intellectual training: the same values were conveyed in both. The
bodily training taught restraint, the importance of conforming to conventions. Likewise,
we see in this article how Turing applies the rigorous rules for logical formalism in order
to create a machine that can perform calculations. His notion of bodies in “On
Computable Numbers” is stripped of the touches of subjective needs or perspectives.
Like a man trained to perform in polite, British society, Alan Turing’s rhetoric
metaphorically learns to walks the walk of acceptable scientific rhetoric. Surely, these
embodied experiences must also intersect in Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric.
In the next chapters, I will develop chiasmic rhetoric in increasingly complex
ways by drawing from increasingly complex notions of bodies. The embodied
experiences discussed in this chapter were relatively simple: sitting, calculating, moving
paper from side to side. Likewise, the chiasmic move to intersect is also relatively simple.
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I have demonstrated that bodies and discourse are inseparable. But I will continue to
develop notions of chiasmic rhetoric to include more complex notion of bodies that have
been disciplined, constructed, and also punished by a broad set of embodied experiences.
Thus, chiasmic rhetoric will develop so that it integrates the social, epistemic, and
cultural construction of our bodies. And particularly in Chapter 4, these will include
bodily experiences of education and disciplining as they relate to Turing as a subject of
governmentality and sexuality.
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CHIASMUS 4:
DYNAMIC EMBODIMENTS

“As you gaze at the flickering signifiers scrolling down the computer screens,
no matter what identifications you assign [in the Turing test],
you have already become posthuman.”
~ Hayles, How we Became Posthuman

“Playing [chess] against such a machine gives a definite feeling that one is pitting one’s
wits against something alive.”
~Turing, “Intelligent Machinery”

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that chiasmus creates a relation that combines the
equality and balance of parallelism with the contradiction and distinction created in
antithesis. And the foundational first move of chiasmus is to create intersections. Now, I
develop these arguments further by demonstrating the dynamic movement of chiasmus.
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By dynamic, I mean that chiasmus moves and creates change. This chapter will focus on
dynamic movement of chiasmus in which bodies and discourse co-construct each other.
This will be seen primarily through a discussion of the disciplinary practices that
construct Turing's subjectivity but also the disciplinary practices that construct
knowledge or what qualifies as intelligence according to Turing’s early work on artificial
intelligence. I will also discuss how chiasmus between bodies and discourse are not only
discipline but also dynamic in productive ways, in particular, productive for knowledge
construction. I will show these dynamic relations, which is both disciplining and
productive, through an analysis of Turing’s 1948 report “Mechanical Intelligence.” In
this report, Turing sets out his initial theories of how to train computing machines so that
they can gradually learn and eventually demonstrate a form of intelligence. This is
significant for our discussion because I demonstrate how Turing’s computers and
intelligence dynamically interact with embodied experience to produce new knowledge.

Dynamic Chiasmus
Chiasmus creates intersections, but these are not necessarily static intersections. Rather
chiasmus figures relations that are dynamic and productive. Jeanne Fahnestock most
directly addresses the dynamic qualities of chiasmus within scientific writing. “It is
movement,” (131) and creates “transformations—like stretching, rotating, translating, and
reflecting” (134). The movement of chiasmus creates an experience so that a reader
“enters the [chiasmus] at one conceptual location and comes out at another; it has the
trajectory of a parabola” (131). Fahnestock finds this figure epitomizing the state of
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eternal flux in Heraclitus. Within the rhetoric of science, this dynamic figure can be
found throughout Newton's discussion of the third law of motion, which states that for
every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Although Newton does not form this
law in the form of a chiasmus, each of his examples are chiasmically structured. For
instance, Newton illustrates, “if you press a stone with your finger, the finger is also
pressed by the stone” (in Fahnestock 142). Like Newton’s law of motion, the two
different parts of chiasmus are reversible and co-constructing. The figure “epitomizes
arguments concerning reciprocal causality, a causal influence that goes in opposite
directions, or a reversible process” (141). Here, we find the very law of dynamics that
conveys dynamic co-construction is figured in language through a chiasmic figure that is
also dynamic and co-constructing.
This notion of dynamic co-construction through chiasmus can be found
throughout literary and religious studies of chiasmus. For example, Henry David
Thoreau’s use of chiasmus creates a pattern that is balanced but mutually dependent
relation between the individual and social or natural forces (Kopley). In his analysis of
chiasmus in the Old Testament of the Christian bible, Nils Lund describes the Hebrew
chiasmus as two parallel ladders. This extended chiasmus (sometimes whole chapters)
creates dynamic processes of reading that lead towards a climax in the center and then
descended (132-136). Thomas Mermall, in his literary analysis of Unamuno, finds that
the figure allows Unamuno “to avoid closure, sustain tension, dissociate terms,
undermine identities, generate perpetual contradiction, and affirm the eternal struggles”
(246). These rhetorical, literary, and biblical scholars all understand chiasmus in terms of
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dynamic co-construction that, many times, connects material and discourse on the page.
In addition, I have used feminist theory as well as rhetorical theory to apply chiasmus as
a heuristic for figuring relations between bodies and discourse in and outside of texts,
specifically in this dissertation in Alan Turing’s technical writing. In order to make this
shift from chiasmus within text to chiasmus between bodies and discourse, I will again
draw from Judith Butler and other gender theorists who discuss chiasmus or use chiasmic
figures in their theories.
For Butler, bodies and language are “perpetually negotiated” (38). They are
always in a chiasmic relation that is intersecting, never subsumed into each other, and
dynamically co-constructing. It is in this complex performance and re-performed
negotiation that the dynamic characteristic of chiasmus is of crucial importance. The
relation between bodies and language is one of constant chiasmic negotiation allows
feminists and scholars of bodies to move beyond essentialist notions of bodies. Instead,
we are able to theorize gender with a “a notion of matter, not as a site or surface, but as a
process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effects of boundary,
fixity, and surface we call matter” (xviii). Because bodies are always in this “process of
materialization” in relation with discourse, the chiasmic relation that I am describing
must constantly be described and re-described. This figure can never be stable or solid.
Rather, bodies and discourse are always dynamically changing, reacting and producing in
relation to each other.
While this chiasmic relation can be productive—they construct bodies in
knowable, recognizable subjects—this relation disciplines and normalizes so that through
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performance over and over again, subjects are disciplined into conforming to norms for
sexuality and gender. These chiasmic relations are how bodies come to matter in
knowable ways. This is a construction through power relations so that “the recasting of
the matter of bodies as the effects of a dynamic of power, such that the matter of bodies
will be indissociable from the regulatory norms that govern their materialization and the
significance of those material effects” (Butler 2). She writes that the materializing effects
of discourse are restricted by the “historicity of discourse” (138). That discursive
performativity of material effects “does not mean that any action is possible on the basis
of a discursive effect. On the contrary, certain reiterative chains of discursive production
are barely legible as reiterations, for the effects have materialized are those without which
no bearing in discourse can be taken” (138). In this way, discourse’s historicity ossifies
material effects through “reiterative chains of discursive production.” Thought
chiasmicly, these reiterative chains of discourse produce bodies that, in large part,
conform to naturalized material forms, like sex, that become invisible. However, by
paying attention to the material discursive interactions, Butler is able to make those
formally invisible effects not only visible, but also demonstrates their instability.

Dynamics of Biopolitics
We can draw on Foucault’s theories of sexuality in order to interpret some of the
technologies that enacted power on Turing’s body and how those relate to Turing’s own
thinking on machine bodies and machine intelligence. Although Foucault does not
discuss chiasmus, his work here is crucial because it explains the larger historical,
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discursive, political, and social mechanism and practices that compose bodies an
intelligible and normalized. Discourses construct and reconstruct his identity as a
homosexual man represented and articulated within the history to computer science and
computer technology and intersecting with practices that produce knowledge. In other
words, Turing as a thinker, inventor, and writer cannot be understood as separate or
distinct from Turing as a man who identified as homosexual. Sedgwick makes this claim
most specific when she opens Epistemology of the Closet with the assertion, “an
understanding of virtually any aspect of modern Western culture must be, not merely
incomplete, but damaged in its central substance to the degree that it does not incorporate
a critical analysis of modern homo/heterosexual definition” (1). This is not to say that
Turing’s inventions and theories are reducible or explainable as products of a queer
sexuality (although this is what Lassègue attempts to posits in “What Kind of Turing Test
did Turing Have in Mind”). Rather, sexuality and knowledge production are both coconstructed through a complex network of practices, institutions, and power relations.
Butler explains in her preface to Bodies that Matter that her efforts to talk about
sexuality always bring her into talking about other things (ix). As much as she tried to
focus her thought on bodies themselves, she found “not only did bodies tend to indicate a
world beyond themselves, but this movement beyond their own boundaries… appeared to
be quite central to what bodies “are” ” (ix). For instance, scholars slide from sexuality to
punishment and trauma by mentioning Turing’s sexuality only in connection with his
death (Copeland). When scholars frame Turing’s sexuality as an identity category, they
do more than name his subjectivity and sexuality; they also frame his identity as
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constituted and knowable, in part, by a set of presumed activities, values, characteristics,
and established knowledge about those activities (Leavitt).
However, this difficulty is exactly the richness that makes the study of sexuality a
high stakes pursuit. Because of these intricate relations between knowledge production
and sexuality, attention to Turing’s sexuality as well as the material-discursive
construction of his multiple subjectivities, inform how we understand Turing’s thinking
as well as his notions of machine intelligence. On the other hand, Turing’s education, the
values of the systems of knowledge production in which he contributed, and the power of
those institutions all construct Turing as a subject in relation to sexuality, governance,
and technology. To explicate this point I will discuss Turing’s embodied experiences as
informed by Foucault’s theories of biopower.
First, I need to define what I mean by sexuality. Foucault’s History of Sexuality
traces the construction sexuality as a category that identifies people and with which
people can identify themselves. This category is a construction between powerknowledge-pleasure (11). For Foucault, it is very important that the act of sex not be
separated or defined as more natural or real than the category of sexuality. To separate
the two would leave the act of sex potentially in the natural or authentic definition with
sexuality as a construction of power and knowledge. The act of sex is no less socially
constructed notion than sexuality. This is because ““sex” made it possible to group
together, in artificial unity, anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts,
sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of this fictitious unity as a
causal principle” (154). Together, this grouping of different actions, things, and
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experiences were given the status of a natural and universal concept. Based on this notion
of sex, the concept of sexuality seems to causally rise: “sex…is doubtless but an ideal
point made necessary by the deployment of sexuality and its operations… Sex is the most
speculative, most ideal, and most internal element in a deployment of sexuality organized
by power in its grip on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and
pleasures” (155). The categories themselves do not simply regulate and normalize
identities. Rather, sex as an act is also embedded in power relations that deploy sexuality.
In this way, the category and the embodied act are always connected and producing each
other. Regarding Turing’s embodied sexual acts and sexuality, I know and therefor can
say relatively little about the particular practices of pleasure. These practices are not
necessary to know in order to understand Turing’s sexuality because this project is not
interested in defining or dissecting Turing’s sexual practices. Instead, this project is
interested in Turing as a homosexual subject as constructed within and against
normalizing practices that are historical, social, material, and discursive.
While Foucault is a central theorist in this dissertation and his scholarship informs
my reading of the construction of Turing’s embodied experiences, his work has been
critiqued for lacking the particularity of unique bodies, especially by Michel de Certeau
(Practices of Everyday Life), Nancy Fraser (Unruly Practices pg 55-66), and Katherine
Hayles (How We Became Posthuman pg 194-199). Foucault discusses institutions,
general practices, and bodily characters that are produced and normailized through
biopower. However, with this focus on historical and social trends, his work erases bodily
particularity. As Hayles argues, that bodily particularity is crucial for understanding how
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particular bodies resist, twist, and alter bodily codes. In particular, for Hayles particular
bodies and particular technologies interact to affect each other through practices. She
writes, “Formed by technology at the same time that [embodied practices] create
technology, embodiment mediates between technology and discourse by creating new
experiential frameworks that serve as boundary markers for the creation of corresponding
discursive systems” (205).
Considering Turing’s particular body as well his particular writing in “Intelligent
Machinery,” we find that the systems that discipline and normalize his particular
experience are dynamically re-inscribed into the training and construction of machine
intelligence. This adds the richness of particular experience to the larger normalizing
effects of biopower. In this way, Turing’s description of the machine he would invent,
program, and train to be intelligent reflects and reproduces Turing’s own education,
embodied experiences, and therefore his understanding of his own mind and body. In
order to invent these notions of machine intelligence, Turing had to already understand
himself in somewhat mechanical terms.

Dynamic Production of Sexuality
Like all bodies, Turing is composed through this dynamic, productive process of
interaction. In this way, not only does chiasmic rhetoric move to intersect bodies and
discourse, chiasmic rhetoric also dynamically produces both bodies and rhetoric. Turing’s
body is produced within a particular historical, social, and political context. I cannot
unpack all of these levels of interaction, but this chapter will begin to address the
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composing of Turing’s body especially his body as a subject with sexual and national
identities.
Turing, in some ways, is a queer figure. He is a gay man. But in many ways he
conforms to normative standards for men of his social status. By in large, after his college
years at Cambridge, Turing revealed his private life to a very small set of individuals.
Primarily he was a private man, especially private about his sexual life. In the entry on
Alan Turing in the Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, Barbone states, “Turing’s place in
homosexual studies is problematic because he neither hid nor proclaimed his sexuality
and would likely wonder why it might concern anyone anyway. Perhaps his own inability
to grasp why his sexuality should be of interest to others is what makes his an enigma
both to those in and out of gay studies” (594). And this is likely more complicated by
Barbone’s suggestion that Turing was “neither in nor out of the closet and may not even
be aware, perhaps, that there was one” (595).
Even in his biographies, Turing’s identity as a homosexual man is discussed in
ambiguous ways. For instance, immediately after identifying Turing by the stereotype of
“an ordinary English homosexual, atheist, mathematician” Hodges writes, “It would not
be easy” (115). Here, Hodges highlights that Turing is peculiar in a lot of different ways.
Turing’s particularity would mean that he does not quite fit or easily move into any clearcut, dominant identity category. Hodges writes that Turing was an ‘ordinary’ English
homosexual, atheist, mathematician,” but for certain, this could not have been a time
worn stereotype. Despite, or perhaps due to this ambiguity, Turing is an interesting
figure. Like so many of us, Turing both conforms to and defies normalizing codes that
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represent bodies. Unlike so many of us, Turning achieved national and international fame
as an genius, became a war hero, was arrested for homosexuality, and was chemically
castrated.

Turing in Transition
Alan Turing’s life changed considerably between 1936 when he published “On
Computable Numbers” and 1948 when he wrote his next major contribution to artificial
intelligence, a report, titled “Intelligent Machinery,” to the National Physics Laboratory.
In 193812 the almost-certain world war and Turing’s own dissatisfaction with the hoped
for mentorship under Alfonzo Church led Turing from Princeton back to Cambridge. But
he did not remain in Cambridge long. With the beginning of WWII, he left theoretical
mathematics and its location in universities and moved towards mathematical
applications and cryptology for the British government at Bletchley Park.
As war with Germany became an ever more likely possibility, the British
government needed to expand its intelligence operations. To an unprecedented degree,
the British government would need mathematicians, scientists, and engineers to fight this
war of information. The German government was encoding messages with the Enigma
Machine, which was not a digital computer but was an electronic encoder that could
encode information at a level of complexity that, at the time, was undecipherable. This
12

This is also the year that he completed his dissertation under the mentorship of Alfonzo
Church at Princeton. Turing theorized what he called an O-machine “a new kind of
machine.” This O-machine would be different from his universal Turing Machine that he
proposed in 1937. The O-machine contained a random ‘oracle’ or black box that would
insert a random figure that is not calculable by a standard Turing machine.
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machine was the “central problem that confronted British Intelligence in 1938” (Hodges
148). Turing was a “natural recruit” according to Hodges: Turing was a mathematician
with experience solving complex mathematical problems with the help of electronic
machines (148). While most men were enlisting in the British army and leaving for the
battlefield, Turing joined a group of elite scientists and engineers in the British
Government Code and Cipher School and left for the countryside at Bletchley Park.
Although many men and women worked in the US and America to advance
mathematics and computer technology during WWII, Turing’s particular contributions
earned him some fame and recognition for his creativity and his ability to think in
flexible ways (Leavitt 8). Turing played a central role designing many of the computers
and techniques for decoding and encoding messages, including the ‘bombe,’ which
intercepted and decoded messages in order to locate the German U-boats (Copeland The
Essential Turing 2). He also designed a computer he named Delilah, which used random
noise to encode messages. British historian and veteran of Bletchley Park, Sir Harry
Hinsley, suggests that the work done at Bletchley Park reduced the length of the war by
as much as two years. Likewise, Copeland argues that Turing’s contributions towards
computing and cryptology made a significant impact on the course of WWII (Copeland
“Turing After the UTM” 493). A fellow cryptologist wrote after Turing’s death: “I won’t
say that what Turing did made us win the war, but I daresay we might have lost it without
him” (in McCorduck Machines Who Think 53). British Lord Chancellor Chris Grayling,
when he announced Turing’s pardon on Christmas Eve 2013, even called Turing “a war
hero like Winston Churchill.” Many of these accolades were reconstructed after Turing’s
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death. During his life, his received some prominence during the war, but he floundered
some outside of Bletchley Park’s selective, protective social circle.
Turing wrote “Intelligent Machinery” in 1948 at a time of social transition that
caught his career at a moment of uncertainty. Turing was offered a prestigious position
with the National Physics Library in 1946, and he set to work designing and building a
general-purpose, digital computer, the ACE machine. During the war his superiors gave
Turing the latitude to execute his unconventional methods because they produced results.
These included methods by intuition, random selection, “sheer bloody guesswork,
guessing and hoping” (Hodges 185). After the war, however, Turing’s superiors and
colleagues questioned his peculiar methods. The ACE machine was one particular
sticking point. The British officials decided to follow Von Neumann’s design. This
decision was indicative of the general recognition that the United States was the world
leader in computer technology (Rees 611). Turing’s ACE machine was being built, but
not in the way that Turing designed (Copland Essential Turing 398-399). Max Newman
showed up yet again to offer a new opportunity for Turing. Newman founded the Royal
Society Computing Machine Laboratory at University of Manchester and offered Turing
the position of Deputy director. This position offered Turing flexibility and intellectual
freedom. Turing asked for a one year sabbatical but soon broke what Director of the NPL
Sir Charles Darwin referred to as a “gentleman’s promise” to return after the sabbatical
(Copeland 400). By May 1948, Turing submitted his resignation to NPL and begin
working at the University of Manchester.
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Biographies Constructing Sexuality
Of course, I am not the first to discuss Turing’s sexuality. With each new biography and
each new account of Turing’s contribution to computer science, scholars discursively reconstruct Turing’s sexuality. By in large, Turing’s sexuality is exclusively discussed in
biographical work on Turing, not theoretical or scientific discussions13. For instance,
although Copeland has worked for years to petition an official pardon for Turing’s crime
of ‘indecency’ (see Copeland, “Pardon the Digital Warrior?”), he makes no mention
Turing’s sexuality in his most extensive text on Turing The Essential Turing. In these
cases, Turing’s sexuality is excluded within the context of Turing’s intellectual work.
This silence also suggests that the field itself is free of or objective to sexuality. In logical
mathematics in particular, any subjective, personal, or even material connections are
excluded. When scholars focus on Turing’s theories they exclude any mention of
Turing’s sexuality. Leavitt also notes this trend: “most popular accounts of his work
either fail to mention his homosexuality altogether or present it as a distasteful an
ultimately tragic blot on an otherwise stellar career” (6). If his sexuality is mentioned, this
is often a passing mention of the tragic circumstances of his sentencing of crimes of
indecency, chemical castration, and his death.
Jean Lassègue posits the most explicit connection between Turing’s sexuality and
his thinking in “What Kind of Test Did Turing Have in Mind.” Lassègue seeks to answer
the question “is the so-called “Turing test” as objective and scientific as it is claimed to
13

Some of the many publications on Turing that make no mention of his personal life or
sexuality include: Bolter, Turing’s Man; Copeland, Essential Turing; Dyson, Turing’s
Cathedral.
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be in the AI and cognitive science community?” with a resounding and final “no” (2).
And his reason for rejecting Turing’s scientific theories is due almost exclusively to
homophobic justifications. Instead, Lassègue argues that the “test says in fact more about
Turing’s psychological life than about the science of the mind itself” (2). Lassègue links
Turing’s homosexuality with a possible traumatic memory of his circumcision:
“circumcision may be interpreted as a wound on the skin… and it may result in the same
creative function in Turing’s mind” (11). While the circumcision is the wound that
Turing supposedly mourns, his particular design of the Turing machine, with tape that is
read step-by-step from side-to-side is also symbolic of the cutting of the foreskin.
Lassègue lays out this argument:
The function of the tape itself would be to recollect the lost integrity of Turing’s
body burnt in the circumcision in the stepwise procedure of a temporal
succession. From this point of view, the tape would represent the now missing
integrity of the body and more specifically the lost skin itself. As to the stepwise
procedure itself, it would represent the specific way Turing found to save his hide.
(12)
Lassègue pathologizes homosexuality by explaining its cause as a wound and trauma.
Furthermore, he presumes that Turing’s driving ambition in his inventive life was to
subconsciously ‘save his hide’ by reversing or healing the wound. Any possible personal
motivation or repressed (as Lassègue acknowledges that this is repressed) trauma related
to homosexuality are serious enough infractions of the ‘objectivity’ of knowledge that
Turing’s contributions must say nothing about computing or artificial intelligence and
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instead only tell us about Turing’s personal life. Despite the homophobic overtones,
Lassègue’s argument was received unproblematically and without critique within science
and technology studies and histories of technology14.
Both Hodges and Leavitt discuss Turing’s sexuality in a way that is complex and
productive. Andrew Hodges’ biography of Turing, Alan Turing: The Enigma, offers the
most detailed representation of Turing’s sexuality. In particular, Hodges integrates
Turing’s personal life in a way that shows its relevance or significance for understanding
his thinking. As his title suggests, Hodges’ biography not merely to collect facts on
Turing, but also to solve the enigma that is this influential thinker. Steven Barbone reads
this book as a collection of influences, facts, situations, and limitations that together
inform why and how Turing may have died. Connecting Turing’s theories and his life
addresses the enigma behind his death because “the solution lies not in any one fact, but
in the whole pattern that led up to the event [of his death]” (Barbone 594).
Leavitt’s The Man Who Knew Too Much also offers a complex account of
Turing’s sexuality. Turing’s assumption that homosexuality is “nothing at all wrong,” for
Leavitt, reflects his “startlingly original—and startlingly literal—nature of his
imagination” (6). He also sees a connection between Turing’s sexuality and his claim that
machines may also have a form of intelligence. He finds, “after all, his insistence on
questioning humankind’s exclusive claim to the faculty of thought had… encoded a
subtle critique of social norms that denied to another population—that of homosexual

14

See Leavitt The Man Who Knew Too Much, Wilson Affect and Artificial Intelligence;
Moor The Turing Test: The Elusive Standard of Artificial Intelligence, Saygin et all
“Turing Test: 50 Years Later
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men and women—the right to a legitimate and legal existence” (5). His goal, as he
explicitly states it, is to write a biography of Turing to repair or revise the representation
of Turing as a homosexual man (6). Both of these accounts are important contributions. I
will build on Hodges and Leavitt’s accounts of Turing’s biography and read within the
context of Foucault’s theories of biopower, in order to show the ways that Turing’s own
embodied experiences being disciplined also inform his own writing and invention.
In the chiasmic relation between bodies and discourse that I have been theorizing,
both sex and sexuality are embodied and discursive performances. Like all of us,
Turing’s body and his discourses are both shot through with practices of sex and
sexuality. All of these mechanisms for producing subjects are disciplining as well as
productive: these produce bodies as knowable subjects and also produce new knowledge.
We can find traces of these disciplining norms in both Turing’s biography and in
Turing’s writing on artificial intelligence. I will focus this on two primary concerns:
norming through intervention and a targeted focus on bodies.

Machines in Transition
In these years between Turing’s proposal of a universal Turing machine and his
arguments for intelligent machinery, computer technology advanced rapidly due, in large
part, to meet the increasingly technological face of warfare in WWII. In her first-hand
account of the rise of mathematics for application into computers, Rees writes:
although automatically sequenced electronic computers were not available before
the end of the war, the needs of the war played a decisive role in their initial
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development and the military services continued their interest and provided much
of their financing of the post-war developments. (610)
With considerable investment from both the British and American governments,
computer technology saw its first official birth immediately after WWII. It would still be
another 2 years before a fully digital, storied memory computer would be patented, and
that would happen in the United States.
Scholars have hotly debated the exact birth date and the particular inventor of the
first computer. By most American accounts, the Electronic Numerical Integrator and
Computer (ENIAC) in the Ballistic Research Lab in Maryland the first electronic, general
purpose, stored-programing, digital computer (Haig; Dyson). John Mauchly and J.
Presper Eckert are credited as the primary inventors who had the machine fully functional
by 1946. Jon Von Neumann is also an important inventor who put the ENIAC to work
towards one of its first major tasks: calculating the viability of the Hydrogen bomb.
While the ENIAC most closely functioned as a blueprint for the modern computer, many
engineers and mathematicians were developing computing technology in America and
England. From a British perspective, the Colossus is claimed to be the first fully
programed digital computer. This was designed in part by Turing’s long time mentor and
friend, Max Newman, during WWII at Bletchley Park. Although Turing did not work
primarily with the Colossus, he was a lead cryptologist and mathematician at Bletchley
Park at the time. Agar documents many universal machines that were developed
concurrently in the US, England, and in Europe (Turing and the Universal Machine). At
the same time, he defines the first fully functional computer at University of Manchester
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in operation by 1949. Turing wrote the computer manual for this machine, which the
technicians called the Blue Pig (Turing 121-2).
In general, the fields of computer science and mathematics were in a state of
dynamic flux. Many computers existed that functioned, in part, as digital, universal
machines. What is more, all of these machines were designed, built and functioned in
very different ways. Turing’s ACE machine probably required the most physical
legwork, which very much reflects Turing’s own physicality and exercise routine. The
operators had to literally run from one tightly packed room of equipment into another in
order to input instructions from one machine to another. Scientists, theorists, and
mathematicians, including von Neumann and Norbert Weiner, were gathering at the
Macy Conferences, which were annual meetings on cybernetics and information theory
from 1943-1954. It is in these foundational meetings that the fields of cybernetics and
computer science were beginning to take shape.

Transitioning Technologies to Transitioning Bodies
In How We Became Posthuman Hayles traces the Macy Conferences discourses during
this time of dynamic change in order to trace the emergence of a materially neutral notion
of information. At this time, it was not obvious or agreed upon that information should be
understood as separate from material. A notion of information or data that was somehow
transcendent or indifferent to material was developed “not because it had no opposition
but because of scientifically and culturally situated debates made it seem a better choice
than the alternatives” (50). Through the Macy Conventions, these founders of cybernetics
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gradually settled on a notion of information that was defined as separate from material
substance. Thus, it is through these discourses that the founders of cybernetics reinscribe
the antithesis between bodies and minds, material and information. Information is free
and indifferent from material or media that may serve at its temporary container.
One of the effects of this notion of immaterial information is that material came to
be thought of as dynamically and endlessly pliable and passive. Weiner draws emerging
digital computation to develop cybernetic theories of altering human bodies. In making
this shift, he tacitly assumes that human bodies are endlessly pliable and needing to be
change. Especially for Weiner, these passive bodies needed constant improvement,
alterations, and additions in order to better human thought as well as human physical
capabilities. Again, Weiner presupposes antithesis between bodies and minds. And he
does so to a relatively extreme level: he imagines leaving bodies behind entirely by
uploading human minds into computers.
For Hayles, posthumanism includes a notion of humanity that can and should be
pushed or ‘enhanced’ beyond our ‘natural’ bodies in the service of advancing technology.
This is a posthuman attribute in which bodies are “the original prostheses we all learn to
manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a
continuation of a process that began before we were born” (3). Hayles demystifies this
notion of information free of particular media and material by tracing the discourses and
inventions that separate information from its material form. Hayles also shows that
information must necessarily have a material form. In this way, Hayles identifies media
bodies as always intersecting with information and mind. Although she does not call
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these chiasmic relations, her work establishes the ways that bodies and information
dynamically interact, especially how those interactions change with changing
technologies.
Turing never attended the Macy Conferences, but he was certainly associated with
conversations. He corresponded with and studied with the most prominent members of
these conferences: Weiner and Von Neumann (Hodges 117-8 402-3). Turing also directly
addresses, at length, the kind of body and the role of bodies in constructing intelligent
machinery. Like the discourses of the Macy Conferences, “Intelligent Machinery”
contributes toward shifting discourses on the relation between bodies and technologies.
However, Turing does not articulate an immaterial notion of information. Rather, this is a
notable text because intelligence and embodiment dynamically interact. “Intelligent
Machinery” not only addresses how Turing understands a complex, dynamic relation
between material and information (as Hayles would predict), but also reveals how
Turing’s own embodied experiences informed his arguments for intelligent machinery.

First Manifesto on Artificial Intelligence: “Intelligent Machinery”
In June 1948, Turing wrote “Intelligent Machinery,” which was his final report to the
National Physical Laboratory. Copeland describes this article as “far-sighted” and
“strikingly original,” which is significant because it “brilliantly introduced many of the
concepts that were later to becomes central in [Artificial Intelligence]” (401). Copeland
calls this article the first manifesto of artificial intelligence. Copeland’s praise aside, the
article originally was received with disappointment. NPL director Sir Einstein described
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this article as a “schoolboy’s essay” that was “not suitable for publication” (in Copeland
Essential Turing 401).
I focus on this article because Turing first articulates his thinking on machine
intelligence. This article is a detailed and very imaginative exposition of defining and
producing intelligence. “Intelligent Machinery” is also significant because Turing
composes this at a time in which Turing’s thinking and also computing technology are in
a time of dynamic flux. In this way, Turing is ‘trying out’ ideas for the first time and in
his working these ideas out we find unusual notions of machine embodiment. Most
significantly, Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric in “Intelligent Machinery” posits notions of
intelligence and body in ways that are thoroughly integrated and even dynamic. Turing
directly addresses the question of what or how our machine intelligence may be
embodied.
In “Intelligent Machinery,” Turing composes dynamic, chiasmic interactions
between bodies and intelligence and these interactions are primarily composed through a
discipline that focuses on the body of the machine. He opens: I propose to investigate the
question as to whether it is possible for machinery to show intelligent behavior” (410).
After acknowledging and refuting several objections, he proposes an unorganized
machine, which he compares to the blank slate brain of a human child. This machine
would have potential networks of connections or pathways. However, the machine would
learn through ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’ to continue using the correct pathways and stop using
the incorrect pathways. This, according to Turing’s view, is a replication of how humans
develop intelligence. His primary claim for making machines intelligent is that a machine
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could be built like a man: “a great positive reason for believing in the possibility of
making thinking machinery is the fact that it is possible to make machinery to imitate any
small part of man” (420).
As this logic goes, given that we can build mechanical replicas of some body
parts, then we may also one day be able to replicate human thought. In order to develop
towards intelligence, just like raising human children, the machinery would have to be
‘raised’ in environments with training particular to complete more simple tasks and not
expected to master complex human thought. This ‘raising’ of intelligent machinery is a
process of programing the machine to follow different practices, gradually learning from
the dynamic, iterative practice.

“Failures” of Turing’s Technical Writing
Turing wrote this article with the supposed intention of submitting it as a technical report
summarizing and concluding Turing’s research from the past year. In some ways, this
article does contain some of the typical markers of technical writing. Turing opens by
defining machinery and separating it into distinct categories, only one of which he will
address. In each section, Turing begins by setting out the categories of a particular
concept and then defining exactly what he will focus on. Each time he introduces a new
term, whether a neologism or a technical term, he always defines its meaning, even if that
definition is then followed by qualifiers like “this does not pretend to be an accurate term.
It is conceivable that the same machine might be regarded by one man as organized and
by another as unorganized” (416). Turing reveals that, although this article has some
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appearances of technical writing, in many ways his writing “does not pretend to be” a
fastidious example of technical writing. This is partially because his rhetorical choices do
not conform to standards. Most strikingly, this failure to meet the expectations of good
technical writing is, in part, due to his tendency to thinking in terms of embodiment. This
defies the basic standard to write objectively. His primary audience was the National
Physics Lab, who expected this report to include concrete findings from Turing’s year of
sabbatical research. In this expectation, they would certainly be disappointed.
“Intelligent Machinery” exhibits much of the rhetorical bravado of a manifesto.
Regarding the content of his writing, his claims are based on future hypotheticals not on
any current, material technology. The hypotheses found in this article are unusual for
scientific or technical writing, to say the least. For instance, he imagines a group of all
male scientists raising this machine like a baby. His suggestion of re-making the human
body out of mechanical parts is a familiar, though strange, revision of Dr. Frankenstein’s
monster. Also like Dr. Frankenstein, he even calls the intelligent machine a “creature” in
the report (420). He describes creating a human-like body with mechanical parts and
then worries that if the machine were allowed to roam it would frighten citizens (420).
This level of imaginative and hypothetical writing breaks even the most loose of
conventions within professional, technical, and scientific discourses.
Further, stylistically, Turing’s style often lacks the specificity and modal
qualifiers that often define good scientific and technical writing. Instead, Turing makes
sweeping, broad claims about what future machines may be able to do and their impact
on society. He even calls attention to the vague quality of this style several times by
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acknowledging, “This definition is probably too vague and general to be very helpful”
(425). This article does not conform to any particular expected form of technical report.
What is especially unusual is that Turing opens with possible objections to mechanical
intelligence before he even describes how the machine would be built or programed.
Again, we find in this article that Turing fails to conform to technical writing standards in
nearly every way.
Although many of the choices he makes, his conclusions, his examples, all seem
strange or out of the ordinary from the standpoint of technical writing or science and
technology studies, I will demonstrate that all of these strange aspects of the article can
be explained given a dynamic, chiasmic relation between Turing’s embodied experiences
and his writing and thinking. The co-construction between Turing’s body and Turing’s
thinking share a similar emphasis on discipline and normalizing. Through an analysis of
Turing’s proposed design for training intelligent machinery and informed by Foucault’s
concept of biopower, I will show the dynamic co-construction between Turing’s
embodied experiences and the knowledge he composed in “Intelligent Machinery.”

Sexuality That Produces Knowledge
Michel Foucault’s History of Sexuality has long shifted our thinking on discourses of
sexuality away from a repressive hypothesis that needs to be liberated with more
discourse on sex and sexuality, to more analysis of the productive discourses around
bodies and sexuality, in order to understand how these discourses construct, discipline
and normalize subjects. As mentioned, Leavitt’s biography is an example of a text that
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continues to assert that there is a repressive stance towards discourses on Turing’s
sexuality. In addition, Leavitt’s goal is in a way to resist that supposed repression with
more discourse on sexuality. He states that his goal in The Man Who Knew Too Much is
to counter the repression of discourses on Turing’s sexuality by including more
discussion and connections to Turing’s sexuality (4).
In History of Sexuality, Foucault traces the material and discursive contingent
histories that establish western societal norms and have developed practices that
intervene on bodies in order to normalize them. In Foucault’s account, Western,
technologic, liberal society is a normalizing society15. Later, I will demonstrate places in
Turing’s biography that conform to much of the normalizing society that Foucault
describes. This normalizing society, which means a society in which the individual
people are socialized into conforming to an ideal norm and evaluated by their relative
approximation to that ideal norm, is the “historical outcome of a technology of power
centered on life”16 (144). People become normalized through technologies of power. We
see in this quick analysis of “Intelligent Machinery” that Turing resisted conventions.
Technologies of power are institutions and practices that are dispersed, shared,
enacted, and negotiated constantly. This notion of power is not administered or held by a
single person: this is not a unilateral, intentional holder of power. Instead, for Foucault,
technologies of power can best be understood as processes, relationships, and
15

In his later lectures on govenmentality he will argue that neoliberalism alters the
practices of normalization so that that the practices under neo-liberalism differ from the
practices found in the panoptic society described in Discipline and Punish.
16
Technologies of power focused on death would include the public, symbolic
interference (torture and death) on the human body that Foucault describes as a political
operation used by the sovereign power (Discipline and Punish 53).
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performances and not a thing that one either has or does not have. Power is enacted not
possessed. These can include literal technologies like computers and also social,
economic, and political systems. Likewise discipline is not exclusively through the very
public and brutal forms of disciplining. A whole complex set of institutions and practices
must already be in place and ready to intervene on human life. These institutions and
practices include laws that define norms and institutions that regulate life to fit into
norms, including scientists who at the time studied hormones in order to establish how to
correct deviant sexualities and genders and schools that define processes of acceptable
knowledge production. These institutions regulate life to define norms, discipline bodies
to become productive parts of economies, and regulate populations in ordered and
controlled ways. While these forms of intervention discipline bodies in many different
ways, sex is an especially effective location of intervention. Foucault explains that this is
because “sex was a means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the
species” and “at the juncture of the “body” and the “population,” sex became a crucial
target of a power organized around the management of life rather than the menace of
death” (146-7).
I will focus on how two main elements—interference and a focus on the body—
that Foucault describes as the normalizing practices. I will also connect these to Turing’s
text and his biography in order to demonstrate that the normalizing practices that
Foucault describes also shaped Alan Turing as a sexual subject and these same practices
reemerge in this foundational text on artificial intelligence. In particular, I find the
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chiasmic relationship as a dynamic one in which discourse and bodies intersect to
produce Turing as a subject of sexuality and also shape his knowledge production.

Analysis of Intelligent Machines and Biopower
Foucault identifies the work of biopower on bodies as a process of interfering with bodies
and populations to regulate towards a norm. This interference comes in a few different
forms. Obviously, laws can be seen as interference and disciplining, as in the case of
Turing’s sentence to prison or chemical castration. Instead of laws prohibiting or
restricting dangerous behavior, laws are also used to protect or regulate populations
towards a norm. In particular, Foucault traces the move towards laws that focus on the
life of the state and population. Although Foucault does not discuss England’s antihomosexuality laws, this is an egregious example of the state using laws to regulate the
population by focusing on the sexual life of individual men and the general population.
But Foucault demonstrates that laws are not the most prevalent or the most effective
forms of interfering on the life of the population. He also finds these interferences in
organizations of space and bodies, including “schooling, the politics of housing, public
hygiene, institutions of relief and insurance, the general medicalization of the population,
in short, an entire administrative and technical machinery” (126).
These interfering practices on bodies can be found to work on the level of the
population and on the individual. Regarding the population, this operates through laws as
well as though education reform and statistics. Biopower, which focuses on sex and
sexuality of populations, “gave rise as well to comprehensive measures, statistical
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assessments, and interventions aimed at the entire social body or at groups taken as a
whole” (146). Through these different institutions and technologies, the state produces
knowledge about populations in order to apply that knowledge towards intervening on the
life of the population.
In addition to this generalized mode of producing knowledge and regulating
populations, Foucault also describes more individually targeted forms of intervention on
bodies. This is far more dispersed form of biopower. In addition, this form of power, like
that of the population, focuses on the on bodies. For examples, while birth controls and
laws banning homosexuality operate on populations generally, the diagnosis, treatment,
and monitoring to hysterical women is more individually focused form of intervening on
women’s bodies. The individual woman was disciplined and regulated for the “health of
their children, the solidity of the family institution, and the safeguarding of society”
(147). In this case, “the intervention was regulatory in nature, but it had to rely on the
demand for individual disciplines and constraints (dressages)” (147). These interventions
regulate and normalize chiasmic relations between bodies and discourses.

Interference on Machinery
Interference is also a key concept for Turing in his conception of artificial intelligence in
“Intelligent Machinery.” In this article, Turing uses the term interference to describe his a
mode of disciplining machines towards intelligence, which is a productive form of
disciplining, through dynamic changes, additions, alterations, and influences on the
instructions and the hardware of the computer. This is necessary because, if a machine is
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going to demonstrate intelligence, it must be able to learn. Turing’s describes his
understanding of the human intelligence by writing, “We may say that in so far as a man
is a machine he is one that is subject to very much interference. In fact interference will
be the rule rather than the exception” (421). And he defines this interference as first a
man’s education and teachers, and also as “frequent communication with other men, and
it is continually receiving visual and other stimuli which themselves constitute a form of
interference” (421). In order to get a machine to learn and develop towards intelligence,
Turing devised a system of educating machines through interference. Turing proposes: “if
we now consider interference, we should say that each time interference occurs the
machine is probably changed. It is in this sense that interference ‘modifies’ a machine”
(419). Regarding the hardware, a machine would be designed with relatively few
established connections or pathways but many possible pathways. This, by analogy,
would be like a child’s brain, a blank slate. In order to create the connections, pathways,
and systems of processing problem solving, the engineer or scientists would need to
interfere. Turing outlines a few specific details about what this interference for educating
intelligent machinery.
First, in “Intelligent Machinery,” for Turing interference would be limited to two
kinds: “one for ‘pleasure’ or ‘reward’ and the other for ‘pain’ or ‘punishment’” (425). By
referring to the process of interfering as pleasure and pain, Turing creates an analogy
with human experience. He compares this to how children are raised with systems of
rewards and punishments (428). The computer would be made to feel pleasure by finding
a solution and establishing a system of thought. A machine would be made to feel pain by
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shutting down a path or connection that led into infinite loops or no solution. Through
“judiciously operated by the ‘teacher,’ one may hope that the ‘character’ will converge
towards the one desired, i.e., that wrong behavior will tend to become rare” (425). Turing
imagines gradual, iterative, interventions not onto the machine’s mechanical makeup but
the machine’s performance of tasks. In this way, Turing demonstrates that he considers
the construction of intelligence not to be an innate quality or a set of instructions. Rather,
intelligence and thinking are produced through iterative practices and through socially
constructed interferences of pleasure and pain that guide Turing’s childlike machine
towards the ‘correct’ way of operating intelligently. That is, intelligence and thinking are
produced chiasmically.
We also find that Turing’s intelligent machinery needed two other things for
intelligence: experience and social context. Regarding experience, it is only through
doing problems, feeling pleasure or pain, creating and shutting down connects, that this
hypothetical machine becomes intelligent. He writes that, “it would be quite unfair to
expect a machine straight from the factory to compete on equal terms with a university
graduate… This contact [with human beings] has throughout that period been modifying
his behavior pattern” (421). A new machine’s intelligence is more like a new human
infant: it would need experiences in order to become intelligence.
Machine intelligence would develop socially. He seems to be musing when he
suggests that the machine would ‘go to school’ within the labs led by engineers and
scientists as teachers (425). Turing describes a hypothetical social space, which also
resembles his actual social space: a place of all men working together to ‘raise’ an
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intelligent machine. And that is exactly how Turing and his colleagues imagined their
inventive, technical work. The computer he worked on while at University of Manchester
was called the ‘baby machine’ (Hodges 394, Leavitt 231). Each of the technicians and
also the interactions with other machines would ‘socialize’ these machines to learn new
tasks, solve new problems, and gradually even learn to use language, play games, and
possibly even write creatively. These interventions, both on Turing’s body and the Turing
machine, focus directly on bodies in order to produce dynamic intelligence and
knowledge.

Focus on Dynamic Bodies
Foucault demonstrates that disciplining norms are regulated through a particularly intent
focus on bodies, those of individuals and populations. Foucault traces how “deployments
of power are directly connected to the body—to bodies, functions, physiological
processes, sensations, and pleasures” (151). Throughout his work, Foucault traces
changes, transitions, and histories. But what doesn’t seem to change is that there is a
focus on the material body. However, this focus on bodies is always connected to and
dynamically intersecting with discourses. And as the discourses change, so to do bodily
practices, bodily norms, and bodily pleasures and pain change.
In History of Sexuality, institutions and practices all regulate and produce
knowledge about bodies, including organizations of “schooling, the politics of housing,
public hygiene, institutions of relief and insurance, the general medicalization of the
population” (126). These material-discursive practices interfere with bodies by
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disciplining and regulating how bodies are organized in space, instructing and training for
“good” behavior, and by producing and distributing knowledge regarding medicine and
health. Discourse and bodies are always connected in Foucault’s analyses. For example,
while he is analyzing the construction of the child as a sexual subject, he is also analyzing
the physical construction of spaces and the practices of observing and disciplining
children (104). Throughout his work, discourses and material dynamically influence each
other. Discourse slides into material bodies and bodies slide into discourse.

Disciplining Machine to Discipline Knowledge
Turing’s program for educating and training his computer reflects many of the trends that
Foucault describes at the time including an intent focus on the ‘body’ of the machine.
Turing’s descriptions of intelligent machinery resonate in some ways with Foucault’s
description of the power over life. In particular, Foucault describes biopower as “centered
on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities… all this
was ensured by the procedures of power that characterized the disciplines” (History of
Sexuality 139). However, for Turing the focus on the machine includes the computer’s
body as well as the metaphor of the human body that is used to compose Turing’s theory
of machine intelligence.
Turing first imagines the possibility of metaphorically reproducing the whole
body of a man in order to construct artificial intelligence. This machine body would have
eyes and ears: “that the microphone does this for the ear, and the television camera for
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the eye are commonplaces” (420). The machine’s body also would need to travel and
experience the world in order to know the world.
“one way of setting about our task of building a ‘thinking machine’ would be to
take a man as a whole and to try to replace all the parts of him by machinery…
this would of course be a tremendous undertaking. The object if produced by
present techniques would be of immense size, even if the “brain” part were
stationary and controlled the body at a distance. In order that the machine should
have a chance of finding things out for itself it should be allowed to roam the
countryside, and the danger to the ordinary citizen would be serious” (420).
Like Frankenstein’s creature, Turing acknowledges that this would frighten people. Also,
secondarily, this would be impossible or impractical to build. Therefore, Turing limits the
body of the intelligent machinery to just the brain: “Instead we propose to try and see
what can be done with a “brain” which is more or less without a body” (420).
Although in the end he describes the machine without a replicated human body,
he continues to attend to a body of the machine through use of metaphor and also through
his attention to the feeling or experience of the machine. At each stage in the computer’s
development, he uses a metaphor of human embodiment. This begins with the baby as the
blank slate, which is the state at which Turing sees computers at the time of his writing
this article. Later he compares the machine to a schoolboy learning through experience.
Turing describes machines that would be indistinguishable from a grown human, in
particular indistinguishable from a man’s chess playing ability. By the end, Turing
compares the computer to a man who has 18 years of experience in the world of men.
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In addition, by focusing on pleasure and pain, Turing connects computer
intelligences with feeling or experiencing as well as solving and working. In this way, his
definition of intelligence requires an attention to bodies. While machines without
intelligence would not learn through experience, for intelligent machines the ‘body’ has
the ability to feel, respond, and learn from feelings of pain and pleasure. In this way, the
particular body of the machine informs its intelligence. Without a human-like body,
Turing concedes, the machine could never be very intelligent about most things. In
particular, this machine would be drastically limited because “the creature would still
have no contact with food, sex, sport and many other things of interest to the human
being” (420). Here, Turing does two things: first he affirms that experiences (including
sex and sport) inform the knowledge that we produce and he second acknowledges that
without these rich set of human experiences a machine would be limited in what it could
know.
Given these limited experiences (Turing concluded in “Intelligent Machinery that
producing a machine body with full sensory abilities and the ability to travel would be far
too complicated.) and limited sociability (all male scientists), Turing acknowledges that
the machine would have very limited intelligence. It would only be good for chess, math,
and language learning and language translation17 (420). These four things are achievable
for this machine because the tasks are learnable without a human body, without the
ability to experience the wider world, and are structured through a set of rules.

17

As it turns out, machines continue to struggle to learn language. As Agar concludes,
“Proficiency in natural language… has broken each new generation of Artificial
Intelligence machine” (Turing 131)
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Regarding the relation between bodies and intelligence, Turing limits what a
machine could know to what a machine could experience in an embodied way. Implicitly,
this argument for machine intelligence depends on a chiasmic relation and dynamic
interaction between the machine experience and the machine’s intelligence. Machine
intelligence is limited by the lack of bodily experience. Therefore, we find in Turing’s
work, embodiment shapes and allows for specific kinds of intelligent behavior. Different
bodies allow for different experiences. And these different embodied experiences allow
for different forms of intelligence. This is not a natural form of knowledge of bodies.
Rather, through experience, pleasure and pain, interference, and social construction,
knowledge is a factor of embodied experience. Humans know because we have bodies.
Given the limited bodies of machinery, their intelligence would be limited to the kind of
experiences, which could be constructed for them by machinery, instructions and code, as
well as the social context engaging with other machines and scientists. Although the
embodied experience of an intelligent machine is highly limited, the significance here is
that Turing imagines intelligence as a product or result of experience and intelligence is
shaped by the embodied particularity.

Embodying Turing within Intelligent Machinery
Foucault’s historically contingent theories of biopower and normalization include the
time period in which Turing was raised and the times in which he was writing. Although
Turing does not explicitly connect his experience to his proposal for intelligent
machinery, parallels between his notion of training a machine and his own embodied
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experiences are easy to find. His experiences shape his identity as a subject with sexuality
as well as a subject who produces knowledge. These experiences serve as a kind of
foundation or analogy for Turing’s invention of artificial intelligence. The interference
through pleasure and pain that Turing describes as a practice for training intelligent
machinery parallels Turing’s own education. In particular, his training at prestigious
boarding schools involved intense disciplining and even pain. As a child, Turing was
sensitive. His brother was sent to a prestigious French school. He wrote back telling Mrs.
Turing “for god’s sake don’t send him here… it will crush the life out of him” (19). At
Sherborne School, Turing experienced what Hodges describes as “continuous public
scrutiny and control of every individual boy. These were the true priorities” (22). The
headmaster stated the goals of this education: “to become familiar with the ideas of
authority and obedience, of cooperation and loyalty” (Hodges 22). Agar describes the
education at Sherborn: “favoured instead the encouragement of classical languages for
the brain, and physical sports, specially rugby and cricket, for the Imperial virtues of
manliness, hierarchy, and leadership” (65). His day-to-day routine as well as his physical
appearance was strictly regimented (Hodges 23). At Sherborne, Turing learned what it
meant to be a man through physical and emotional pain: he was disciplined for untidy
behavior and also mocked for his performance in sports.
But Alan Turing also would have learned about what it means to be a scientific
man by the pleasures he was afforded throughout his life. In this way, although Turing
certainly struggled, he was also afforded a lot of privilege due, in part, to his ability to
conform to expectations of an eccentric, introverted young genius. Because he showed an
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aptitude for science and math, teachers let him skip out on required social and physical
activities to work in the lab (Agar 18-19). He was given a space and time to experiment.
By withdrawing into science, Turing was able to find pleasure in work and safety from
disciplining. As a scholarly student, Turing could “take on the role of an intelligentsia in
the ‘nation in miniature’, tolerated provided [he] interfered with nothing that mattered
[i.e. sports and competition]” (Hodges 22). While at Bletchley Park and then later at
University of Manchester, Turing was afforded leverage and freedom to be a bit peculiar.
People would comment on his strange behavior: locking his coffee cup to his bicycle,
showing up to work sweaty after 10-20 miles of running or biking, tying his pants up
with a piece of rope. But they still referred to him as ‘the professor’ at Bletchley and
Manchester. In Manchester, he was given freedom of what his colleagues called his
“creative anarchy” (Hodges 343). This freedom was granted because Turing was seen as
an intellectual, which is a role that was respected despite his social oddities.
Turing would have also felt the pleasure from the recognition and approval he
gain for his intelligence and single-minded commitment to his work. It is no wonder he at
times appeared to have a greater fondness for computers than for people. Turing would
have had years of experience negotiating safe and unsafe spaces for gay men. He was
relatively open about his sexuality (Leavitt describes him as “naïve, absent-minded, and
oblivious” [4]). But in many ways he remained outside of the major social scenes: Turing
never joined major social clubs nor did he attend large social functions. His social
experiences looked very much like what he imagined the computer social experience: all
male and highly intellectual. He went to an all male school and lived there for his entire

145

education. At King’s College Cambridge, he lived and worked with all men. These men
explored their sexuality as well as their intellectual and political interests together
(Leavitt 17-19). And in these social settings Turing was relatively safe being open
regarding his sexuality. At Princeton, he lived and worked with all men. The only time in
Turing’s life in which women were present were the 5 years that he was at Bletchley park
because women did most of the computing work at that time. Other than this, Turing
worked on problems, calculations, and even engineering either in solitude or with groups
of all male scientists and technicians. It was also the social scene of all intellectual,
highly educated men. These experiences inform his later program for artificial
intelligence. When Turing imagines the social context in which the machine is ‘raised’
towards intelligence, he describes the social setting as exclusively masculine. It is not
simply that Turing imagined his computer intelligence through similar mechanisms that
disciplined his own body. In addition, Turing’s own embodiment and the embodiment
that he imagines for the AI are both dynamically constructed through practices and
relations of biopower. The practices that I describe above are not passive or neutral
activities. Rather, they are the historical consequence of political, economic, and social
practices that tend towards normalizing bodies like Alan Turing.

Constructing Posthuman Bodies in the Empire
Above I describe the ways that Turing’s embodied experiences parallel the particular
ways that he goes on to propose the future of mechanical intelligence. However, before
even beginning, Turing already held an understanding of bodies, human life, and his own
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life in an ambiguous relation with technology. More specifically, Turing already had to
understand his own life and human bodies dynamically in ways that disrupt humanist
ideals. The material and social institutions framed Turing as a subject who is at least
partially understands human bodies, minds, and experience in mechanical terms. And
those relations, through that Turing understood his body, are shaped by historical,
political, economic, and social settings. The discourse communities in which Turing
engages in are the same discourses out of which the posthuman subject emerges. Hayles
looks to Turing’s article “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” as an important ‘birth’
of this posthuman subject (xii-xiii). In Chapter Five, I analyze this paper to demonstrate
that Turing was always already constructed as a posthuman subject. And like Hayles, I
recognize that this can be empowering for Turing. And at the same time, this posthuman
subject also led to greater levels of control and disciplining of Turing’s body.

British Body as Beta Version Computer
Jon Agar’s work on the history of the computer contributes to this discussion by
explaining the political context in which Turing writes, lives, and invents. Foucault writes
that biopower, as opposed to sovereign power, “gave rise as well to comprehensive
measures, statistical assessments, and interventions aimed at the entire social body or at
groups taken as a whole” (146). And the computer is implicated in this work, as Agar
explains. Although Foucault does not discuss the computing technologies specifically,
Jon Agar writes the history of computers as the central tool for the British government
bureaucracy to regulate global populations. In The Government Machine, Agar
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demonstrates that the British Civil Service provided the prototype to the computer’s
organization and implantation. This bureaucracy had long been surveying and studying
populations through its complex and extensive network of diplomats, civil servants,
frameworks, and governmental structures. Computing machines had long been used to
calculate, store, and compile data. This use of computation and statistics, Agar
demonstrates, was a critical tool in maintaining and regulating a colonial power that
spanned the globe.
The model of the British governance is so closely tied to the model of computer
technology that Agar asserts, “to study the history of technology is to study the state, and
vice versa” (3). Of course, Turing, whose father held a fairly high ranking position in the
International Civil Service in India, was born into this legacy of computation for state
control. As the Second World War became almost certain, Turing quickly enlisted to aid
the British government in developing technologies that would further facilitate the
processing, interpreting, and control of statistical data. This was not Turing’s initial
purpose for developing computer technology. Nevertheless, his wartime inventions were
quickly adopted for more administrative use by the British government. His inventions
were also directly put back into the service of maintaining the expansive work of British
government and commerce around the globe.
In Agar’s historical account of digital computation, the body of British Civil
Servants—like Turing’s father—is the prototype for the computer. Mechanical computers
were built to simulate and eventually replace the work done of a large administrative staff
of human computers. When Turing first introduced Turing machines in his 1936 article
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“On Computable Numbers,” he based his development of digital computation on the
embodied work of humans working unintelligently but with discipline on calculations.
Later, Turing’s machine would eventually replace the calculating work done by humans.
And the goal of this computational invention was further regulate, manage, and control
the expansive population of the British colonial power. But before Turing could even
have imagined his computer taking the place of these human bodies, he already had to
understand humans’ role as somewhat mechanical parts in the larger machine that was
the British government. In this account, we see that the posthuman subject is regulated
and assimilated into the work of empire. Computers and human bodies are both at the
service of government, science, and progress generally.

Posthuman Bodily Enhancements
But this notion of human subjectivity, which Hayles calls posthuman, does not only
operate on the level of populations. In addition, we can see this working on the individual
subject through a focus on the individual body, especially the individual body as a pliable
matter that can and should be enhanced through technology. This notion of posthuman
bodies as plastic and porous for technological improvements can best be seen in Norbert
Weiner’s writing on cybernetics and Hans Moravec’s cybernetic man, both of which
Hayles includes as founding thinkers of posthuman subjectivity. Moravec and Weiner
contribute towards the shift towards posthumanism by articulating a dynamic notion of
the human body that his pliable and plastic for technological enhancement. For Moravec,
technological enhancements of bodies included feedback loops to allow for breathing and
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improved circulation to survive extended space travel. In addition to these invasive
enhancements for the benefit of science and space travel, Moravec would image, one day,
uploading human consciousness into digital computers.
David Serlin traces how this same plastic notion of bodies became apparent in the
post-WWII serge in plastic surgery and other forms of bodily enhancements. In
Replaceable You, David Serlin argues that bodily modifications became popular after
WWII because the individual body needed to achieve its utmost level of wholeness,
health, and “normalcy” in order to reflect the strength and vitality of the national identity.
Although he does not use the term posthuman subject, Serlin describes a notion of the
individual body that is shaped to best reflect the power and vitality of the nation as a
whole. Two related aspects of Serlin’s research relate to both Foucault’s discussion of
intervention and Turing’s experience. First, Serlin argues that the health and ‘normalcy’
of the individual citizen represented a microcosm of the state generally. He asserts that,
after the brutalities and also the social changes experienced during and after WWII, there
was a drive to re-affirm the strength and health of the state by reasserting the manliness
and health of its citizens. In particular, with so many men and women who had been
wounded in war, cosmetic surgery was seen as a way to technologically reinstate the
strength of men and also the beauty of women. Second, Serlin points to the increased use
of hormone therapy to regulate gender and sexuality. Serlin documents how
“Psychologists and sexual scientists, moved by what they perceived to be the glandular
basis of behavior, maintained the orgotherapy [estrogen that was to neutralize
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sexuality]… was a successful program that contained the patient’s tendency towards
sexual transgression” (137).
Although Serlin focuses specifically on American identity and the American state,
this is the same hormone therapy that was administered to Turing in order to punish him
for homosexual sexual acts. The scientific findings that Serlin describe are the same
forms of hormone therapy that were used to ‘neutralize’ Turing’s transgression of
homosexuality. This punishment was perceived to be a ‘treatment’ of chemical castration.
British judicial and civil institutions, as well as individual citizens, looked towards these
treatments as ways of controlling and artificially bringing “abnormal” genders and
sexualities to “natural” norms of feminine and masculine gender identities. Together, in
this case, we find knowledge as a kind of dynamic power that is used to determine and
regulate norms. In addition, we see how the individual must be managed and the
individual body must be managed and intervened upon to regulate and represent the
upmost health of the state.

Biopower and the Punishment of Alan Turing
At this point, we see that the institutions of science, governance, and education all form
Turing as a subject with sexuality as well as a kind of posthuman subject of the British
empire. And these different forms of subjected-ness that form Turing’s embodied
experience all coalesce and converge at this moment of trial and punishment. In Turing’s
punishment, the regulation of the subject of the state is absolutely dependent on the
mutual regulation of Turing as a sexual subject. Both as a subject of government and a
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subject of sexuality, Turing’s thinking and his embodied experiences are shaped and
controlled through mutual regulation, intervention, and focus on his body.
Just 2 years after the publication of “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,”
Turing met a young man at in front of the movie theaters. They had a brief affair, which
quickly turned sour. The young man seemed to be trying to take advantage of Turing,
who seemed unusually willing to be taken advantage of (loaning him money even after
the young man stole from him). When Turing returned home one day to find that
someone had broken in and stolen valuables, he immediately called the police and alerted
them that this young man may have been involved. In the process of investigating the
burglary, the police ‘uncovered’ the sexual nature of their relationship. At that point, they
dropped the investigation of the young man and started investigating Turing.
Turing was arrested in March 1952. The young man who Turing had sex with
that led to the police ‘discovery’ was not arrested. This detail is important in order to
understand why Turing in particular was arrested, tried, and found guilty. Yes,
homosexuality itself was illegal. In particular, male homosexuality was illegal. Female
homosexuality seems to have either not been understood as a reality or not be understood
as a threat. So not every form of homosexuality was found serious enough for
punishment. In addition, not every case of male homosexuality was punished. The young
man who slept with Turing did not get arrested. In the process of investigating Turing’s
‘crimes’ the intelligence agencies would surely have discovered that Turing had previous
sexual relationships. Those men were not investigated. Rather, it was Turing in particular.
To explain why he in particular was perceived as a threat, we have to consider how he
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was not simply his sexuality, but also his status as a war hero.
The intersections between Turing’s identity as a subject with sexuality, Turing’s
identity as a subject with national identity, and his intellectual and public status, are
significant here. Homosexuality itself, while illegal and stigmatized, was often treated
with the standard of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell.’ However, in the early 1950’s, homosexuality
increasingly came to be defined as opposed to the health and security of the state. This
can be understood in a few different ways. First, as Serlin argues, the post-war state
needed to affirm its strength and power. These perceptions of state health and power
reflect the need to affirm manliness. Turing was not just a man who could be sidelined as
an outcast or marginal figure in relation to the British state. He was a war hero. He was a
personal contact and favorite of Winston Churchill. He was also in the spotlight as an
inventor and an intellectual. His arguments regarding machine intelligence were widely
publicized and promoted. He was known both as a national hero and a national genius
whether or not most people agreed with his arguments.
In addition to homosexuality being perceived as an affront to manliness,
homosexuality was also perceived as opposed to nationalism or patriotism. Leavitt
explains that the homophobic culture at the time associated homosexuality and any
personal deviance with from the norm of heterosexuality with immorality and as a sign of
bad character18. In this case, homosexuality was seen as opposed to manliness, which was
also seen as unhealthy or unsound for the strength and manliness of the strong British
state. Homosexuality was perceived as a kind of immoral act. Given this perception of
18

This casual connection between homosexuality and treason would again be drawn in
the case of Anthony Blunt in 1979.
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immorality, other forms of bad character were associated with homosexuality including
deceit. Given the level of sensitive state secretes he was privy to, Turing’s sexuality was
seen as a security risk. He had been a part of the inner circle of Bletchley Park. He was
given a level of access to all forms of the British intelligence and top-secret technology.
He was also granted rare access to the Bell Labs in the US. With these knowledges in his
head, how could he be trusted? This connection between Turing’s sexuality and his
character, as well as his status as a war hero, became the focus of the trial. It was
unquestioned that he had sex with another man. Turing’s character was what was really
on trial. He was found guilty.
After the trial, things did not improve. Turing was given estrogen treatment,
which was seen to neutralize or sterilize his dangerous sexuality. But that wasn’t all. The
estrogen impaired his ability to have sex, but he was still considered a security risk. He
was forbidden from leaving the country, which he had previously done often for holidays.
In addition, police officers would follow him, park in front of his house to make sure that
he came and left at expected times, and also showed up at surprise times. Turing had
every reason to believe that all of his activities were watched carefully. This level of
policing was administered because his sexual “betrayal” of “natural order” suggested a
likelihood that he may also would betray his loyalty to country as well.
Turing did not admit any guilt nor did he try to defend himself. When faced with
the choice of prison or one year of estrogen injection, Turing chose to sacrifice his
sexuality in order to continue to work and continue to live his life. The ‘treatment’ of
estrogen as a form of chemical castration can also be understood from this perspective of
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posthuman subjectivity. As Serlin explains, estrogen treatments were seen as a significant
and progressive development to improve the sexual health of the state. And as Hayles
outlines, this posthuman notion of bodies is always already embedded in technology. As
we see in Moravec’s and Weiner’s cybernetic theories, the dynamic human body is
subject to enhancements for the betterment of the health of the state or for the sake of
scientific progress. Given these factors, we can better understand why the court offered
Turing a choice between prison and chemical castration. The ‘choice’ of estrogen
treatment was offered as a lenient and generous sentence. By choosing chemical
castration, Turing was further making decisions within a posthuman notion of his own
body. In this way, giving up his sexuality and using technologies to alter his body
towards a norm were both preferable to giving up his work and his reputation within the
scientific and engineering communities.
Artificial intelligence too would be, in Turing’s projection, co-constituted
between mechanical design of unorganized or random machines and interferences of
pleasure and pain, experience and sociability. This text is chiasmically connected with
Turing’s own embodied experience. However, in this chapter we are seeing a far more
complex notion of bodies. This body may still be mechanical in many ways, but even this
mechanical notion of bodies is composed through a historical, political, and social
process of intervening on life and bodies. The systems of biopower that compose
Turing’s body, his sexuality, also compose his status as subject of the British state. Here,
the chiasmic rhetoric that Turing composes brings with it the weight of political, social,
cultural, and discursive construction and deconstruction. These bodies that intersect and
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appear within Turing’s text are dynamic in so far as they come charged with the
historicity of the particular body. In addition, Turing then imagines a system of educating
machines so that these bodies also experience systems of intervention and disciplining
their bodies. In Turing’s conception of intelligence, discipline and bodily interference are
critical for intelligence. Likewise, his own experience of embodied disciplining form his
intelligence, his subjectivity, as well as his knowledge production.
Later in life, a critic of Turing objected that if a computer could learn to write a
poem, that poem would not be any good. Turing responded by saying that maybe you
would have to be a computer to appreciate the poem. And maybe Turing always engaged
with computers on their terms. He would read the computer’s output in hexadecimal code
because he wanted to read in the computer’s native tongue. What I am trying to do is
demonstrate that the interventions on Turing’s body form him as a subject of government
and a subject with sexuality. In the end, Turing identity as a gay man, his identity as a
British civil servant, and his invention of artificial intelligence all dynamically,
chiasmically inform each other. Turing had been so rigorously disciplined through
interventions and violence against his body. Nevertheless, Turing is not simply a cog in
the mechanized British state. His embodied particularity reveals small locations in which
he moves away from or resists normalization, even despite the intense disciplining. His
ability to resist normalization is no doubt, in part, due to his bodily particularity: he had
been afforded privileges and great liberty because he played the role of eccentric genius
so very well, and this role he played depended on embodied differences including male
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and class privilege. In the next chapter, I will further complicate Turing’s chiasmic
rhetoric by adding the complexity of bodily difference, especially gendered differences.
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CHIASMUS 5: DESTABILIZING FORMS

“Bodies never quiet comply.”
~Butler, Bodies that Matter

“Machines take me by surprise with great frequency.”
~Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”

Chiasmus creates relations that allow for, at one time, both difference and similarity
between bodies and discourse. As a heuristic for analysis, chiasmus figures the relations
between bodies and discourse so that bodies and discourse intersect and interact in
dynamic, productive ways. In each chapter, I have turned to the figure of chiasmus to
analyze how bodies and discourse interact to construct Turing’s rhetoric as well as the
knowledge he produces. These interactions are productive for knowledge and also
disciplining forces on Turing’s body and his writing. For instance, I’ve shown how
Turing’s embodied experiences learning to discipline and control his body inform his
design of computers. In this chapter, I again return to chiasmus to analyze the relations
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between bodies and discourse in Turing’s life and writing. However, this time, the
dynamic relation is more than productive (in so far as productive is also controlled and
usable for science); instead, we find that chiasmus destabilizes.
In this chapter, I argue that Turing’s writing in “Computing Machinery and
Intelligence” is a unique time in this history of the computer in which technologies were
embodied and gendered in feminine ways. Turing’s writing genders artificial intelligence
in the famous Turing Test as feminine and includes notions of gender that are flexible
and unstable. This feminine gendering is not limited to machines; rather, Turing’s
gendering of machine intelligence also implies feminized notions of intelligence. While I
will discuss Barad’s work in more detail later in the chapter, I will now define that, by
using the word ‘gendering,’ I am drawing on Karan Barad’s notion of gender not as a
thing or a state but as a material-discursive performance or experience that produces
temporary, flexible notions of femininity and masculinity. Gendering is always produced
through material-discursive practices and is not attributable to a single material,
biological status. In this rather unique time in the history of computer technologies,
femininity is central to Turing’s development of not only thinking machines but also his
definition of what qualifies as a legitimate exhibition of intelligence. Turing destabilizes
relations between emerging computing technologies and humans through his use of
destabilizing chiasmic rhetoric. This unstable, chiasmic relation calls attention to the
ways in which humans and machines are not definitionally opposed, but are rather
connected and intertwined.
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Turing Moves Towards Machine Intelligence
Before he composes this gender-bending notion of machine intelligence, Turing begins to
settle down in his work and his home for the first time in his life. Although the 1948
article “Intelligent Machinery” was not well received by the National Physics Laboratory,
that made little difference to Turing. He was moving on. In the fall of 1948, he moved to
take a position at the University of Manchester. While Cambridge was ornate, refined,
and had all the markers of an elite social status, Manchester was austere, dingy, and was
dominated by the decay of old manufacturing industries.
Turing seemed to make himself right at home in Manchester. He bought a home
in the suburbs and hired a housekeeper who would write to Turing’s mother snickering
about his peculiar bachelor habits. He built a bike that only he could seem to figure out
how to ride without crashing. He continued to have a reputation as a strange fellow, even
in this less refined city. For instance, Turing would run long distances, sometimes over
20 miles on the way to University of Manchester, where he would start working covered
in sweat. He traveled often and dated some. Things were going well, overall.
Turing’s work in the lab was going relatively well. Max Newman started the
Manchester Computing Lab and began work on the University of Manchester Computer
in 1946. Although the machine was technically named the MARK II, the technicians
called this machine ‘the baby.’ Compared to the Colossus that many of these men worked
on during WWII at Bletchley Park, this computer was just a baby. It still took up multiple
rooms and required legwork to operate. So perhaps it was only natural that this baby soon
became Turing’s baby. He wrote the computer’s manual, which is quite entertaining to
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read as far as computer manuals go (“Programmers' Handbook for the Manchester
Electronic Computer Mark II”). Turing designed the language of the machine, and this
language was so complex that the other technicians depended on Turing’s training just to
be able to use and operate the computer. Although the baby was cumbersome, prone to
operator failure, and at times inaccurate, it still gained some attention for its speed and
flexibility in completing different kinds of tasks. Norbert Weiner traveled from the
United States to see the machine and to talk to Turing. From this exchange, Weiner was
emboldened in his belief that machines could be developed to replicate or even replace
human bodies (c.f. The Human Use of Human Beings). Turing held a more modest belief.
He didn’t necessarily think that machines would replace humans; however, as we ill see
in “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” machines did challenge and expand the
notion of intelligence and even challenged traditional notions of humanity.
Whether or not the baby was ready, the press picked up on the developments
underway with Mark II. And Turing became the ‘face’ of this development. In addition to
complex mathematical calculation, they taught the computer, their ‘baby,’ language,
songs, and poetry. During a radio broadcast, a reporter brought children to see and hear
the baby try to sing popular songs. The technicians explained that the computer was also
learning to play chess. A reporter who interviewed Turing cited his goals as “the
investigation of the possibilities of machines for their own sake…and to what extent it
could think for itself” (Hodges 406). Although this is more moderate than Weiner’s goal
of replacing human bodies, the general public did not receive news of Turing’s work and
the computer at Manchester with open arms (Hodges 404). In particular, a prominent
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neurologist, Sir Geoffrey Jefferson, composes the most widely read critique of Turing’s
work. Jefferson explicitly objects that Turing’s intelligent machine challenges the
humanist exclusive claim on intelligence. This critique is especially of note in this
dissertation research because Jefferson’s arguments reveal that, even at the time, Turing’s
machine and his writing were received as threatening and destabilizing.

Destabilizing Chiasmus
Chiasmus is a dynamic figure. In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that chiasmic figuring
between bodies and discourse could produce a dynamic, co-constructive relation. In that
movement of chiasmus, to be dynamic means to be active and also suggests the capacity
to create a change. In particular, dynamic chiasmus allow for changes that are a coconstructive shaping of both Turing’s discourse and embodied experiences. Turing’s
original and innovative writings are composed, in part, through the dynamic relation with
his embodied experience. Although I identify this as a form of disciplining, it is also
productive for Turing’s inventive and original thinking.
Now I return to the dynamics of chiasmus to demonstrate that the relations
between bodies and discourse are at time destabilizing or disruptive as well as productive.
To be dynamic suggests power and the ability to cause changes. The Oxford English
Dictionary defines dynamic specifically as “force producing motion.” In Greek,
“dynamis” means power or strength. Dynamics, the science, is the study of “the action of
force” (OED). Dynamics thus at once can be understood as a physical property of force
and also more generally as the capacity or potential to change or exert force. In the
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history of rhetoric, the physical notion of dynamics can also be found animating
discourse and persuasion. Fahnestock finds chiasmus in Heraclitus: “Cool things become
warm, and the warm grows cool” or “the moist dries and the parched becomes moist”
(141). These chiasmic phrases structure Heraclitus’ philosophy of reversibility, flux, and
eternal change. Jean-Pierre Vernant defines the sophistic practice of dissoi logoi as a
“dynamic view of argument” (286). He compares this method to mechanical devices, like
pulleys or weights, which can change the dynamics of moving a load or weighing a
quantity. Similarly, Vernant describes the technê of dissoi logoi as one that changes the
dynamics of an argument so that the orator in the weaker position may appear stronger.
Steven B. Katz argues that Cicero should be considered in the sophistic tradition because
Cicero, like the sophists, understood rhetoric as a musical and poetic form. That is,
rhetoric has a sensual as well as a symbolic function, and that sensual function is a form
of dynamic experience: poetics, rhythm, and rhyme. Together, these forms of sensuous
language use are not simply decorative but also produce a form of “affective knowledge”
(108-9).
Chiasmus, as a rhetorical form and as a relation between bodies and discourse can
produce rhetorical effects that destabilize, that disturb, that unsettle. When figures
emphasize balance, as parallelism and in a different way antithesis do so well, they may
also make relations appear natural and harmonious. To appear as a natural and
harmonious relation between bodies and discourse would, in effect, cover over the
movement, negotiations, and tensions between the language that we use, the technologies
of bodies, and also the bodies that compose our lives. Therefore, chiasmic relation
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between bodies and discourse may not always create a peaceful, calm relation that is
settled and stable. No, the opposite is the case. Chiasmus allows us to see the unsettled,
constantly negotiating, reforming movement between bodies and discourse. This is
significant because there is no one relation between bodies and discourse. Rather, there is
a constant relation-ing, a constant forming and reforming. Likewise, in this dissertation,
chiasmic rhetorics—those rhetorical effects that emerge out of the relation-ing between
bodies and discourse—are processes or movements that change with the particularity of
the bodies and the particularity of the discourse. In each chapter, bodies, discourses, as
well as Turing’s own writing and life, have been forming and re-forming to produce new
chiasmic rhetoric as well as new knowledge and new technologies.
However, in this chiasmic movement, there is also tense negotiation. With each
chiasmic relationing between bodies and discourse, we find new iterations of bodies and
new forms of discourse. These surprise and even startle. Turing’s article was certainly
received with surprise, even if that surprise was also a largely negative one. Although I
would not go so far as to say that these moments are necessarily empowering or
progressive, I do want to suggest that in the chiasmic relationing between bodies and
discourse, new relations, new discourses, and new embodied experiences can be
produced. These new relations open the possibility of disturbing reified, naturalized
notions of bodies. Before I can say that a positive chance is perhaps possible, I can say at
the very least these out of balance relations between bodies and discourse call attention to
the process of constructing relations between bodies and discourse. This relation often
remains unnoticed in its ossified form where bodies are so often defined as natural and
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passive. Unstable chiasmic rhetoric allows us to see what is often so naturalized that it
goes unnoticed: the unstable, chiasmic relations between our bodies and our discourses.

Critiques of Machine Intelligence
When word of Turing’s machine reached the general public, this unstable relation
between human and computer elicited a strong negative reaction, notably from University
of Manchester neuroscientist Sir Geoffrey Jefferson. Jefferson published his critique in
the article “Mind of the Mechanical Man,” which circulated widely. Jefferson begins his
critique by addressing the question of the relation between brain and mind. Jefferson was
a renowned expert on this topic: he innovated neurosurgery during and after WWII. He
saw firsthand how physical, neurological, and psychological trauma would affect not just
the brain but also the mind and body in different ways. In his discussion of mind and
brain, Jefferson argues that human intelligence is directly connected to embodied
experience. He then goes on to argue for a version of ‘true’ intelligence (the machine
could at best hope to be a parrot spitting back a few lines it could learn) that would be
unattainable by machines: this would be creative, emotional, and even sensory
intelligence.
Jefferson concludes that even if we could build an intelligent machine, to do so
would be inherently anti-humanist: an affront to the centrality and superiority of
humanity. In this article, Jefferson defends a strong humanist notion of intelligence in
which intelligence is the sole property of humans, and excludes any machine, and even
animals. This is so, for Jefferson, because the human brain is completely and
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unexplainably unique: “its functions may be mimicked by machines, [but the human
mind] remains itself and is unique in Nature” (1106). For Jefferson, humanity is the
definition of intelligence, and intelligence is the defining quality of humanity.
And what qualifies humans to be the sole possessor of thought and intelligence?
Jefferson defines this as the whole range of human experience of pleasure, pain, and even
love and sex. In particular, Jefferson defines language as the thing that sets humans apart
from even the highest animals: language use, and the ability to use language to remember
more and to advance human knowledge.
Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto because of thoughts
and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could we agree that
machine equals brain—that is, not only write it but know that it had written it. No
mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy contrivance)
pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves—fuse, be warmed by flattery, be
made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed when it
cannot get what it wants. (1110)
A machine may be able to spit out correct answers or repeat stock phrases, but
intelligence requires a full range of embodied and discursive behaviors. A machine could
never have these things; hence, a machine cannot be said to think.
At the heart of Jefferson’s argument, we find a humanist argument, and also the
human body. The embodied experiences of humans—our experiences, passions, and
emotions—these constitute intelligence. In some ways, Jefferson’s arguments align with
the Barad and Grosz’s arguments that intelligence is embodied and that our embodied
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experiences inform our thinking and knowledge production. However, Jefferson’s
primary critique is that the human mind has some thing, some soul like essence, that is
always more than bodies and always unexplainable through material sciences. In many
ways, I also agree with Jefferson’s nuanced and complex description of the relations
between bodies and intelligence.
In his response, Turing agrees on many of Jefferson’s points. Turing agrees that
the analogy between human brains and computing machinery is a weak analogy in so far
as human brains and bodies are far more complex. In addition, Turing will agree that
human intelligence is a product, in part, of our human embodied experiences and
emotions. However, Turing will shift the conversation.
As we found in “Intelligence Machinery,” Turing locates intelligence through a
broader set of experiences and bodies. What is especially significant here is that when
Turing moves to defend machine intelligence against these humanist critiques, Turing not
only ‘humanizes’ computing machinery, he also genders machines as feminine. He does
this first by comparing creating a parallel between a test to guess the difference between a
man and a woman with a test to guess the difference between a machine and a man. In
addition, this descriptions of machines at work include discursive practices that feminine
the machines, the technicians, as well as intelligence itself. This gendering of computer
technology creates a blurred relation between technology and humanity. This moment of
blurred gendering and embodying of computer technology is a significant point in which
Turing expands notions of intelligence. To complete this argument, Turing creates
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dynamic relations between humans and computers that further disturbs and challenges
humanist definitions of intelligence.

Dynamic Rhetoric
While I have been discussing chiasmic rhetoric as especially dynamic and even
disturbing, in so far as its goal is to create a change, rhetoric itself has been understood as
a form of dynamics. Contemporary rhetorical theory revives a notion of rhetoric that is
energetic with life. That is what George Kennedy suggested in his surprising article
“Hoot in the Dark.” Scholar of Greek and Classical rhetoric and translator of Aristotle,
Kennedy argues that rhetoric is energy and as such rhetoric includes more than language,
including “physical actions, facial expressions, gestures and signs generally” (4). Starting
with the definition that rhetoric is energy, Kennedy expands his notion of energy of
rhetoric to exist before speaking or writing and even prior to the speaker’s intent. The
result is that animals and even plants can behave rhetorically by exerting their energy to
enact a change or response, whether or not that exerted energy is intentional. In this
definition, rhetoric becomes defined in a way that is indistinguishable from life and
living. Steven Katz also proposes an energetic notion of rhetoric in Epistemic Rhetoric of
Music. In this book he theorizes the non-referential knowledge of language, which is
driven by emotion and the body of the author, as a form of knowing. This form of
knowledge can only be understood in the experiential and temporal qualities of language.
This is the sensuous side of language, which is always tied to language’s symbolic
function, but also exceeds the symbolic function in ways that are experienced rather than
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defined. This musical, sensuous function of language is exclusively dynamic in that sense
because it exists in time and action. Debra Hawhee also turns to the ancient Greeks to
develop a theory of energetic rhetoric. Agon is a significant term for her thinking on
Greek rhetoric and athletics because it connects persuasion and physical strength with a
focus on bodily struggle. Agonism is struggle and competition between athletes, orators,
as well as heroes, statesmen, and the gods. It is a “dynamic through which the ancients
repeatedly produced themselves, and which functioned as a point of cultural connection
between athletics and rhetoric” (15). And this point of production is significant. The
Greek body and mind were not simply thought to be: body and mind are brought forth or
constituted in action. This is where agonism comes in: through dynamic energy, struggle
and gathering, the art of bodies and words were constituted. Both Hawhee and Dolmage
also theorize the Greek term metis, which was a Greek term for craft, skill, or practice
that lead towards artful mastery and knowledge, as a major concept for rhetorical practice
because of its emphasis on embodied practice and knowledge.
Feminist philosopher Karen Barad can also contribute to our notions of energetic,
dynamic rhetoric. Her theories of material-discursive relationing offer a definition of
rhetoric that speaks to both rhetoric studies and feminism. In this dissertation, I focus
specifically on the rhetoric that emerges from the interactions among bodies and
discourse. This form of rhetoric, which is represented in this complex movement of
chiasmus, is always connected, intersecting, and dynamic relation between material and
discourse.
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Chiasmic rhetoric is different from Kennedy’s notion of rhetoric in so far as
chiasmus cannot be pre-linguistic. Kennedy would hold that even before language
developed, rhetoric was energizing and evolving pre-human life. Because it is prelinguistic energy, rhetoric can be seen as a force in organic evolution. However, I have
theorized chiasmic rhetoric that needs to always be intersecting with both material and
discourse. This chiasmic relation is like the Möbius strip that Elizabeth Grosz describes
between body and mind. The Möbius strip allows us to see relations of body and mind
that “are disparate “things” being related, they have the capacity to twist one into the
other… [The Möbius strip] enables subjectivity to be understood as fully material and for
materiality to be extended and to include and explain the operations of language” (209210). With these dynamic figures, discourse always twists and turns into material and
material likewise twists and turns into discourse. The purpose of these figural heuristics is
to make visible the connections and twists between bodies and discourse. Likewise, when
Jean-Luc Nancy imagines a radically de-centered, postmodern notion of bodies, what he
calls corpus, is always already touching writing. In the process of naming, language
brings objects, actions, values, concepts into being identifiable and knowable. Karen
Barad calls this work the ‘temporary cut’ of discourse intra-acting in material. Language
and discourses name, and naming is a mode of composing the diversity of material reality
into things that are knowable. Language distinguishes some assemblages, events, and
qualities as significant within larger network of material and energies.
Here, Karen Barad’s work contributes by defining a rhetorically significant theory
of ontology that also can help us comprehend the change in Turing’s body life,
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represented and instantiated (embodied) in “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.”
Barad, like so many before, argues that the workings of the material universe and the
workings of human discourse are not so dissimilar. She comes to her ontological and
philosophical claims through her background as a physicist and a feminist. All material
and all cultural phenomenon are constructed through interrelation between
“phenomenon” and “force,” which are the terms Barad uses instead of thing or object
because phenomenon and force both suggest movement, space, and time. Barad’s
theories of actions allow for an account that “refuses the representationalist fixation on
“words” and “things”…advocating instead a causal relationship between specific
exclusionary practices embodied as specific material configurations of the world”
(“Posthumanist Performativity” 132). The interactions between matter—atoms, planets,
and physical forces—constitute each other. Likewise, discourse and bodies interact with
learned language practices and other bodies performing those language practices. In
performative language, words are defined as “discursive practices/(con)figurations” and
things are “specific material phenomena” (132). From this, Barad gives us an ontology
that is defined and constituted through a “dynamic process of intra-activity in the ongoing
configuring of locally determinate causal structures” (135). And this dynamic process
is—for all human ethical and political purposes—always already discursive, in so far as
language is one of the most significant “locally determinate causal structures” that
produce our ontology.

171

Dynamic Rhetorical Bodies
In Barad, we find ontology defined as interactions, but are all of those interactions equal?
Are all interactions as meaningful as others? Are the interactions between Turing’s body
and the cold Manchester industrial landscape as significant as the interactions between
Turing’s body and the court mandated estrogen treatments that he will experience just 2
years after the publication of “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”? Certainly both
affected the man and his knowledge production. Politically, I have to find the relations
between Turing body, the doctors administering the chemical castration, and the estrogen
that infused his body and changed his physical appearance as well as his thinking, mood,
and sexual ability, as more significant. This is because these later interactions regulate
Turing as first a ‘deviant’ body, and then normalize it through physical interventions and
medical ‘treatment.’ These later interactions subject Turing’s body to disciplinary
practices that regulate heteronormativity. These interactions reinscribe a notion of gay
men as being dangerous, pathological, and in need of medical treatments to pacify this
threat.
For making these distinctions, I have to think that we need rhetoric. Barad uses
the term ‘agential cuts’ to indicate the rhetorical work of identifying and demarcating
specific objects and specific interactions. These cuts “are at once ontic and semantic. It is
only through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties of
“components” of phenomena become determinant and that particular articulations
become meaningful” (Meeting the Universe 148). We make temporary cuts in the world
to define ‘woman’ as a meaningful and real category of human. Now, this temporary cut
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is not an intentional cut. Although Barad refers to these as “agential cuts” she specifics
that the cuts are “enacted not by willful individuals but by the larger material
arrangement of which “we” are a “part”… Cuts cut “things” together and apart. Cuts are
not enacted from the outside, nor are they ever enacted once and for all” (Meeting the
Universe 178-179). Through the repetition, fixation, and consistency of woman as a
category of human reifies and ossifies this as a meaningful, significant, and even can
appear fixed or natural. This does not mean that the category of woman is constitutive of
our ontology, but the material discursive performance of naming, categorizing and
knowing ourselves as gendered is constitutive of our ontology. The temporary cut that
defines my body as woman constitutes my body as legible and knowable as a particular
kind of human subject among other humans. With this temporary cut as woman,
discourse and material interact so that I may identify myself. In some ways this
temporary cut can work to limit my experience as sexism, but has so often worked to use
the temporary cut of woman to regulate limits on the experience and potential for women
subjects. At the same time, I myself come to know myself in this subject position and
also can use this knowable category to identify with, however contingently and
temporarily, with other women. Barad does not identify these temporary cuts as rhetoric.
However, this work is wholly rhetorical. These are the practices that make order, sense,
knowledge, and value through the temporary cuts made in material-discursive practices.
With Barad’s theories and an energetic notion of rhetoric, we can define rhetoric
as material-discursive practices that create knowledge, value, and power through
‘temporary cuts’ into the larger always-connected fabric of human experience. However,

173

like Kennedy’s notion of rhetoric, the rhetorical force of Barad’s temporary cuts is not
intentional in the traditional form of authorial intent as something planned or willed or
chosen by Turing or any other human agent. For Kennedy this is because the energy to
cry for help or the energy for a plant to turn towards the sun does not require a conscious
will. When I yell because I stub my toe, my yell has rhetorical energy, but it lacks
intentional meaning and intention to create a change. Nevertheless, change may happen:
my roommate may come to my aid.
Again, Barad can help to theorize notions of agency that are rhetorically
significant, without depending on a notion of intention or a free moral agent. She defines
the agency of bodies and material through a theory of agential realism, which claims that
all matter has some form of agency. This agency should not be understood as choice or
intention. The agency of matter represents grounds for negotiations or inter-action. Barad
argues that material and discourse are in a constant state of inter-action. The energy and
intra-actions are constantly becoming through material discursive practices. This dynamic
process is agency: “Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing reconfigurings of the
world” (135). In this context, ‘discourse’ could be understood as any relationality
between entities. Like Grosz’s definition of embodied subjectivity, embodiment is the
site of contestation or negotiation between material and culture. Within these
‘negotiations’ between material and culture, both parties have access to agency in so far
as both determine and affect the other. In this way, agency is not a thing to own or to
give. Rather, “It is through specific intra-actions that a differential sense of being is
enacted in the ongoing ebb and flow of agency. That is, it is through specific intra-actions
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that phenomena come to matter—in both sense of the word” (135). Hence, agency is
enacted. It, too, is a dynamic performance.
Chiasmus has allowed the ‘temporary cut’ of my rhetorical work to always
connect both bodies and discourse. Together, these connected bodies and discourse have
been shown to be powerful for knowledge construction. Turing’s material-discursive
rhetorical practices give us a temporary cut in which bodies and technologies inform each
other. What we find in “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” is that the temporary
cut Turing represents as the relation between bodies and technologies, between humans
and machines, displays Turing’s dynamic and ambiguous definition of human and
gendered experience. This dynamic nature is visible in all rhetoric, as I have defined
rhetoric as an energetic set of material-discursive practices that create action, construct
meaning, produce knowledge, enact power, and also to assign value. In “Computing
Machinery and Intelligence” the gendered discourse creates relations that are especially
unstable. Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric expresses relations between bodies and discourse
that are destabilizing. But that out-of-balance in Turing’s writing is the key in so far as it
calls attention to the relation between bodies and mind, machines and intelligence, and
also offers a unique and unusual notion of technology that challenges humanist notions of
mind and body. This challenges not only humanist notions of human intelligence, but
suppositions in the rhetoric of science and technology about humans and machines.
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Later Critiques of Turing Test
Although Jefferson’s critique is an early one, similar lines of argument continue to
critique Turing and the shift towards digital technology and artificial intelligence
generally. Jefferson faults Turing on many of the same grounds that scholars fault Turing
and the computer technologies that are so often attributed to him: by arguing that
machines can think, Turing has disembodied intelligence. Turing’s arguments for
intelligent machinery continue to be understood as an anti-humanist and disembodying.
Jay David Bolter articulates an extensive discussion of disembodying technology
in Turing’s Man. In order to argue that Turing disembodies human intelligence, Bolter
depends on what he defines as an age-old metaphor between humans and technologies.
Metaphor is a rhetorical trope that, unlike schema, is not defined by any particular
syntactic or formal qualities. He argues that Turing’s invention allows for the tightest
and closest metaphor between human bodies and technologies. Turing takes the logic of
abstract mathematics—pure logic without material referent—and applies that as the
foundational concept for digital computers. This, for Bolter, allows for a metaphor in
which bodies are understood as metaphors with the exact terminology and purpose as
digital computers. This metaphor that Bolter associates with Turing’s digital computer
perpetuates a notion of of intelligence that is abstract, universal and disembodying. To be
sure, this notion excluded any bodily specificity, especially gender. While Bolter is
tracing a larger social trend regarding digital technologies, he also places the weight of
the instigator on Turing’s shoulders. Friedrich Kittler also associates Turing with the
trend towards disembodying. The logic of Turing’s machine is “tantamount to declaring
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nature itself a universal Turing machine” (1). The particularity of nature, bodies, and
machines is irrelevant, in Kittler’s reading, once code has subjected everything to
universal computability. Turing split software instructions and hardware machinery and,
in doing, erased the materiality of technology under the rule of abstract code. Wendy
Chun also points towards Turing as one of many inventors who allow for the “erasure of
the vicissitudes of execution [and]… the conflation of data with information, of
information with knowledge” (53). This erasure happens through a tautology from code
to meaning: “source code as logos: as something iterative and universal. Word becomes
action becomes word becomes the alpha and omega of computation” (167).
All of these claims, in general, are valid critiques and descriptions of trends in
technology in general and digital computation in particular. However, we need to look
more closely at Turing’s work because, especially in “Computing Machinery and
Intelligence,” we find an unstable blurring between human bodies and computer
intelligence. The embodiments and intelligence that Turing describe blur the lines
between human and machine, and that blurring is of central importance because it
disrupts the ossified, sterile notion of technologies. If we define bodies strictly in
humanist terms, then Turing can be understood as positing disembodied notions of
intelligence in the machine. However, Turing does not maintain a notion of human-only
intelligence. Nor does he attempt to create machines that will be exactly like human
bodies. Rather Turing defines machine intelligence in a way that is ambiguously between
human and machine. The locations of blurred overlap between human and machine
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intelligence widen, for Turing, new possibilities for thinking, creating, and problemsolving.
These machines must have a material form or ‘body’ of some sort. In other words,
computers may have been defined in abstract, immaterial form, but even digital
computation is also material, concrete, and ‘embodied.’ They are a particular form of
body, and they differ from human bodies for sure. However, they are bodies nonetheless.
And ignoring these bodies we ignore their material design and also their material
experience. In the case of Turing’s article, ignoring the embodiment of the thinking
machines also means ignoring the gendering of machines. It means ignoring a moment in
the history of computing in which gender was being negotiated: both the gendering of the
inventors and also the machine. Finally, this means ignoring a time in which computers
were not sterile of the messy lives of humans. But in the ambiguity of the chiasmic
rhetoric, of Turing’s writing, of the Turing Test, and probably of Turing’s mind, the
machines were indistinguishable from humans, with their genders, desires, loves, deceit,
failures, and rewards. Clarifying up this ambiguity means ignoring an unstable chiasmic
intersection between human and machine life.

Computing Machinery and Intelligence
“Computing Machinery and Intelligence” is Turing’s most widely read and also his most
famous article. Is popularity is in no small part due to the style of writing, which is both
surprisingly clear and surprisingly entertaining for an article by a mathematician. Turing
was writing not for other mathematician but for a broader audience that would have
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discovered Turing’s thinking for the first time—in this article published in the premier
philosophy journal Mind. In this article, he introduces what has become known as the
Turing test. This test has become a well-rehearsed standard of evaluating computer
intelligence. Although the general concept of the Turing test is well known, I am going to
analyze Turing’s text in more detail in order to demonstrate that, not only is this text fully
enmeshed with bodies and embodied experiences, it is also integrated with feminine
gendering discourses. With these gendering discourses, Turing‘s text articulates a
chiasmic rhetoric that shifts normative relations between our bodies, our discourses, and
our digital technologies.
Turing opens by replacing the question “can machines think?” with a more
specific question that can be tested through an imitation game. To introduce this imitation
game, Turing starts with a gendered imitation game:
It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an interrogator (C)
who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart from the other
two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the two
is the man and which is the woman. (441)
The interrogator can ask the man and woman questions, but the interrogator cannot see
either or hear their voices. In this game, deception is the rule. The trick is that the woman
is supposed to be honest and the man is tasked with tricking the interrogator with making
the wrong choice: “it is A’s object in the game to try and cause C to make the wrong
identification” (441). After establishing this first game of gendered deception, Turing
switches the man for a computer: “What will happen when a machine takes the part of A
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in the game? Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played like
this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These questions
replace our original, ‘Can machines think?’” (441).
Turing then defines machines in this test specifically as digital, electronic
computers. Next, Turing extends the discussion he started in “Intelligent Machinery” on
how to train these machines to demonstrate intelligence. This time he finds that the
pleasure/pain model, which he outlined in “Intelligent Machinery” and was discussed in
Chapter 4, would not be enough. Instead, he adds gradual training through practice and
repetition. Turing then moves on to review and address objections, including specifically
Jefferson’s objections. This discussion is some of the most interesting and surprising of
Turing’s writing. For instance, he addresses the “theological objection” that only men
have souls and hence only men demonstrate intelligence (449). To which he writes that if
intelligence is a sign of a soul, perhaps these machines are just new homes for souls.
When addressing the “disability’ objection”—which addresses Jefferson’s objection that
because computers cannot perform a wide set of human activities, then they cannot be
said to think—Turing writes that, presently, computers are too limited but that with time
machines may be able to perform a greater array of behaviors (453-455).
In this description of the famous Turing Test, Alan Turing describes a very
confused game between genders, humans, and machines. And scholars of artificial
intelligence have long been sorting through this confused game. Is the computer acting
like a man acting like a woman? As Leavitt reads it, this is the most literal translation of
the text. Is the computer acting like a man while the woman acts like a woman and the
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other test is which is genuinely human? These genders are further confused because
Turing goes on to refer to the human subject B, which was originally a woman as ‘he.’
Although reading this text leaves open some very provocative ambiguities, most scholars
of Turing and machine intelligence have been quick to reform this confusion so that it
excludes gender and embodied experiences. Hodges quickly assumes Turing’s use of
gender unnecessary to the general concept: gender is a distracting and poor choice, a red
herring (415). Hodges then proceeds to explain the test gender-free. Copeland argues that
gender of the test is necessary for comparing scores, but that the actual test of intelligence
is gender neutral (435-436). Lasségue does allow the gendered aspect of the test to
remain ambiguous, but he does so in order to reject the test and Turing’s thinking as
illegitimate for scientific work. Most often in contemporary versions of this test, gender
is erased completely (Copeland & Proudfoot, “The Computer, Artificial Intelligence, and
the Turing Test;” Schnelle, “A Note on Enjoying Strawberries with Cream;” Whitby,
Artificial Intelligence). Even Turing erases the gendered aspect of the test in later
arguments for mechanical intelligence (“Can Automatic Calculating Machines Be Said to
Think”). He, too, must have felt the discomfort of this ambiguous relation between
human and machine life. By erasing gender from the test, these men proceed with a more
cleanly demarcated difference between man and machine. Arguably, by erasing gender,
they are then able to define intelligence free of the complex particularities of bodies.
I am not interested in providing the most accurate or effective reading of how to design or
execute the Turing test. Instead, I want to take this ambiguous relation and allow it to
remain productively ambiguous. This is because in this ambiguous relation between
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human and machine we find a discursive gendering of not only machines but also
intelligence. Like Hayles, I wonder “What do gendered bodies have to do with the
erasure of embodiment and the subsequent merging of machine and human intelligence”
(xii). Hayles leaves this question regarding Turing unanswered while she turns in detail to
the Macy Conferences and their role in discursively segregating bodies and material.
However, Turing’s article is especially significant exactly because he does not allow for a
clear distinction between human and machine experience and intelligence nor does he
allow for an erasure of bodies. Instead, he leaves a dynamic chiasmic relation between
human and machine. Next, I will demonstrate this ambiguity by addressing the particular
embodiment of the machine, the feminizing discourse, and finally the relations between
gender and intelligence.

Gendering the Turing Test
As with all of Turing’s writing, embodiment can be found in “Computing Machinery and
Intelligence” informing Turing’s thinking, his invention, and also his concern with the
design and capabilities of thinking machines. However, in this article the character of that
embodiment is unique in so far as the machines are gendered to a degree that is unusual
in technical writing, and even Turing’s unusual style of technical writing. But notably,
feminizing intelligent machinery can be found throughout the article. Gendering
technologies through discourse is by no means unusual. Brian Easlea demonstrates that,
when building the technology for nuclear warfare, the engineers and scientists
consistently framed themselves as fathers birthing and breeding their nuclear weapons.
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However, Easlea also demonstrates that the scientists or engineers as well as the
technologies themselves were gendered masculine. Through technology, these men
metaphorically erased the need for female reproduction. Feminist scholars and gender
theory scholars have demonstrated the many ways that computers, weapons, and other
technologies in the 20th century were gendered as masculine, thereby becoming
technological extensions of masculine strength and power (see Grint and Gill; Seidler;
Cockburn). Contrary to this discursive code, Turing genders both the machine and its
inventors as feminine.
The first way that Turing genders this intelligent machine is by the gendered test.
The man and the woman are supposed to serve as a ‘control group’—a standard to
evaluate how effectively an interrogator can guess the ‘true’ body based only on the
subject’s responses. The man A is supposed to pretend to be a woman. The questions for
this test are decidedly feminized: “will X please tell me the length of his or her hair”
(441). Even when the interrogator is choosing between a human (unsure if that is male or
female) and a computer, the questions are still ambiguously gendered: “please write me a
sonnet on the subject of the Forth Bridge” (442). The interrogator also asks about chess,
and poses a mathematical problem, which the machine answers incorrectly. Later, Turing
does refer to the human player in the human/machine examination with masculine
pronouns. The woman in the first scenario seems to have disappeared without
explanation or comment.
Although Turing seems to have dropped the woman in this test, other forms of
gendering can be found throughout the article. We also find feminizing phrases and
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metaphors throughout this article. Turing writes, “we do not wish to penalize the machine
for its inability to shine in beauty competitions” (442). Here, Turing humorously
imagines how poorly his ‘baby’ will perform when evaluated for its physical beauty.
When considering what qualifies as intelligence, Turing writes this beautiful list of things
that qualify as intelligence but that the machine cannot do:
Fall in love, enjoy strawberries and cream, make some one fall in love with it,
learn from experience, use words properly, be the subject of its own thought, have
as much diversity of behavior as a man, do something really new. (453)
Turing then addresses each of these concerns and argues for ways that machines can be
said to perform these forms of thinking. We also find feminine gendering with Turing’s
inclusion of emotion. But not just any emotion: falling in love and making someone [or
some machine] fall in love with a machine. Notice, sandwiched between falling in love
and being loved, Turing includes the feminizing and somewhat sexualizing “enjoy
strawberries and cream.” With these considerations, Turing aligns the performance of
intelligence with stereotypically feminine activities. It is also notable that in this long list
of things a computer is not supposed to be able to do, Turing address each of the
objections, but he leaves falling in love or being fallen in love with unanswered. In these
ways, Turing’s feminizing discourse destabilizes the usual relations expected between
human bodies and machine bodies.
To be sure, gendering a machine as female is no rare task. There is a historic
precedent for gendering tools, bodies, and things that are seen as in the service of life as
feminine. One of the very first films on the possibility of machines to run out of control,
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Metropolis, portrays technology not only as feminine but also as hyper-sexualized
femininity. Ships have long been christened with feminine names and adorned with
feminine figures. Pilots name their planes women’s names. Car companies feminize their
products in order to appeal to male drivers. However, Turing’s use of feminizing
discursive practices is unique because Turing is gendering technology not as a tool for
use but as a new form of intelligence. This feminized construction is a thinking machine,
and that thinking is not in the service of someone or something else, but in the service of
thinking itself. In particular, feminine gendering, in this article, is constructed as an
essential and even defining quality of intelligence and humanity, thus making the
feminization particularly important.
Consider what Turing imagined what this machine could do: play chess, write
poems, learn language, and sing songs. This machine then, is doing the creative,
intelligent work. Some of these tasks, like math and chess, are characterized as
masculine. (Turing almost exclusively played chess with men. The one woman who he
found to be a worth chess opponent he also proposed to marry. Turing continually
remarked on how she could play chess like the men. He called off the engagement after a
few months.) At the same time, the machine could do things like write poetry and sing
songs that are associated with femininity. The pursuit of these arts, especially by
connecting them to the sciences, was decidedly feminizing move. This brought
considerations of taste, emotion, and pleasure into a field that has been dominated by a
telos of productive, efficiency, and rationality.
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What about the scientists who ‘raise’ this machine? How does this article gender
their role in connection with the machine? This would include Turing as well as any
technician or scientist constructing a thinking machine. To begin, Turing specifically
states, in one especially strange place, that Turing would need to be “all of one sex”
(443). At Manchester, the team would have been composed primarily of men. Some
women also aided in the coding and operation of the machine, but they would have had a
secondary, supportive role in the operation of the machine. No women were included in
the public debates over machine intelligence. One may expect that these expert minds
that Turing describes would be masculine gendered due to being an all male group, and
also associated as masters over this machine. But that is not what we find. Instead, Turing
genders the scientists as feminine also. They are all mothers. When discussing the work
of coding instructions for this machine, Turing uses the analogy:
Suppose Mother wants Tommy to call at the cobbler’s every morning on his way
to school to see if her shoes are done, she can ask him afresh every morning.
Alternatively she can stick up a notice once and for all in the hall which he will
see when he leaves for school… and also destroy the notice when he comes back
if he has the shoes with him. (445)
In this example, the work of coding is compared to a mother training a child. This work is
done in a domestic sphere, the home, and for domestic pursuits, getting her shoes fixed.
The narration that Turing writes differs significantly from his earlier proposal for training
with pleasure and pain. Here, the material coder gives instructions and tasks without
threatening the child-like machine. Later, Turing identifies the work of setting up the
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initial state of the mind (either human or machine) as a “birth” (460). These (male)
mothers (scientists) first birth, then raise and train their ‘baby’ to perform tasks, learn
new skills, sing songs, and write poetry. Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric creates a unique
feminine gendering of an all-male, typically masculine, group of engineers, technicians,
and scientists.
This gendering should not be misunderstood as Turing’s assigning any essentially
gendered qualities to machines. Both the gender as well as the intelligence cannot be
thought of as genuine or original. In this test, originality and authenticity cannot be
included as criteria for judging gender or intelligence. Originality, Turing finds, is not
necessary or even possible for machines or humans. The gender of both the man and the
woman was a deception or a performance, not an authentic quality determined by their
bodies. Even creative works and intellectual work are not original. When addressing the
objection that the machine can only produce new solutions or combinations out of what
the machine has been given by the engineers, Turing finds that machines are not alone in
their lack of pure originality: “There is nothing new under the sun.’ Who can be certain
that ‘original work’ that he has done was not simply the growth of the seed planted in
him by teaching, or the effect of following well-known general principles” (455). In this
way, Turing identifies the intelligence of humans and machines to be equally shaped by
education, ability, and previous experience, even language and culture.
In fact, not only is authenticity outside of this consideration, but also the abilities
to trick and to fail are not only incidental but also pre-requisites for intelligence. Turing
states this explicitly: “The question, “Can machines think?” should be replaced by “are
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there imaginable digital computers which would do well in an imitation game?” ” (448).
Even in the first test between man and woman, Turing states the man’s “object in the
games it to try and cause C [interrogator] to make the wrong identification” (441). Turing
includes deception in this test by having the machine produce an incorrect answer in
response to a calculation: in response to “add 34957 to 70764,” the computer first waits
30 seconds then answers “105621” (442). The computer would actually need to decide to
fail in order to “deliberately introduce mistakes in a matter calculated to confuse the
interrogator” (454). When directly addressing the objection that intelligence requires the
ability to err or fail, Turing agrees that, hypothetically, machines cannot err, but,
practically, the functioning of the machinery and the code both lead to errors. More than
that, at times these failures to follow the expected conclusions are not errors at all, but
new conclusions. “Machines take me by surprise with great frequency,” Turing relates
(455). One way in which the Manchester University Computer took its inventors by
surprise was with the little love letters that they programed the machine to produce.
Shortly before Turing’s death, Christopher Strachey, Turing’s colleague at Manchester,
programed computers to write letters (Hodges 477-478). These love letters were
awkward. But, to these inventors who were so invested in this baby, these random
compositions of stereotypical affection were surprisingly charming notes that were posted
about the halls of the Manchester Computing department:
DARLING SWEETHEART
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YOU ARE MY AVID FELLOW FEELING. MY AFFECTION CURIOUSLY
CLINGS TO YOUR PASSIONATE WISH. MY LIKING YEARNS FOR YOUR
HEART. YOU ARE MY WISTFUL SYMPATHY: MY TENDER LIKING.
YOURS BEAUTIFULLY
M. U. C.

Turing at the Beginning of Posthumanism
Hence, we find a notion of intelligence that is gendered, performative, and deceptive in
“Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” Turing’s discourse creates a blurred distinction
between human and computer intelligence. These ambiguous distinctions between human
and machine are significant because these disrupt humanist definitions of intelligence that
have so often excluded women and people of color. And Turing acknowledges this
significance of his work. He writes that arguments that exclude animals and machines
from intelligent thought resonate with many of the same claims that have excluded
women from intellectual pursuits (449). Jefferson charges Turing with erasing the
quintessential humanness from intelligence. However, Turing is not erasing the human as
much as he is disrupting what it means to be a thinking subject. And in doing so, Turing
also disrupts the security of the humanist subject. In place of a humanist subject, he
describes an early version of the posthuman subject. Hayles also describes “Computing
Machinery and Intelligence” as a “primal scene” for the posthuman subject (xii). Before I
continue to describe the posthuman subjectivity found in Turing’s article, let me define
the distinctions between humanist and posthuman subjects. By humanist I mean a liberal,
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atomistic, notion of humans as the authentic owner of a unique body and identity and the
executer of unique will. This is the human that the enlightenment defined.
By post-human, I mean the subject who is always already embedded and
constructed in relation to other humans, objects, technologies, institutions, and rhetorics.
Hayles writes that the posthuman subject is first a foremost a notion of embodied
subjectivity that is culturally and technologically embedded: “embodiment makes clear
that thought is a much broader cognitive function depending for its specificities on the
embodied form enacting it. This realization, with all its exfoliating implications, is so
broad in its effects and so deep in its consequences that it is transforming the liberal
subject, regarded as the model of the human since the Enlightenment, into the post
human” (xiv). When Barad calls for a posthumanist performativity, she starts with her
revised notion of agency, not as a thing which humans own and administer, but as a
dynamic process of intra-actions. And these intra-actions are material-discursive
practices, which are also rhetorical practices. The significance here is that agency is
distributed between and among humans, non-human animals, and really the entire
material, discursive world. The most significant shift here is that human life is not the
only form of life that is active. Humans share active, constituting, and even discursive
practices in relation and negotiation with “the world-body space in its dynamic
structuration” (“Posthuman Performativity” 147). For Haraway, the posthuman
subjectivity is ironic and tense but in that confusion tension she argues for the “cyborg as
a fiction mapping our social and bodily reality and as an imaginative resource suggesting
some very fruitful couplings” (149). This fruitful coupling that Haraway describes
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resembles the chiasmic relations of bodies and discourse: both are tense, productive, and
even overflowing.

Feminist Posthumanism
Braidotti, Hayles, and Haraway all theorize posthuman subjectivity while also
recognizing the limitations of the posthuman figure. In Braidotti’s analysis of posthuman
subjectivity, she does want to find a way to use posthumanism as a critical interjection
into ethics that accounts for human within a complex network of non-human actors and
environments. However, she also very soberly recognizes that the post-human shift is
also at the heart of advanced capitalism and bio-genetic technologies, which she
addresses as a “perverse” and at times “inhumane” capability of the posthuman notion of
subjectivity (4-5). Likewise Katherine Hayles is critical of the posthuman subject in so
far as its discourse gradually ossified a notion of information and knowledge that is
separate and transcendent from material and bodies. This is not a physical erasure.
Rather, she identifies the rhetorical production of an epistemic commitment to
information without matter. However, behind this discourse of disembodiment, Hayles
always points towards the often-excluded bodies and material form. Haraway has been
read as an overly naïve celebrator of posthuman cyborg subjectivity (e.g. Bordo 228;
Wendell, 169). However, she does recognize the many ways that posthuman is tied
systems of control and exploitation. For example, she writes, “Modern production seems
like a dream of cyborg colonization work, a dream that makes the nightmare of
Taylorism seem idyllic. And modern war is a cyborg orgy, coded by C3I, command-
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control-communication-intelligence, an $84 billion item in 1984's US defense budget”
(149). In addition, Haraway identifies how cyborg subjectivity disproportionately
intervenes women’s bodies and restricts women’s experiences and possibilities.
Haraway’s cyborg is in a “pleasurably tight coupling” with both disruptive and
controlling potentials (152). All of these texts analyze digital technology in relation to
human bodies. From that analysis they reveal the significant political and ethical issues.
In particular, they reveal the ways that technologies intersect with gender and politics of
sexual difference.
For Braidotti, Hayles, and Haraway, post-humanism is a fact of our current social
condition. Hayles writes that the machine in Turing’s test doesn’t even have to pass the
test in order to establish post-human subjects. This test is from the beginning based on
post-human presuppositions:
The important intervention comes not when you try to determine which is the
man, the woman, or the machine. Rather, the important intervention comes much
earlier, when the test puts you into a cybernetic circuit…in which represented
bodies are joined with enacted bodies through mutating and flexible machine
interfaces… no matter what identifications you assign to the embodied entities
that you cannot see, you have already become posthuman” (Hayles xiv)
Simply the act of setting up the test—asking a human to judge intelligence based on
questioning unseen subjects and reading text off of a computer screen—presupposes a
post-human subject. For Braidotti, post-humanism is a fact of our current social
conditions but it is also a shift that opens grey areas and “introduces a qualitative shift in
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our thinking about what exactly is the basic unit of common reference for our species, our
polity, and our relationship to the other inhabitants of this planet” (1). Haraway also
identifies a posthuman subject, always interpolated with technology, throughout human
history. Whenever tools, even language, structure the human experience, then pure,
atomistic notions of humanism become contaminated with the construction from
technologies, materials, and contingent historical contexts. And this interpolation opens
possibilities: “The cyborg skips the step of original unity, of identification with nature in
the Western sense” (150).
Although they all recognize the ways that posthumanism perpetuates and extends
systems of human oppression, Hayles, Braidotti, Barad and Haraway all look for fissures
or ruptures that are possible with posthuman subjectivity that were not possible with the
notion atomistic, unified notions of human. These all find in the posthuman subject a grey
area or an ambiguity that allows for the possibility of positive change. Braidotti writes
that she has never been given access to this humanist self and has no nostalgia for its loss.
Haraway writes that she would rather be a cyborg than to strive for the impossible ideal
of goddess. It is surprising to me that Turing’s writing does not play a more central role
in any of any of these discussions of posthumanism. Only Hayles even mentions Turing,
and that is only in her prologue, which sets up the Turing test as an important moment of
birth for posthuman subjectivity. Although he is never discussed in these feminist
contexts, I believe that Turing may have been of like mind with Braidotti and Haraway:
the computer intelligence, a kind of posthuman subject, opens up possibilities and new
forms of thinking that did not replicate humanist definitions of intelligence, but rather
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created alternatives. I am not attempting to anachronistically commit Turing to a feminist
notion of posthuman liberation. However, we can extrapolate from “Computing
Machinery and Intelligence” that Turing does define and also advocate for an alternative
definition of human that merges gendered, fallible bodies with the computational thinking
and machinery. Thus, Turing contributes to the destabilizing posthuman figure that
connects human and technologies. His chiasmic rhetoric produces destabilizes humanist
definitions of intelligence so that bodies, machines, and mind all overflow with
significance beyond their siloed humanist definitions
The form of computing intelligence that Turing describes in this article challenges
a humanist notion in which intelligence is defined as the sole property of humans. In
particular, Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric extends this challenge by adding bodily difference
to Turing’s intelligent machine. And that challenge was understood immediately, causing
a sense of fear regarding Turing’s computer. Although Turing would not have called his
notion of computer intelligence a posthuman subject, he did define this as a form of
heresy against traditional notions of humanism (“Intelligent Machinery: A Heretical
Theory”). And in this heretical theory of machine intelligence, Turing blurs the lines
between human and machine terms that integrate the gendered, sexual, error-prone messy
lives of humans into the too-often assumed sterile, purely logical work in computers.

Gendering Intelligence
What we find in this Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric discursively constructs a
destabilizing relation between humans and machines. In particular, the relation between
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bodies, humans, intelligence and technology is destabilized from a humanist notion by
Turing’s addition of feminine gendering. In Turing’s article, not only are bodies and
intelligence connected, in addition, femininity and intelligence are also dynamically
related. In this article, we have a productive example of the blurring line. In particular,
this unbalanced and ambiguous description is a place in which gender is the key to
intelligence. Here, Turing femininizes not just a machine (this is not a fembot like what
we see in Metropolis) but he also feminizes intelligence itself. He first genders this
machine in feminine ways. He also by then identifies intelligence with the performance
of tasks that are both masculine as well as feminine. Which is not to say that these tasks
are gender neutral, rather, Turing genders intelligent machinery with an ambivalent
tendency towards feminine as well as masculine tasks. The form of thinking that are
traditionally associated as masculine—mathematics, rule-based tasks, logical proofs—
these were tasks that Turing already knew that the machine could do. In order to prove its
‘intelligence’ Turing would need to also prove that the machine could perform modes of
thinking that have traditionally been gendered feminine. The machine’s access to
intelligence hangs on its ability to be gendered feminine.
Chiasmic rhetoric produced at the intersection of these bodies (both machine and
human) and Turing’s text here certainly unstable. And that instability is a chiasmic
rhetoric that lets us see the negotiating relation between gender and intelligence. Where
as gender and intelligence are typically cleanly partitioned so as to seem naturally
separate, Turing’s article connects and relates the two in a way that is unique and also
challenging to traditional notions of intelligence that excluded embodiment, emotion, and
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even women. In addition Turing’s chiasmic rhetoric in “Computer Machinery and Human
Intelligence” makes no pretense of naturalness or stability. Rather, the dynamic and
unusual relation between gender and intelligence calls attention to the relationing
performed in this text. In this off-balanced chiasmic rhetoric, we see feminizing
intelligence as a crucial move for defining intelligence in machinery.
Throughout this chapter, I have wanted to find places in which Turing is not a
passive victim. However, here as elsewhere, I cannot say that Turing decided or wanted
to feminize intelligence as a subversive choice that disrupts humanist notions of
intelligence. I don’t think it was that simple or that deliberate. However, this result of his
material-discursive performance in this text has produced rhetorical force that does
disturb definitions of human and computer. In their reified articulations, our relations to
bodies are barely perceptible. Bodies are ossified so that they are perceived as passive,
natural, and permanent. Turing’s writing disturbs this ossified because he articulates a
strange and even disturbing relation between machines and bodies. In particular, he does
this by gendering the machines. The effect is that machines move closer toward
intelligence by also moving them closer towards the embodied, gendered, sexualized
experience of humans.
At the same time, like Hayles, Braidotti, and Haraway, I also recognize that with
this posthuman subject comes the possibility of being co-opted and controlled by the
status quo. With time, that has been what has happened: gender was removed from the
test and the computer was evaluated under more and more masculinized notions of
intelligence like problem-solving, mathematics, and rule-based game play. Nevertheless,
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in this article, we see a brief moment in which the relations between bodies and
intelligence are disrupted by the chiasmic rhetoric of a man who took delight in
composing this heretical argument. His composition process for “Computing Machinery
and Intelligence” was apparently delightful. He wrote this quickly and read it back to his
friend Robin Gandy. Gandy relates that Turing giggled in parts, smiling as he performed
this text that was intended to solicit a strong reaction. Although this text has sense then
been interpreted in more sterile ways, and although Turing may not have fully realized
the impact of gendering machinery in this way, the text continues to exist as a place of
negotiation and also as a place where Turing’s unique mind, body, and experience
produce a chiasmic rhetoric that exposes a dynamic and re-forming relation between
bodies and intelligence.
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CHIASMUS 6:
COMPOSING THROUGH CHIASMUS

“We can only see a short distance ahead,
but we can see plenty there that needs to be done.”
~Turing
“We do not even know what a body can do.”
~Spinoza

Chiasmic rhetoric has been my heuristic and theoretical framework for analyzing
relations between bodies and discourses. I have developed this notion of chiasmic
rhetoric from theoretical work on feminism, gender theory, literary theory, and rhetorical
figures. In the life and text of Turing, I have used chiasmic rhetoric in order to
demonstrate that these relations are productive: they produce Turing as a subject and they
produce Turing’s original knowledge and inventions. But this dissertation also began
broadly with the always already connected relations between bodies and rhetoric.
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My development of chiasmic rhetoric touches on notions of figuration—figures of
flesh and figures of text—more broadly than Turing’s particular body and his particular
texts. By broadly, I mean that the implications of this research engage with a larger set of
discourses beyond Alan Turing’s body and text. My first introduction to theories of
bodies and writing came through the embodied, lyric performance of Luce Irigaray.
When we write, Irigaray claims, we are also composing our bodies within a system of
sexual difference. However, the figure of writing is not passive or neutral towards all
bodily differences and all embodiments. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference Luce Irigaray
composes a performative critique of the phallocentric forms of philosophical discourse.
At once, she exposes the male embodiment and sexuality defining the norms and forms
of writing and also uncovers the definitional exclusion of femininity on which these texts
are composed. Irigaray was perhaps where I began, but my research has been informed
by rich conversations on bodies and writing. For instance, Jean-Luc Nancy defines bodies
as a corpus, which is composed anew with each touch between writing and flesh. Cixous
urges women: “Write yourself. Your body must be heard” through poetics (880). And
Cixous’ intersection between bodies and writing is also a politically subversive act that
challenges patriarchal values and modes of composing knowledge. Donna Haraway also
finds feminist leverage in the embodied point-of-views that allow for forms of ‘objective’
knowledge. She theorizes the bodies that ground objectivity in order to “insist on the
embodied nature of all vision and so reclaim the sensory system that has been used to
signify a leap out of the marked body and into a conquering gaze from
nowhere…Feminist objectivity means quite simply situated knowledges” (“Situated
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Knowledges” 581). In all of these texts and so many more that I could list, bodies and
discourse intersect. In addition, those intersections between bodies and discourses
produce knowledge. In addition, especially for feminists, these intersections are
potentially disruptive. At the same time, these same interactions between discourse and
bodies can punish, discipline, control and exclude bodily differences.
My dissertation research does not necessarily extend these discourses. Instead,
this dissertation is built on the same epistemological commitments to the relations
between bodies and texts. This dissertation is committed to the epistemological
grounding that all knowledge is situated in particular embodied experiences and
differences. Feminist scholars of science and technology, especially Haraway, Hayes,
Fausto-Sterling, Keller, Hekman and others, have shown the many ways that bodies
inform our knowledge production within scientific communities. This dissertation brings
together these discourses in order to demonstrate how Turing’s particular embodied
experiences and his particular texts intersect to produce his subjectivity and his
knowledge. What is more, this dissertation extends these epistemological commitments
into the rhetoric of science and technology. Chiasmic rhetoric forms our scientific and
technical knowledge.
Chiasmic rhetoric is just one way to understand these relations. Chiasmus has
productively aided me to theorize increasingly complex relations between bodies and
discourse. In addition, chiasmus has created such a strong bond between bodies and
discourse that this project has been able to demonstrate the ways that embodiment
informs the writing and thinking of Alan Turing, who is often considered a disembodying
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figure. However, chiasmus has its limitations. To begin, chiasmus only intersects two
things. This reproduces a binary relation where a heterogeneous form may best suit the
experience of embodiment. I have run up against this limitation multiple times in this
dissertation research. For the most part, I’ve described chiasmus as the relation between
bodies and discourse. However, I also use chiasmus to figure relations between bodies,
identities, knowledge, and technologies. In order to fully describe the many relations that
compose both Turing’s body and his knowledge, perhaps chiasmus is still too simple. A
more complex figure is still needed. Nevertheless, chiasmus is a starting point that has
allowed for analysis of intersecting, dynamic, and destabilizing relations between bodies
and discourse.

Uncovering Bodies
Chiasmic rhetoric allowed for a rich analysis through several moves of increasing
complexity. I began with contrary antithesis, a relation of mutual exclusivity, in order to
explain the relation that is typically constructed between bodies and writing. However, I
used feminist theories and a close reading of Turing’s text in order to demonstrate that
this relation of antithesis could not be maintained: locations of overlap and connection
were always present in the text. The first chiasmic move is to connect. As an X, chiasmus
always connects. So too, bodies and discourse are inseparable, but also not collapsible
into each other. Then chiasmus moved again to become dynamically productive. Both
sides of chiasmus—the rhetorical figure as well as the figuring between bodies and
discourse—enact force on each other. The result is that, by connecting, each side changes
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the other. This is a process of co-constructing both bodies and discourses. Together, these
bodies and discourses produce new knowledge and invention for Alan Turing. However,
these are not simply productive co-constructions. This chiasmic interaction also
disciplines and controls bodies. Finally, I turn the most active chiasmic movement:
destabilizing. At this point the interactions between the two sides of chiasmus seem to
overflow and exceed each other. In the case of Turing, we found that his gendering
discourse exceeded beyond gendering of human bodies into the gendering of computers
as well as feminizing intelligence itself. This moment is significant because, when bodies
overflow to frame computer and intelligence, normative relations between bodies and
technologies are destabilized. This destabilized relation was quickly sterilized by erasing
the feminizing gendered discourse from the Turing test. Nevertheless, this chiasmic
analysis brings gendering discourse to the forefront in order to argue that gendering and
embodiment were central to Turing’s thinking and writing.
From these movements of chiasmic rhetoric, we find bodies interesting with
discourse in places where we may not expect to find bodies. This project finds the bodies
that have always already been present in Alan Turing’s texts. This chiasmic relations
between bodies and discourse in of Alan Turing’s writing revealed the rhetorically,
epistemic, and inventive ways that Turing’s body, the bodies in his text, and the bodies
around his text all give shape to the his inventions and rhetoric. For instance, his
experiences losing his friend motivated his initial thinking about cognition outside of
human body. His physical experience solving mathematical problems informs his design
of digital computation. And his experience as a disciplined subject of sexuality and
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governmentality also inform his plan for training a computer and also his definition on
what that intelligence could include.

Uncovering Bodies in the Rhetorics of Science and Technology
One of the primary contributions of this research is to the fields of rhetoric of science and
technology. Within these fields, science is understood as a rhetorical activity out of which
facts are constructed. The work of Bruno Latour is surely notable for its contributions
towards how fact are constructed by people, in spaces, in relation to objects and
institutions, disciplinary practices and values, as well as discursive practices (Laboratory
Life). Facts are constructed within an entire network, which he calls the circulatory
system of the larger body of knowledge production (Pandora’s Hope). Scholars of
rhetoric of science have long come to understand the significance of discourse for
knowledge production (Bazerman; Myers; Campbell; Fahnestock). For instance, Boyd
argues some theory constitutive metaphors are essential for science to translate between
causal relations in the world to conceptual relations in language. For these metaphors, the
rhetorical trope itself forms the knowledge of the theory or fact not-yet known. Gross
makes a stronger claim that rhetoric is constitutive of scientific knowledge (Rhetoric of
Science) although he hedges that claim significantly in his more recent publication
Starring the Text. The rhetoric of science and also science studies more broadly have
continually shown how our scientific knowledges are inseparable from the words,
figures, forms, and strategies of composing science in discourse (Taylor). My research
extends these discussions by demonstrating that the rhetoric of science is also as an
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embodied rhetoric. This is especially significant because I am drawing from a definition
of bodies developed by material feminism, in which our embodiment is always volatile,
singular, and also co-constructed within power relations.
Because I argue that bodies are singular, we find that there are particularities and
even peculiarities in Alan Turing’s scientific rhetoric. For instance, Gross has
demonstrated that the IMRAD (Introduction, Methods, Results and Discussion) presents
an inductive process of scientific discovery (Rhetoric of Science; also see Penrose and
Katz, Writing in the Sciences). This form sets the standard from presenting and
developing scientific knowledge. However, Turing never once utilizes the IMRaD form
in his scientific writing nor does he present his thinking as an inductive process. Rather,
his style his unusual and even unprofessional by general standards. His articles most
frequently begin with a proposition that he is seeking to develop or defend. For instance,
he begins “Nature of Spirit” by asking about the relation between spirit and the body. In
his report to the National Physics Lab, “Mechanical Intelligence,” Turing opens by
writing “I propose to investigate the question as to whether it is possible for machinery to
show intelligent behavior” (410). Then he immediately addresses several common
objections. He never presents data. Much of what he proposes is hypothetical,
imaginative, and even personally significant. Likewise, in his most famous article
“Computing Machines and Intelligence,” Turing opens with the question “can machines
think,” then continues to propose the “imitation game” to define what it means to think.
This is also highly imaginative and creative. Turing never conforms to the form of
scientific writing. In addition, it is clear that his thinking is also peculiar. His inventions

204

and scientific theories are not inductive. Rather, they are deductive and often that
deductive process starts from a personal knowledge.
Technical rhetoric is also notable for its characteristic style of expediency, which
Katz identified in his analysis of Nazi technical documents (“Ethics of Expediency”).
Katz not only identifies expediency as a key quality of Nazi ethics of technical writing; in
addition, he finds that expediency is the defining ethic of technology itself. A third
quality of technical and scientific writing is to maintain an objective, disinterested point
of view. Certainly, since at least Francis Bacon, the distance between the scientist and the
object of study must remain impassionate, objective, and disinterested. Turing, however,
as I have described his work, is an exception to that rule. When we consider the relation
between his embodied experiences and his technical writing, we can also begin to notice
all of the ways that Turing is both inexpedient and also subjective: he writes imaginative
tangents, he muses about hypothetical situations, he writes in first person, his theories are
clearly informed by his personal experiences, especially his experiences being disciplined
and trained through education.
By studying Alan Turing’s writing as embodied writing, I have explained his
writing and thinking, which do not conform to the most significant expectations within
his discourse communities, within the context of his unique life and singular embodied
experiences. He lived and wrote in a way that resisted the expected forms. Most notably
this is seen in relation to his sexuality. He was a homosexual man in the ultra
conservative society of mid-20th century England, one that employed chemical castration
as punishment and also a ‘cure’ for those found guilty. He was open about his sexuality.

205

What is more, even when he was arrested and tried, Turing refused to defend himself as
he held a conviction that there was nothing indecent or criminal about his sexual
behavior. More generally, he was also a peculiar man in his day-to-day life. Although
elite British society maintained rigorous standards of etiquette and polite society, Turing
seemed unaware or merely disinterested in many of these expected social graces. He was
peculiar: he rode on a broken down bike, he tied his pants up with a rope, he never
participated in social clubs, and was often sweaty or dirty while working in the
laboratory, he said strange things, and never ceased to think of mathematics and
computing machines. But he seemed committed to living his life in the way that suited
his body, mind, and personality.
Also, given that bodies are always already composed within power structures and
political networks, bodies also create an intersection between those power structures and
the scientific texts. In this way, Turing’s body forms a nexus between the scientific
knowledge he composes and the power structures that co-construct his body. In
particular, those power structures define and discipline bodies in terms of sexuality and
gender. These gendered and sexual power dynamics shape Turing’s body and they also
shape the knowledge that Turing composes. In particular, power dynamics that define and
regulate gendered norms also inform Turing’s definition of artificial intelligence.
However, Turing, in a typically-for-him queer move, uses these gendered norms to
compose a disruptive notion of embodied intelligence that is both feminine as well as
surprisingly humane.
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Hence, my with this theory of chiasmic rhetoric, I have been able to contribute to
the rhetoric of science by adding the complexity inherent in the interactions between
bodies and discourse that together produce new knowledge. Although my dissertation
focuses on the embodied composition of technical writing, the chiasmic interactions
between bodies and discourse inform all writing. Therefore, the value of chiasmic
rhetoric extends well beyond technical writing and into every composition, including the
composition classroom.

Bodies in Composition
While we have studied bodies in composition theory for a very long time, I will point out
some significant contributions that chiasmic rhetoric brings to the teaching of writing. In
particular, scholars who want to leverage ‘the body’ in composition tend to privilege
affect and embodiment as positive and productive. As we’ve seen from Turing’s writing,
disciplinary practices that regulate and punish bodies also focus on bodily experiences
and affect. Consider, for example, Sondra Perl as one writer who argued that composition
must focus on bodies but who does not account for the ways that this attention to bodies
can be both painful, disciplining, and controlling. Perl’s methods of writing with the body
is built first and foremost on a need to create a protected space, a safe space, for a writer
to explore her own interests, perspectives, and writing processes. Perl begins by
addressing those scary moments of first starting a project. And her project is to design
methods of moving beyond those scary moments toward comfortable composition. And
for Perl, comfortable writing is the felt sense of embodied writing Once in a comfortable
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space, writing with the body can start to flow. If we listen to her CD we hear “Breathe
deeply, repeat the topic to yourself, sense into your body.” Moments later we hear “wait
patiently for a word, a phrase”… then more peaceful silence. Through Perl’s process, a
writer can access the knowledge of felt sense in our bodies that may have otherwise been
repressed.
Peter Elbow, like Perl, begins by discussing the dissonance experienced in much
writing: the frustration of getting stuck on the wrong word, the feeling of “nausea” when
you’ve worked and worked on something until you can’t look at it any more. When free
writing, our vernacular language can be used to free ourselves from the pain, discomfort,
or blocks of more critical, self-conscious writing. As Elbow describes, can use our
embodied sense to feel our way past this discomfort of writing. And that embodied sense,
Elbow finds most of the time, is a sense that leads to good writing. While thought in
Elbow’s work is trained and disciplined, eloquent language is described as a mother
tongue, which is “kinesthetic, as though it is in the body” (Vernacular Eloquence 6). For
Elbow we should use the naturalness and comfort of our speaking voices to ease the
writing process towards comfort. In this notion of embodied writing, both the nausea of
over working on a project and the pleasure of speaking naturally and comfortably are
embodied writing. However, for Elbow, ideal writing the body is comfortable, natural,
and fully engaging one’s body through speaking. This embodied writing is similar to the
flow and freedom that Elbow associates with creative mode of writing in Words of
Power. In this text, Elbow pairs the creative function of writing with the critical function
as the two modes that allow for good writing. He separates these modes into the creative
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intuitive mode of what “feels right,” which is associated with bodily, affective, and
unconscious experience and knowledge (11). The other mode, the critical mode, he
describes as “conscious awareness” or “conscious control” (11-12). These two modes
reinforce and inform each other. Together, for Elbow, these modes compose good
writing. The problem with this model is that it reinforces a binary between unconscious
flowing body and conscious critical mind. The first feels good and natural. The second
does the hard discerning work of judgment and critique. This overlooks the ways that our
embodied knowledge is also conscious knowledge. In addition, our embodied intuition is
always already controlled and disciplined.
In many ways Elbow’s theories have been both useful for improving my writing
process and product. As a teacher, I have used Elbow and Perl’s theories to describe and
develop writing processes when teaching composition. Both of these writers offer rich,
useful methods of writing our bodies and writing eloquently. However, they are also
leaving much of the complexity and ethical dimensions of embodied writing out of their
description of the embodied, intuitive mode our writing process. In other words they
preserve a portion of the writing process for us, as writers and teachers, that feels too
positive, too easy, comfortable in writing.
Both Perl and Elbow are commonly associated, even though many challenge these
associations, with what James Berlin identified as the expressionist theory composition
pedagogy (“Contemporary Composition”). Berlin and others have critiqued this approach
to composition pedagogy because it focuses so exclusively on the individual expression
and lacks critical attention to the ways that what makes “good writing” good is always
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already composed through political and social disciplinary practices. Given that bodies
are composed and disciplined through power dynamics and political structures, our
embodied mode of the writing process is just as culturally, politically, and socially
informed as any other form of composition.

Bodies in Every Composition
Chiasmic rhetoric pushes us beyond these expressionist relations between bodies and
texts. This approach to rhetoric assumes that bodies are always already intersecting with
text. In addition, these bodies are not naturalistic. These bodies are heavy with the
complexity of history, politics, culture, and discourse. To move towards this more
complex relation between bodies and texts, I suggest we ask, “when are we not writing
our bodies?” Perl and Elbow assume that we are really writing our bodies when we are in
safe spaces, when we get out of our minds, and when we focus on our bodies, and when
we more physically enact speech acts orally than through writing. Perl and Elbow both
describe a process of writing bodies that requires accessing embodied writing through
processes of clearing our minds, creating safe spaces, and speaking out loud in order to
allow our bodies to drive writing instead of our analytic minds. Writing our bodies should
be unencumbered by too much analytic thought so that our embodied experiences and
embodied knowledge flow onto texts. This assumes that thinking is somehow separate or
distinct from writing our bodies. It also assumes that writing our bodies is in some way
the most natural practice of writing. Why should our bodies only play a significant role
when we’ve cleared our minds and created safe spaces? If we reject a binary between
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thought and emotion, mind and body, then we can begin to think about how to include
bodies in composition pedagogy in a wide range of situation, or every situation.
We must presume that we are always writing our bodies. The chiasmus between
bodies and discourse is always already intersecting. And this presupposition opens up
embodied writing into all forms and processes of composition. After all, we can’t write
without our bodies. We can’t think without our bodies. Given what I have reviewed from
feminist philosophers, especially Lloyd, Gatens, Grosz, and many others, we know that
embodiment is necessary aspect of our ontology. Our bodies are a precondition for
writing. At the same time, our bodies do not exist before or beyond writing, waiting in
some pure form to be conveyed through language. No, bodies are also constructed,
disciplined, defined, and come into shape through language. This is the chiasmic
interaction between bodies and discourse, which is an intersecting, interacting, dynamic
and at times unstable relationship.
I want to suggest that writing our bodies is inherently rhetorical mode of writing. I
do not write my full unique experience in every text I write. No one can communicate his
or her full self on each page or writing or in each speech act. In addition, writing our
bodies is in many ways pre-constructed as we only know our bodies in and through
discourse and performance. Instead of writing our embodiment in its fullness, we
rhetorically shape the bodies we write into text. We make choices about what we allow
bodies to do in texts. And we make choices about what we write when we write our
bodies and others’ bodies.
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This is not to say that we have full control or choice over our bodies or our
writing. Our chiasmic rhetoric that intersects writing and bodies, like any rhetoric, is
incomplete, partial, and not fully in our control. Concepts, experiences, epistemological
frameworks, material affordances and limitations, and technologies of discourse and
material: these all slip into our writing in unexpected and not-totally-controlled ways. All
of these complex factors are inseparable from the chiasmus that integrates bodies and
discourse. The anomalous ways that bodies slip into writing are as interesting and
important as the planned, deliberate ways. Within technical writing, these bodies are
almost always slipping in unintentionally. But those unintentionally embodied, subjective
rhetoric in technical writing also help us to understand how the text functions rhetorically
as well as what bodies the text may presuppose, exclude, or marginalize.

Chiasmic Pedagogy: Composing Bodies through Disorienting Composing
In classes, I aid students towards an awareness of their own embodied practices of
composition by designing disorienting pedagogy. The word disorienting is specific here. I
presume that students come into my classrooms already oriented towards language,
composition, education, and rhetoric. They have learned their orientations through their
previous experiences in classrooms as well as out of classrooms. Many times this
orientation is that language is a transparent, neutral tool to communicate ideas. Other
times, their orientation towards writing and rhetoric is that they hate writing or are bad at
writing. Whatever the orientation may be, students are not aware that they have been
oriented or disciplined through practices of composition. By disorienting, my
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pedagogical practices call attention to their naturalized notions of writing and
composition. By teaching disorienting practices, I also teach many alternative patterns,
behaviors, relations, actions, and technologies for orienting ourselves and our bodies in
composition.
In this disorienting pedagogy, I am looking for the opposite of what Elbow and
Perl describe. They look for an almost natural, easy relation between bodies and
composition. But chiasmic rhetoric at its best is always in tense negotiations. Elizabeth
Grosz describes the relation between discourse and bodies as volatile. I use a pedagogical
method that addresses how negative, stressful, dissonant, and even uncomfortable affect
be an important method of engaging bodies in composition. Lynn Worsham wants
writing to be not a form of learning, but unlearning. The goal of this unlearning “does not
mean that writing produces ignorance; rather, it produces a sense of defamiliarization visà-vis unquestioned forms of knowledge” (101). Worsham calls for a defamiliarization in
composing that allows us to see how we have been learned. I would call this form of
learning a kind of disorientation. Additionally, I am informed by Kristie Fleckenstein’s
notion of writing our bodies. Fleckenstein describes how somatic writing must negotiate
between senses of immersion and emergence. This writing process “depends on the
immersion of being-in-a-material-place and the emergence weaving throughout; it
depends on the continuous hybridization of who and what and where we are. I do not find
it easy" (298). The examples that she offers for somatic writing that emerges to disrupt
corporal codes include the biographies of holocaust victims and describes this as the
“ragged edge of necessity - the experience of hurt and betrayal, the insanity of cultural
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stories contradicting physical experience” (293). I am not suggesting that all moments of
discomfort in writing are necessarily political resistance. However, I am suggesting that
these moments make us see our own performance or constructedness in relation to
writing and rhetoric. While on the other hand, easy, comforting moments of composition
may offer a false sense of naturalness.
How then, do I structure chiasmic rhetoric into my pedagogical practice? Because
chiasmus is dynamic and even destabilizing, I use disorientation to call attention to the
relations between our bodies and our compositions. In my classes, we work on 2
assignments at the same time. I define what qualifies as ‘good work’ for each assignment
as opposite and even opposed to the other’s definition of ‘good work.’ Each project has
its foil that requires the opposite set of skills. For instance, for the largest project, the
research assignment, students write an article in Wikipedia at the same time as they write
an opinion for the school newspaper.
These assignments are defined with drastically different audiences, genre, media,
styles, and purposes. However, both are research projects on the same topic. In class, we
alternate back and forth, often in class working for 30 minutes on one assignment and
then 30 minutes on the other assignment. For instance, we may work to define and revise
for ‘good style’ in Wikipedia then when we switch to do the same activity for the student
newspaper students must re-orient their approach to style and revision.
This practice of switching discourse practices creates a change in the students’
orientation to language. They must stop the ‘natural’ flow of their writing and become
more aware of how to create deliberate differences in sentences structure, word choice,
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voice, and organization. Through this they experience how rhetorical choices ‘feel’
different. And students do comment on the disorienting feeling of switching between two
different definitions of good writing. They write that this is uncomfortable, challenging,
and requires a level of focus to switch styles. And that challenge is exactly the goal. This
is a form of rhetorical flexibility that requires keen attention to the details of rhetorically
effective composition.
However, this obviously does not by itself make the students more aware of their
bodies in the composition process. In fact, it could be really confusing. They may
struggle, but they may not realize why. In order to reflect on these changing practices of
composition, I structure in a comfortable, reflective space for composition. Each week, in
class, we spend time writing and sharing personal reflections on their own writing
process, experiences, practices, and struggles. In this reflective writing assignment,
students write about their writing. It is here that they begin to see their own discomfort
and their own physical struggle to write. We talk about how we feel ‘at home’ in some
kinds of writing, and distant or awkward in other kinds of writing. In this way, my
disorienting pedagogy is not opposed to comfort and ease in writing. In fact, this
reflection on the disorientation is essential to help students see when and how they feel
comfort in language and when and how they feel uncomfortable in language.

Continued Destabilization
The point is not simply making our students uncomfortable. Instead, I want to help them
to see that their bodies perform, feel, and experience differently to different practices of
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composition. This suggests that our bodies are active in our composition processes. From
this grounding, we can begin to discuss the ways in which their bodies have been trained
to feel more at home in some writing conventions than in others. Ultimately, the goal is
not to valorize discomfort over pleasure. Rather, the goal is to expand the ways that we
think of bodies engaging in writing. More specifically, my approach to pedagogy seeks to
recognize our bodies as they actively perform in all rhetorical situation and all
composition processes.
Again, chiasmic rhetoric is just one place to begin understanding the relations
between bodies and discourse. Likewise, disorienting pedagogy is just one method that I
have begun to try. With this approach, I aid students to feel and reflect upon the ways that
their bodies are active in the composition process, even with technical writing. Through
disorienting pedagogy, I attempt to facilitate the final move of chiasmus towards
destabilizing relations between bodies and discourse. By disorienting students and
producing destabilizing relations between bodies and discourse, I work as a teacher and a
scholar to make the bodies in our texts ever more visible and palpable. However, much
more work needs to be done. I also need more time to think, act, and respond as a teacher.
With each class I learn more from my students. With each new research project, I learn
more about bodies and writing. As I continue to teach and continue to research, I know
my thinking on chiasmic rhetoric and composing with chiasmus will change. At the same
time, I also know that my embodiment and embodied knowledge will change. Only after
more experience will I be able to fully integrate the insightful, persuasive, inventive,
uncomfortable, and disciplining embodied knowledge into my pedagogical processes.

216

References:
Agar, Jon. “Alan Turing, a Broken Heart & the Invention of the Computer.”
SoundCloud. 16 Feb. 2013. Web. 28 Nov. 2013.
---. The Government Machine: A Revolutionary History of the Computer. Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2003. Print.
---. Turing and the Universal Machine: The Making of the Modern Computer.
Cambridge: Totem, 2001. Print.
Ahmed, Sara. “Open Forum Imaginary Prohibitions: Some Preliminary Remarks on the
Founding Gestures of the `New Materialism’.” European Journal of Women’s
Studies 15.1 (2008): 23–39. Web. 28 Nov. 2013.
Aristotle. On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Trans. George A. Kennedy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. Print.
---. On the Generation of Animals. New York: Kessinger Publishing, 2004. Print.
Asimov, Isaac. Words of Science, and the History Behind Them. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1959. Print.
Austin, Gilbert, Mary Margaret Robb, and Lester Thonssen. Chironomia: Or, a
Treatise on Rhetorical Delivery. 1st Edition. Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1966. Print.
Bacon, Francis. The Advancement of Learning. New York: Modern Library, 2001.
Print.
Ballif, Michelle. Seduction, Sophistry, and the Woman With the Rhetorical Figure.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2001. Print.
Barad, Karen. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement
of Matter and Meaning. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007. Print.
---. “Posthumanist Performativity.” Material Feminisms. Ed. Stacy Alaimo and Susan J
Hekman. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008. 120–157. Print.
Barbone, Steve. Reader’s Guide to Lesbian and Gay Studies. Ed. Timothy F. Murphy.
Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers, 2000. Print.
Bazerman, Charles. The Languages of Edison’s Light. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2002. Print.

217

Berlin, James A. “Contemporary Composition: The Major Pedagogical
Theories.” College English 44.8 (1982): 765. Web. 1 July 2014.
---. Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures: Refiguring College English Studies. Anderson,
SC: Parlor Press, 2003. Print.
Biesecker, Barbara A., and John Louis Lucaites. Rhetoric, Materiality, and Politics.
New York: Peter Lang, 2009. Print.
Bolter, J. David. Turing’s Man: Western Culture in the Computer Age. Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina Press, 1984. Print.
Bordo, Susan. Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body. Berkley,
CA: University of California Press, 1993. Print.
Boyd, Richard. “What Is Metaphor a Metaphor For?” Metaphor and Thought. Ed.
Andrew Ortony. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 481–533. Print.
Braidotti, Rosi. Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 2013. Print.
Breck, John. “Biblical Chiasmus: Exploring Structure for Meaning.” Biblical Theology
Bulletin: A Journal of Bible and Theology 17.2 (1987): 70–74. Web. 28 Nov.
2013.
Bulwer, John. Chirologia Or the Natural Language of the Hand, 1644. New York:
Kessinger Publishing, 2003. Print.
Burke, Kenneth. Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1984. Print.
---. The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action. Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1974. Print.
Butler, Judith. Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex”. New York:
Routledge, 1993. Print.
---. Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative. New York: Routledge, 1997.
Print.
---. Gender Trouble. New York: Routledge, 1990. Print.
---. “Sexual Difference as a Question of Ethics: Alterities of the Flesh in Irigaray and
Merleau-Ponty.” Bodies of Resistance: New Phenomenologies of Politics,
Agency, and Culture. Ed. Laura Doyle. Evanston IL: Northwestern University
Press, 2001. 59–77. Print.

218

Campbell, John Angus. “Darwin and the Origin of Species: The Rhetorical Ancestry of
an Idea.” Speech Monographs 37.1 (1970): 1–14. Web. 18 Apr. 2014.
Cavarero, Adriana. For More Than One Voice: Toward A Philosophy Of Vocal
Expression. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. Print.
---. Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood. New York: Routledge, 2000. Print.
Certeau, Michel de. The Practice of Everyday Life. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press,
1998. Print.
Cixous, Helene. “The Laugh of Medusa.” Trans. Keith Cohen and Paula
Cohen. Signs 1.4 (1976): 875–893. Print.
Cockburn, Cynthia. “The Circuit of Technology.” Consuming Technologies. Ed. Eric
Hirsh. New York: Routledge, 2003. Print.
Copeland, B. Jack. “Narrow versus Wide Mechanism: Including a Re-Examination of
Turing’s Views on the Mind-Machine Issue.” The Journal of Philosophy 97.1
(2000): 5–32. Web. 21 Sept. 2013.
---. The Essential Turing. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Print.
Copeland, Jack. “Pardon the Digital Warrior?” Huffington Post. 19 Aug. 2013–19 Aug.
400. Web. 19 Feb. 2014.
Corbeill, Anthony. Nature Embodied: Gesture in Ancient Rome. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004. Print.
Corbett, Edward P. J., and Robert J. Connors. Classic Rhetoric for the Modern Student.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Print.
Crowley, Sharon. “Body Studies in Rhetoric and Composition.” Rhetoric and
Composition As Intellectual Work. Ed. Gary A. Olson. Carbondale: Southern
Illinois University Press, 2002. 177. Print.
Davis, Debra Diane. Breaking Up (At) Totality: A Rhetoric of Laughter. Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 2000. Print.
Derrida, Jacques. Spurs: Nietzsche’s Styles. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1979. Print.
Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections
and Replies. Trans. Michael Moriarty. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Print.

219

Descartes, René, and Stephen Voss. The Passions Of The Soul. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 1989. Print.
Diprose, Rosalyn, and Jack Reynolds. Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts. Durham:
Acumen, 2008. Print.
Dyson, George. Turing’s Cathedral: The Origins of the Digital Universe. New York:
Random House, 2012. Print.
Easlea, Brian. Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms
Race. New York: Pantheon Books, 1987. Print.
Eddington, Arthur Stanley. The Nature of the Physical World. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1958. Print.
Elbow, Peter. Vernacular Eloquence: What Speech Can Bring to Writing. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012. Print.
Elbow, Peter. Writing With Power: Techniques for Mastering the Writing Process.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. Print.
Engel, William E. Chiastic Designs in English Literature: From Sidney to Shakespeare.
Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009. Print.
Espy, Willard R, and Henry Peacham. The Garden of Eloquence: A Rhetorical
Bestiary. New York: Harper & Row, 1983. Print.
Fahnestock, Jeanne. Rhetorical Figures in Science. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002. Print.
Fausto-Sterling, Anne. Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and Men,
Revised Edition. New York: Basic Books, 2008. Print.
---. Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality. New York:
Basic Books, 2000. Print.
Fleckenstein, Kristie S. Embodied Literacies: Imageword and a Poetics of Teaching.
Carbondale: SIU Press, 2003. Print.
---. “Writing Bodies: Somatic Mind in Composition Studies.” College English 61.3
(1999): 281. Web. 29 Mar. 2014.
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. New York: Random House Digital, Inc.,
1977. Print.

220

---. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978--1979. London:
Routledge, 2010. Print.
---. The Birth of the Clinic. London: Routledge, 2003. Print.
---. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. New York: Random House Digital, Inc.,
1990. Print.
Fraser, Nancy. Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary
Social Theory. 2nd edition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008.
Print.
Gatens, Moira. Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality. New York:
Routledge, 1996. Print.
Glenn, Cheryl. Rhetoric Retold: Regendering the Tradition from Antiquity Through the
Renaissance. Carbondale: SIU Press, 1997. Print.
Gödel, Kurt. On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and
Related Systems. New York: Dover Publishers, 1992. Print.
Grayling, Chris. “Alan Turing Is ‘a War Hero like Winston Churchill’, Says Chris
Grayling.” Telegraph 48 Dec. 2013. Web. 12 Feb. 2014.
Grint, Keith, and Rosalind Gill. The Gender-Technology Relation: Contemporary
Theory and Research. New York: Taylor & Francis, 1995. Print.
Gross, Alan. The Rhetoric of Science. Reprint edition. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press, 1996. Print.
Gross, Alan G. Starring the Text: The Place of Rhetoric in Science Studies. Carbondale:
SIU Press, 2006. Print.
Grosz, Elizabeth. Space, Time and Perversion: Essays on the Politics of Bodies. 1st ed.
New York: Routledge, 1995. Print.
---. Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1994. Print.
Grothe, Mardy. Never Let a Fool Kiss You or a Kiss Fool You. New York: Penguin,
2002. Print.
Haigh, Thomas. “Actually, Turing Did Not Invent the Computer.” Communications of
the ACM 57.1 (2014): 36–41. Web. 18 Apr. 2014.

221

Haraway, Donna. “Situated Knowledges.” Feminist Studies 14.3 (1988): 575–599.
Print.
Haraway, Donna J. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New
York: Routledge, 2013. Print.
Hayles, N. Katherine. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics,
Literature, and Informatics. Chicago, Ill: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
Print.
Heisenberg, Werner. The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory. Courier Dover
Publications, 1949. Print.
Hekman, Susan. The Material of Knowledge: Feminist Disclosures. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2010. Print.
Herek, Gregory M., and Eric K. Glunt. “An Epidemic of Stigma: Public Reactions to
AIDS.” American Psychologist 43.11 (1988): 886–891.
Hilbert, David. “The Grounding of Elementary Number Theory.” From Brouwer to
Hilbert: The Debate on the Foundations of Mathematics in the 1920s. Ed. Paolo
Mancosu. Trans. W. Ewald. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 266–
273. Print.
Hinsley, F. H., and United States Air Force Academy. The Intelligence Revolution: A
Historical Perspective. Colorado Springs, Colo: Washington, D.C: U.S. Air
Force Academy  ; 1988. Print. The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military
History no. 31.
Hodges, Andrew. Alan Turing: The Enigma. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1983.
Irigaray, Luce. An Ethics of Sexual Difference. Trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian Gill.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993. Print.
---. This Sex Which Is Not One. Trans. Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1985. Print.
Jarratt, Susan C. Re-Reading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric Refigured. Carbondale:
SIU Press, 1998. Print.
Jefferson, Geoffrey. “The Mind of Mechanical Man.” British Medical Journal 1.4616
(1949): 1105–1110. Web. 15 Mar. 2014.

222

Katz, Steven B. The Epistemic Music of Rhetoric: Toward the Temporal Dimension of
Affect in Reader Response and Writing. 1st edition. Carbondale, Ill: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1996. Print.
---. “The Ethic of Expediency: Classical Rhetoric, Technology, and the
Holocaust.” College English 54.3 (1992): 255. Web. 1 July 2014.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender, and
Science. New York: Routledge, 1992. Print.
Kennedy, George A. “A Hoot in the Dark: The Evolution of General
Rhetoric.” Philosophy & Rhetoric 25.1 (1992): 1–21. Web. 15 Mar. 2014.
Kerferd, G. B. The Sophistic Movement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981. Print.
Kittler, Friedrich. “There Is No Softwear.” Stanford Literature Review 9.1 (1992): 81–
90. Print.
Kopley, Richard. “Chiasmus in ‘Walden.’” The New England Quarterly, 77.1 (2004):
115–120. Print.
Lang, Fritz. Metropolis. 1927. Film.
Lanham, Richard. Analyzing Prose. 2nd edition. New York: Continuum, 2003. Print.
Lanham, Richard A. A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms. Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1991. Print.
---. The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1994. Print.
Lassègue, Jean. “What Kind of Turing Test Did Turing Have in Mind?” Tekhnema
3Spring 1996 (1996): n. pag. Print.
Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific
Facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. Print.
Leavitt, David. The Man Who Knew Too Much: Alan Turing and the Invention of the
Computer (Great Discoveries). Reprint edition. New York, NY: W. W. Norton
& Company, 2006. Print.
Lloyd, Genevieve. The Man of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in Western Philosophy.
Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota Press, 1993. Print.

223

Lyotard, Jean-François. Discourse, Figure. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 2011.
Print.
Manning, Erin, and Brian Massumi. “Series Forward.” Semblance and Event: Activist
Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts. Boston: MIT Press, 2011. Print.
McCorduck, Pamela. Machines Who Think: A Personal Inquiry into the History and
Prospects of Artificial Intelligence. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1979. Print.
McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York:
Routledge, 2001. Print.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes.
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968. Print.
Mermall, Thomas. “The Chiasmus: Unamuno’s Master Trope.” PMLA 105.2 (1990):
245. Web. 12 Feb. 2014.
Moor, James, ed. The Turing Test: The Elusive Standard of Artificial Intelligence.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. Print.
Moravec, Hans. Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence. Boston:
Harvard University Press, 1988. Print.
Myers, Greg. Writing Biology: Texts in the Social Construction of Scientific
Knowledge. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990. Print.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. Corpus. New York: Fordham University Press, 2008. Print.
Nye, Andrea. Words of Power: A Feminist Reading of the History of Logic. New York:
Routledge, 1990. Print.
Olson, Paul R. The Great Chiasmus: Word and Flesh in the Novels of Unamuno. West
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 2003. Print.
Parutakupiu. Pictograms of Olympic Sports - Judo. N.p., 2006. Web. 28 Apr. 2014.
Penrose, Ann M., and Steven B. Katz. Writing in the Sciences: Exploring Conventions
of Scientific Discourse. 3rd Edition. New York: Longman, 2010. Print.
Pera, Marcello. The Discourses of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Print.
Perl, Sondra. Felt Sense: Writing With the Body. San Diego: Boynton and Cook
Heinemann, 2004. Print.

224

Petzold, Charles. The Annotated Turing: A Guided Tour through Alan Turing’s Historic
Paper on Computability and the Turing Machine. Indianapolis, IN: Wiley Pub.,
2008. Print.
Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. Mobile Reference, 2008. Print.
---. Republic. Trans. G. M. A Grube and C. D. C Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing, 1992. Print.
Quinn, Arthur. Figures of Speech: 60 Ways To Turn A Phrase. New York: Routledge,
2012. Print.
Quintilian. The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1922. Print.
Rees, Mina. “Mathematical Sciences and WWII.” The American Mathematical
Monthly 87.8 (1980): 607–621. Print.
“Dynamic, Adj. and N.” OED Online. Web. 5 May 2014.
Saygin, Ayse Pinar, Ilyas Cicekli, and Varol Akman. “Turing Test: 50 Years
Later.” Minds and Machines 10.4 (2000): 463–518. Web. 2 Feb. 2014.
Schnelle, Helmut. “A Note on Enjoying Strawberries with Cream, Making Mistakes,
and Other Idiotic Features.” Alan Turing: Life and Legacy of a Great Thinker.
Ed. Christof Teuscher. New York: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2004. 353–358.
Web. 17 July 2014.
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. Epistemology of the Closet. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2008. Print.
Seidler, Victor J. Jeleniewski. Man Enough: Embodying Masculinities. New York:
SAGE, 1997. Print.
Serlin, David. Replaceable You: Engineering the Body in Postwar America. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2004. Print.
Sprat, Thomas. The History of the Royal Society. New York: Kessinger Publishing,
2010. Print.
Taylor, Charles Alan. Defining Science: A Rhetoric of Demarcation. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1996. Print.
Turing, Alan. “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” The Essential Turing. Ed. B.
Jack Copeland. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 433–464. Print.

225

---. “Intelligent Machinery.” Essential Turing. Ed. B. Jack Copeland. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004. 395–443. Print.
---. “Letter to Mother and Father with Diagram of a Fountain Pen.” 1 Apr. 1923.
---. “Nature of Spirit.” Apr. 1932.
---. “On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem.” The
Essential Turing. Ed. B.J. Copeland. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
58–90. Print.
---. Programmers’ Handbook for the Manchester Electronic Computer Mark II.
Manchester: University of Manchester, 1944.
---. “Can Automatic Calculating Machines Be Said to Think.” The Essential Turing.
Ed. B.J. Copeland. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 58–90. Print.
Turing, Sara. “Watching the Daisies Grow.” Image. Apr. 1929.
Vernant, Jean Pierre. Myth and Thought Among the Greeks. New York: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1983. Print.
Wendell, Susan. The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability.
New York: Routledge, 2013. Print.
Whitby, Blay. Artificial Intelligence. New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2009.
Print.
Wiener, Norbert. The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society. New
York: Da Capo Press, 1954. Print.
Wilson, Elizabeth A. Affect and Artificial Intelligence. Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2010.
Worsham, Lynn. “Contending with Words: Composition and Rhetoric in a Postmodern
Age.” Contending with Words: Composition and Rhetoric in a Postmodern Age.
Ed. Patricia Harkin and John Schilb. New York: Modern Language Association
of America, 1991. 82–104. Print.

226

